Cinquante ans après

Culture, politique et politiques culturelles

Fifty Years On

Culture, Politics And Cultural Policy

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A 2009 perspective on the aims of 1959

Antoine COMPAGNON

How can I inaugurate this fiftieth anniversary without recalling the words used by André Malraux at the inauguration of his Cultural Affairs mission when his Ministry was first created in 1959? 'The mission of the cultural affairs minister is to render the major works of humanity accessible, and first and foremost in France, to the greatest possible number of French people; to ensure the widest possible audience for our cultural heritage and to promote the creation of works of art and the spirit that enriched them'. Three objectives were thus specified, and in an order that is not without significance. Firstly, there is the sharing of culture among the whole French nation, the popularisation of great French creations and subordinately those of foreign creation; secondly, the spreading throughout France and beyond France of a 'cultural heritage', a new concept, comparing to historic monuments everything that has been judged worthy of preservation from the past (at the time, there was still no talk of 'memory'); thirdly, there was assistance with contemporary creation.

When the Maison de la Culture was inaugurated in Amiens in March, 1966, André Malraux repeated that the aim of these establishments, which were devoted principally to the theatre, coincided with the initial ambition of his ministry, namely, 'to do what needs to be done in order to ensure that every child has access to works of the heritage of humanity'.

It is in the context of these three achievements that the actions of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, subsequently known as Culture, can be appreciated today, half a century later. A few notable and powerful assertions punctuated the affirmation of the mission of the new ministry in 1959: 'major works of humanity', 'cultural heritage', 'works of art and of the mind'. An exalted concept of culture lay behind these words, that of a culture that would not cultivate all works but just the essential works. And there was a strong insistence on the national, French character of the works in question, whose circulation needed to be assured or whose creation needed to be supported. These words remind me of my childhood in Washington in the early1960s, under the aegis of the high culture that is identified with France. I was there for Malraux's visit when he accompanied *The Mona Lisa* in January, 1963 and showed it to John and Jackie Kennedy; I was a devotee, as if at mass, of the annual tours of the Théâtre de France, that Malraux commissioned from Jean-Louis Barrault, at which *Andromachus*, *The Marriage of Figaro* and *The Satin Slipper* were performed.

In fifty years, everything has changed, and first and foremost the very concept of culture, absorbed into the cultural. 'Everything is cultural', as Jack Lang once told the Assemblée Nationale in 1981. In 1959, the word 'culture' in French still had its former Latin meaning, the Ciceronian agricultural metaphor. It was the *cultura animi*, cultivation of the soul, the elevation of the mind in the cultivated man or woman in contact with writing, essentially in book form – popular theatre produced stage versions of the writings – and through meditation on the subject. It was a matter of encouraging the French to individually acquire culture by making it easier for them to gain access to cultural works. A new mission was thus assigned to the administration with respect to society and even to the individual, to state education, individual acculturation, but one that was nevertheless faithful to the classical and humanist concept of *otium studiosum* or studious leisure. Culture, a personal effort, based on retreat from the world and a certain asceticism, contrasted with *negotium*, worldly activity, following a modern and secular variation on the distinction between the active life and the contemplative life. It might be considered that we lived better, more fully, more happily, by rubbing up against works of art and the mind.

Today, one decade into the twenty-first century, the word 'culture' in French has come to mean far more and far more different things. The word is confusing, equivocal, polysemic. Its acceptance in the German sense of *Kultur* has completely disappeared, that which was understood as the mindset of a people or nation, linked to race in the non-biological but rather the historical or mythological meaning of the term, the entrenchment in the people, language and folklore, fairy stories and myths. *Kultur* stood in contrast to civilisation, the French concept of the *Ancien Régime*, an acquired, superficial and artificial distinction. Culture today consists neither of the German *Kultur* nor French civilisation. This ancient dichotomy no longer exists, since the English meaning of the word has gradually imposed

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itself upon us, *culture*, derived from ethnology and sociology, used to designate the range of symbolic values that define a particular group of humans, that which binds men and women into a collective entity. Far from confining itself to heritage or luxury, culture is functional. Every community has its own culture, or even *is* its own culture. Just like groups of human beings, every culture has equal legitimacy, equal dignity, even equal value. The 'major works of humanity' disappear over the horizon, or go with the flow of the clear conscience of universalism.

In fifty years, culture has changed from the French meaning in the Latin sense of culture as *cultura animi* or cultivated culture to the English *multiculturalism*, the subject of the *cultural studies* introduced by Richard Hoggart in Birmingham in 1964 and continued by Stuart Hall, studies – in terms of class, race and gender – of cultural values, the cultural practices of various social groups and sub-groups, especially the dominated groups which are attacked by cultivated culture and whose *cultural rights* must be respected. 'Culture' is what everyone pursues in their leisure time, their BT or RSA. The *otium studiosum* has given way to cultural entertainment.

When did this transition occur in France? Not all at once, but intermittently, since the 1970s, with advances and retreats, and the process has hardly been completed, if at all. Symptomatic of French backwardness is the watchword 'cultural exception' defended by the European Commission in the GATT negotiations in 1993 at French insistence and interpreted by Jacques Delors in the epithet: ''Culture is not a commodity like any other'. The defence of the cultural exception presupposes the idea of a culture of quality, valuably supplementary, gratis or complimentary, to be protected against the cultural industries, deserving exemption from free competition, as opposed to a functional and community culture. During the WTO negotiations in Seattle in1999, the Commission nevertheless substituted for, 'cultural exception', which appeared to be defensive, the requirement for 'cultural diversity', which jibed better with the ambient multiculturalism and the politics of identity; cultural diversity has now become the official doctrine of the European Union, and consequently, that of France.

As an exception to the diversity, the mutation of culture that has occurred in the past thirty years or so, can be summarised as 'democratisation of culture' or even the 'cultural democracy'. Some link this fracture to the switch from the Malraux decade to the Lang decade. This cliché seems to me to be just as approximate as the one maintained by others, of a continuity between the Malraux Mandate and the Lang Mandate. Culture indisputably changed direction between the 1960s and the 1980s, but its metamorphosis may have been due less to the vagaries of national cultural policy than to the laws of the sociological evolution of West. It is a fact that France was not among the avant-garde in recognising cultural diversity and the equal dignity of cultures. In the United States, between 1976 and 1980, under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, certain foundations began financing the cultural practices of minorities in the context of city politics and in order to pacify the ghettos after the riots of the early 1970s. In Great Britain and Germany, in the late 1970s, governed by politicians of opposing colours, Margaret Thatcher on the one hand and Helmut Schmidt on the other, the dominated cultures were already being subsidized, although it is true that it was by local and regional authorities in the absence of a national ministry of culture. Even in France, under Jacques Duhamel, Georges Pompidou's minister from 1971 to 1973, the scales had already been weighted from the popularisation of cultivated culture in favour of the observation of French cultural practices, the attention of the 'the primary cultural life of a country', as Jacques Duhamel put it, embracing design, advertising and the circus, into what has since been dubbed 'cultural development', conducted in collaboration with the local authorities and promised as a hostage to fortune after 1981. The movement was nevertheless suspended by Duhamel's successor, Maurice Druon, in 1973-1974. Consequently the slide into culture for all, within the meaning of the enlightened ideal of human emancipation through major works, into culture by all, within the meaning of the development of minority cultural practices, comes neither from the left nor the right, but is western or even global, and France in 1981 was merely following in its wake, from the time of the first political alternation since 1958. It could even be maintained – at any rate, this is my thesis – that cultivated culture has resisted the trend better in France than elsewhere, and that it remains more respected, due to the existence of a Ministry of Culture, whereas countries that are more decentralized or less nationalized have renounced it more hastily. This is not to diminish the originality of Jack Lang's contribution to the transformation of French cultural practices between 1981 and 1993 – events such as the Fête de la Musique, Journée du Patrimoine, etc. – nor to exonerate him in the face of those who accuse him of having ditched French high culture, but to reposition his action in the context of the widespread tendencies that extend way beyond the French borders. When Jack Lang rewrote the founding decree of the ministry, in 1982, determining as his primary goal that of 'enabling all the French to cultivate their ability to invent and to create, to freely express their talents and receive the artistic training of their choice', he was merely bearing witness to an inflexion that was already well-entrenched among our neighbours, that had no ministry of culture. There has long been no more equation between the right and elitist culture or the left and popular culture. Today, as an excellent illustration of the point we have reached, we have a President of the Republic who is no longer ashamed to claim the political values of the right nor to express his indifference, even his contempt, for cultivated culture. It was on his initiative that the performance by Johnny Hall-

iday was subsidised on the last 14th July but his rantings against *La Princesse de Clèves* have given Madame de la Fayette's novel such unexpected publicity that everyone was reading it at the beach last summer.

The fact remains that the change in the meaning of the word *culture* in current French in the late twentieth century seriously complicated the activities of the ministry in question, torn between practices that were become increasingly ill-assorted, yet all of which were defined as cultural. The new minister had barely left the Villa de Medici, when he was forced to rush to the defence of the rapper Orelsan in one of his first public declarations (*Le Monde*, July 19, 2009). Several of the principles that have lain behind the history of the ministry are currently being called into question, to the point that one of its former office-holders, Jean-Jacques Aillagon, has gone so far as to suggest that the ministry is no longer necessary. We are currently experiencing a moment of uncertainty and even of turbulence; we find ourselves if not faced with a crisis, at least with a turning-point, confronted with several crucial alternatives. Between the casual entertainment industry employees and the Hadopi [anti-piracy] Law, culture is moving in all directions, and the ministry is no longer in charge. Its fixed rates paralyze its action, and the local authorities finance culture just as much as the State. Numerous ambiguities need to be settled. Neutral observer that I am, I should like to indicate a few of them, those that seem to me to be the most urgent. Just to get the discussion going.

The first ambiguity concerns the relationship between culture and education. Malraux had done badly at school and was wary of schooling. He contrasted it with the 'museum of the imagination', i.e. the real presence, direct communion with works of art and of the mind, or with photographs of them. If there is a minimal consensus today concerning the results produced by the ministry in fifty years, it is to note the failure of the first goal that Malraux set himself, 'making the major works of humanity accessible, and firstly those of France, to the greatest number of French people'. The Ministry of Culture has not significantly reduced the cultural inequality in this country. The rejection of artistic education has returned to haunt the Ministry of Culture as its original sin. In order to remedy this situation, an amalgamation of the Ministries of National Education and of Culture was even contemplated in 2007, when François Fillon's government was being formed. Circumstances caused Jack Lang to hold both portfolios in 1992-1993, but there were no plans to merge the two houses. Even in 2007, there was a recoil against what appeared to be a betrayal of a French uniqueness and the crime of contempt committed by Malraux. But room was finally found in school curricula for artistic education in primary school, secondary schools and high schools (lycées), with art history, trips to look at paintings, art practice. Without fearing the word, isn't it time to place art education at the centre of the Ministry of Culture's actions, to review the distribution of roles between Education in the Rue de Grenelle and Culture in the Rue de Valois?

Vacillation also affect the second of the aims of 1959, 'ensuring the widest audience for our cultural heritage', a concept no longer confined to historic monuments, as in Malraux's time when, following a report by André Chastel, included the 'rich legacy of memories' constituting, according to Ernest Renan, the national identity. On the one hand, the fall-out from this inheritance might lead to a rethink in the relationship between the rue de Valois and the Foreign Ministry at the Quai d'Orsay and its cultural relations directorate, which has experienced many metamorphoses and since March, 2009 has found itself mired in a massive general directorate for globalization, development and partnerships (DGM). In 1959, in the tradition instituted under the Third Republic, France's external cultural activities were mainly linguistic and educational, led through various subsidised associations such as the Mission Laïque or the Alliances Françaises, to which were added the Association Française d'Action Artistique (AFAA), which was responsible for the theatre tours of my childhood. This action distanced itself from education to move closer to culture, attributing increasing importance to maintaining contemporary creativity and the increasing visibility of marginal cultures. Between the two world wars, a few of the mandarins at the Sorbonne split the world between them and exercised their aegis over the continents. There were Georges Dumas in Latin America, Paul Pelliot in the Far East, André Siegfried in North America. They tended to confuse French cultural promotion with university policy. Today, it is the crossroads between culture and foreign affairs that lacks direction. One no longer knows where to turn, as evidenced by reading the annual report of the activity of Culturesfrance, the operator to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture have delegated their international cultural exchanges. It's all a bit of a mess.

But that is not the crux of the matter. Far more problematic today is the very idea of a 'cultural heritage', even before thinking of transmitting it. One might agree as to the task involved, which itself is also inherited from the Third Republic and even the July Monarchy – Guizot and Mérimée – the inventorying and preservation of historic monuments. But in heritage, there is also the idea of homeland, nationhood, national identity. Or, in the transition from cultural exception to cultural diversity, from cultivated culture to community culture, the national cultures have lost much of their legitimacy. They are gripped in a pincer movement between global culture, industrial or brandname culture, and local cultures, centrifugal culture or marginal culture, the national culture, apparently one and indivisible, is suspected of having a colonialist, imperialist, universalist and even fundamental outlook. The global world is post-colonial world that favours the periphery over the centre, which thus prefers local to national. And French cul-

ture, which is especially national due to its uninterrupted continuity since the Middle Ages, is particularly targeted in the global world. The mere wish to ensure the 'the widest audience for our cultural heritage' has become unacceptable in a world that judges the concept of a national identity to be arrogant, hegemonious, domineering. In 1982, in order to assuage the sensitivities of the minorities, Jack Lang presented the second objective of his ministry as that of 'preserving the national or regional cultural heritage or that of the various social groups for the common benefit of the entire collective', as well as 'contributing to the transmission of French culture and art in the free dialogue of world cultures'. Nationhood was thus diluted between the local and the global, between social groups and world cultures. Despite this confession of humility, even of repentance, which Jacques Toubon would repeat in 1993 – he reinstated Malraux's 1959 decree, but without controlling the course of events – this, at any event, is how I see it although this is another subject that I will not deal with here – is one of the reasons for the reduced presence of French culture in the world.

Even so, some people – such as Max Gallo – are placing their bets on a return to nationhood, the European construction having reached its limits. Perhaps. The national model represented today as a haven against Europe and globalization is in no way cultural but social. The so-called 'French model', the one that the President of the Republic disavowed before the financial crisis and that he rehabilitated at the Congress of Versailles in June, is a social protection system that has little to do with culture. The doubt is therefore no less profound: how is it possible to still speak of 'cultural heritage', of 'major works', concepts on which the transmission of French culture has relied hitherto?

The first two tensions – museum of the imagination *or* artistic education, national heritage or centrifugal practices – emerged gradually in the course of 1960 or 1970. Today, they impose trade-offs between culture and national education, or between culture and foreign affairs. The fact that these are partly administrative matters does not make the choices any the less essential; if everything in France is cultural, it is also administrative. A third ambiguity from the outset constituted part of the ministry's action, inseparable from its third aim in 1959, that of 'promoting the creation of works of art and of the mind'. The objection has often been made in these terms: wasn't the Ministry of Culture originally mainly a ministry of artists? Too close to cultural intermediaries, subsidising difficult creativity, fraught with conflicts of interest, did it not renounce the acculturation of the masses in order to assist the professionals? In short, did it not draw more of its inspiration from the ideal of the Age of Enlightenment or from the customs of the Ancien Régime, from the dream of *maisons de la culture* or from the reality of philanthropy? Here again, in order to simplify, some believed they detected a deviation from the Malraux decade to the Lang decade, but the conflict between democratisation and culture and the support for creativity, between a policy of demand to the policy of supply, is inherent in the cultural action of the French State. It is the result of the persistence of the monarchy under the Republic, a particularly sensitive fact in matters of culture.

The complaint is so well know that it would appear to be pointless to dwell at length on what an illustrious colleague and friend has dubbed *The Cultural State* (1991). In the free-trade Europe and France of the twenty-first century, pleading for less of an administrative state, one might believe this vacillation to be outdated. Certain signs suggest it, such as the desire, expressed in August, 2007 in the mission letter from the President of the Republic, to his new Minister of Culture, Christine Albanel, to give priority to the expansion of the audiences for the development of the cultural offer. Yet, at the very moment that he was expressing his wishes for the world of culture in January, 2009, Nicolas Sarkozy announced the formation of a Council for Artistic Creation, presided over by himself and by the Minister of Culture: 'By creating a Council for Artistic Creation', he said on that day, 'I wish to renew with you the ancient attachment that has united the Nation and its artistes. Since Charles V and Francis I, the State has fostered creativity and has been the protector of artists.' It is time 'for the reaffirmation of the missions of the state', Christine Albanel reiterated (*Le Monde*, 5 February, 2009). This majestic return to state culture proves that there was a need for the balancing between republican popularisation and monarchic patronage remains current under the sixth president of the Fifth Republic.

The fourth ambivalence in the state's cultural policy that I wanted to mention was also introduced without transition. It exceeds the boundaries of the Ministry of Culture and concerns State promotion in general, which finds itself on all fronts at the crossroads of interventionism and laissez-faire, without having definitely chosen which path to follow. I am most familiar with the case of the universities. They were granted the autonomy to manage their own affairs on the initiative of their own sponsorship, but this was a freedom that some shrewdly defined with the name of 'Jokari', the name of the popular beach-ball game from the Malraux years: the State batted the ball, but the ball was on an elastic string. In order to comply with European standards, the State multiplied the number of so-called independent agencies, but it had the greatest difficulty in cutting the cord and letting them live their lives. Just one example will suffice. In July, at the last minute, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had to waive the announcement of a very complicated regrouping of the French cultural network abroad – institutes, cultural centres, cultural services, etc. – into a new autonomous agency, to be known as the Institut Français, based on the model of the British Coun-

cil, the Goethe Institut and the Institut Cervantès, when faced with the resistance of the French ambassadors and the Quai d'Orsay, who got the Élysée Palace involved (*Le Monde*, 18 July, 2009). In all areas of public activity – the removal of the *juges d'instruction* [examining magistrates] without allowing prosecutors to become independent is another example – the Gordian knot has not been cut. In this case, the state is not willing to give up its cultural policy, not only in the formulation of general principles but in the ordering of detailed activities, which in this case runs counter to general principles.

The desire to get the most out of the state budget for internal and external cultural affairs has been given as the excuse, but can this be taken seriously? The share of big business sponsorship in the financing of culture is even now as high in France as it is in the United States. Despite its best efforts, the Culturesfrance budget remains more than 80% paid for by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and less than 5% comes from sponsorship. It is the financing of culture by individuals that is lacking in France. Philanthropy of this kind is not part of French culture. As long as this form of culture remains unchanged, the plan to get culture off the budget will remain a pious wish. The state itself has not abandoned its own doctrine, as illustrated deliciously in the quarrel that broke out one winter's day last between the Réunion des Musées Nationaux (RMN) and the big Paris museums (the Louvre, the Musée d'Orsay, the Musée Picasso) on how to distribute the exceptionally large profits generated by the 'Picasso and the Masters' exhibition held in the autumn of 2008.

We have stopped on the threshold. We hesitate to cross it, to cross over into a different economics of culture. Reform of the State, the redoubtable General Revision of Public Policy (RGPP), in April, 2008 produced a new flow-chart for the Ministry of Culture. It contains no directorates for the book and for heritage, all that remains of the former *cultura animi*. Enter the DG3, the general directorate for media development and the cultural economy. True, communications have regularly been associated with culture for a good thirty years. There is fear for the traditional tasks of the ministry, inherited from the Secretary of State for the Fine Arts, but the heritage budget was substantially increased in February, 2009 under the relaunch plan (to 100 million euros).

Today, the word 'culture', as remote as it is from cultivated culture, features pre-eminently in French in the ubiquitous expression 'culture of the result', aspiring to apply to every public action the assessment criteria applicable to SMEs. It still needs to be decided whether the effectiveness of state action should be assessed through the number of internet hits for *Bienvenue chez le Ch'tis* or the values of *Les Amours d'Astrée et de Céladon*, the film made for the 'privileged few' by Eric Rohmer. Yet the president of the Republic finds himself able to simultaneously defend the culture of the result and what he himself calls 'culture for culture's sake', disinterestedly, an irrecoverable investment.

Do we have a Ministry of Culture of the Result or a Ministry of Culture for Culture's sake: how better to summarise the dilemma in which we find ourselves? I wanted to give you the point of view of a friendly spectator. While sympathising with public cultural action, I sincerely wish that cultivated culture were popular in this country, that French culture could radiate through the world, that cultural creation could be fruitful. These were the objectives of the ministry fifty years ago. We ought not to wait for a political culture to produce geniuses, but those three essential missions remain just as valid in a world, European and national context even though it has changed radically.

Faced with the ambiguities I have indicated, religion is not created in the top echelons of state. Hence the sniping, the pulling in opposite directions. But should these ambiguities be settled at all? Should we not keep this as they are for as long as we can, the museum of the imagination *and* artistic education, the national cultural heritage *and* elementary cultural life, the development of cultural supply *and* the expansion of the cultural demand, state intervention *and* laissez-faire, the culture of the result *and* culture for culture's sake. Must these remain as alternatives? Let us not hasten to settle the matter. On the contrary, it is up to us to search for compromises. Let this colloquium allow us to progress along this path, it is one of my dearest wishes.

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Cultural policies in European time and space. Models and evolutions

Pierre-Michel MENGER

Defined as a systematic collection of actions and measures taken under ministerial authority and under the aegis of a specialised administration, and associated with local and regional authority action, the cultural policies of numerous democratic European countries are now fifty years old. They are part of the history of the creation of the Welfare State. Comparing various countries' policies reveals few differences between national models when it comes to the broad aims of public action. Variations appear to arise primarily from two factors which are usually foremost in comparatives studies: that of the delegation of choice and action, or the direct exercise of responsibility under ministerial authority and its administration and that of the centralised, decentralised or federal nature of public action.

According to the first criterion, public action differs depending on whether it is implemented by a decision-making political and administrative authority, or whether it is to be dealt with by independent, non-governmental public organisations, as exemplified by the 'arm's length' policy, initially adopted in Great Britain. The 'arm's length' approach values disconnecting the political and administrative level (which determines budgets and the overall scheduling of public cultural action and which, in terms of ministries or ministerial departments, works in line with government action and is answerable to parliament and the electorate), from the management and fund-allocation level which comes under independent public bodies financed by the ministry or department of culture. In practice, this principle has introduced a culture of long-term planning and public action evaluation much earlier than in those countries with a centralised model, who have more recently been converted to new public management methods. It has also led to the combining of public financing and para-governmental resources such as those raised by the UK National Lottery and allocated to a series of "good causes" largely within the domain of arts and culture (this system has served as a source of inspiration throughout Europe). The British 'arm's length' model is les stable than it looks: over the last fifteen years various restructuring exercises have been carried out between non-departmental public bodies and on relationships between the local and national echelons of these non-governmental public bodies. Regularly-debated issues include coping with the administrative costs for these proliferating bodies, inter-organisational co-ordination costs and their ability to take on new public action directives. The Departmental/Non Departmental Public Bodies dichotomy therefore at least has the benefit of finding resolutions for the problems it causes, other than taking the outright reform option.

The centralised model on the other hand, conferring a tutelary role on the state and its administration, seemed efficient in the heyday of public sector voluntarism but fell from grace when the Ministry of Culture's scope for action was hampered by the weight of its own accreted action, the crisis of the welfare state and the model devised during Europe's strongest growth period. However, no algorithm has been invented to precisely evaluate the respective merits of the two systems: usually benchmarking is more an art than a science. In a comparative study of European cultural policies, a Dutch economist and erstwhile culture minister maintains that the combined approach of an 'arm's length' policy with ultimate ministerial decision-making power was superior to the straightforward 'arm's length' approach espoused in Britain, and preferable to the state-led French and Italian models[1].

The reality of public action is much more diverse and hybrid than the classification models imply. Delegation of decisions certainly does occur in French cultural policy-making. Moreover, the combined approach is not hybridised in the same way throughout the Netherlands and Northern Europe: Denmark is moving towards an Anglo-Saxon model since adopting its new economic philosophy of culture as a source of growth, whilst Finland remains strongly attached to public management as strictly controlled through central political decision-making. The 'arm's length' principle has even been gradually undermined in Great Britain itself, as its government has made culture a prominent part of public action, citing in particular the considerable economic potential of the 'creative industries'.

1. Frederick van der Ploeg, "The Making of Cultural Policy: A European Perspective", in Victor Ginsburgh, David Throsby (eds), *Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture*, Amsterdam, North Holland, 2006, chap. 34.

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The second differentiating criterion for cultural policy models concerns the degree of centralisation, decentralisation or federal organisation of public action. It is quite rare in Europe for countries to have a federal political system and parallel arrangements for cultural policy, (principally Germany, Austria, Belgium and Switzerland): in these countries, it is the *Länder*, the cantons, and the linguistic communities that have ostensibly been the prime movers, when culture has become a matter for public action. In contrast with the historical bases for federal democracy in Switzerland or Belgium, largely prompted by linguistic considerations, the cultural federalism of Germany and Switzerland was born of a constitutional reaction to the centralising totalitarianism of the Nazi state. The respective contributions of state, *Länder* and municipalities are identical in Germany and Switzerland, with only one seventh of public cultural resources coming from the federal state, whereas in Austria the state involvement (one third of financing by the federal state) is more direct, despite having diminished since 2000. The set-up in Spain looks somewhat like federalism due to the sweeping extent of regional autonomy since the end of the Franco government.

The profile of other European countries, with their varying degrees of centralisation or decentralisation of public action, is more complex. If we consult the comparative table of national profiles drawn up by the Council of Europe in its cultural policy *Compendium*, we can see:

– the communist legacy of centralisation in Eastern European countries, with a few countries breaking away from this trend with tentative steps towards decentralisation (Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia, Ukraine)
– the centralisation of Southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal whose cultural policies represent their break with past dictatorial regimes, but which can only be initially deployed at the behest of the state, and under the budgetary constraints of an economic growth rate below the European average The evolution of public action is especially noticeable in Portugal, whose cultural expenditure structure changed radically in the 1990s. In 1994, central and local expenditure were still identical, but ten years on, the boom in local cultural activity has made an impact: local authorities provide three quarters of public finance for culture;
– the progressive centralisation of countries which typify one of the cultural policy models, which makes the production of culture and access to cultural goods and services central elements of social protection and the freedom of the individual within the welfare state. France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland all devised their public cultural action model half a century ago. The drive for decentralisation emerged as a developmental stage of public action, but was initiated at the behest of the state and as part of a state designed to manage the structuring of priorities and ensure the equity of welfarism. Public action in Finland is governed by a highly bureaucratic culture, making local authority action highly dependent upon central initiatives. In the late 1960s, the Netherlands made decentralisation work to drive the growth of public action, but, as in France, the division of financial commitments and responsibilities was subject to a series of extremely meticulous negotiations. The Nordic belief in the welfare state pushed Denmark and Sweden towards a centralising model for scheduling and coordinating public action which relied upon the guidance of independent advisors and agencies to both direct public action and to ensure the independence of decision-making and implementation. The decentralisation of Italian cultural policy started with the creation of the regions in 1972 and the strong involvement of the most prosperous Northern Italian regions in active cultural policies, but remains inequitable due to the considerable north/south developmental divide and the considerable weight of expenses devoted to maintaining the country's artistic, architectural and archaeological heritage.

Recent data on the relative proportion of local and central expenditure on public cultural action gives a good snapshot of individual profiles, but reveals nothing of the changing philosophy behind public action, as decentralisation or territorialized public action are prioritised across the board.

The two hitherto-cited criteria differentiating public action only make sense when viewed as part of an overall process of cultural policy evolution. For half a century now, cultural policies in European democracies have developed along broadly similar lines. I shall use the differentiating criteria in the organisation and territorialisation of public action to throw into relief differences in the typical progression of welfare state cultural policies. I shall define four distinct phases, examining the significance of any changes or reorientations involved in each successive phase. A temporal comparison will also allow me to demonstrate how justifications for public action evolve in response to social, political, economic and technological changes in the cultural activity environment, and at each stage to question anew the utility of public intervention in sectors which are dominated, for the most spectacular part of their development and their hold over private consumption, by the cultural industries and by the destructive and creative powers of their innovations. From a democratisable culture to a socially and economically sustainable culture, the chosen route seems to change its fundamental aims considerably. However this lecture must be completed, as I shall conclude: contrary to common belief, inertia in public action is stronger than any paradigm shifts.

The Four Phases of Cultural Policy over the Last Fifty Years

In viewing the phases of public cultural action as a series of phases in the various European countries, a meticulous historical and comparative approach is required to avoid lapsing into caricature. It is a tricky exercise and could easily go beyond the bounds of this study. I can only refer to the details of the documentation and works which I have consulted for this talk[2]. The general evolutionary trend which I will expound upon shows four distinct phases: 1) the creation of a systematic cultural supply policy based on a limited definition of culture suitable for public financing and based on a vertical concept of democratisation by conversion.

2) the gradual decentralisation of public action, which leads to an increasing disparity in its aims and functions, and which challenges the initial universalist and unanimist model; 3) a revision of the legitimate scope of public action, which declares symbolically obsolete the founding hierarchy of cultural politics, that which would oppose erudite culture, protected from market forces and entertainment culture and governed by the laws of the industrial economy; 4) an increasing tendency to justify cultural policy on the basis of its contribution to economic growth and to the balance of national social diversity, which legitimises the regulatory power of public action as well encouraging the expansion of the "creative industries" and the demands for the evaluation of procedures and results.

The Initial Model: Excellence in the Arts – the Virtues of Democratisation

At the point at which culture entered the welfare states' agenda in the 1950s, states initially introduced public finance systems to organise and increase previously sporadic and compartmentalised activities relating to museums and major arts performance venues (opera, theatres, etc) However a simple and resolute doctrine quickly formed the basis of public action. It consisted of two objectives: protecting and developing cultural activity, and providing citizens with equal access to it.

The cultural provision policy was initially circumscribed, its definition of culture was homogenous, associated with erudite culture, with its hierarchies and classifications and its selective renewal and settling principles. Culture symbolised a national identity whilst also claiming to embody universal values. How are we to view this claim to universality other than as an abstract concept? The argument goes as follows: within all art there are a series of works from the past which are (or deserve to be) the subject of admiration which is both unanimous (within national boundaries) and universal (as ranked internationally). The excellence of such past production was consecrated by erudite opinion and ratified by its entry into museums and repertoire. In the mid-20th century, the valuation of such works was no longer based on easily-definable and legitimised aesthetic canons but on a turbulent history of evaluations. Admired and sanctioned works come from periods in history in which originality and new aesthetics were defined on a very broad basis and in which the structure of artistic life was successively dominated by corporations, royal, aristocratic or religious patronage, and, since the start of the 19th century, by market forces. Competition for the attribution of value to works and for public recognition of their authors has always followed the same trajectory: uncertainty as to quality and originality encourages a varied output and the coexistence of an infinitely varied range of artists. This system of ruthlessly selective hierarchical rankings and classifications results from a multitude of differently-argued appraisals and decisions, which are controversial, revisable and subject to trend-driven re-evaluation and devaluation. At the point when public cultural policies were expanding in the 1950s, the publicly-recognised values of heritage works with varying degrees of popularity had in some way to be stripped of the contextual conditions of their financing and selection so that erudite culture's greatest works could be treated as unanimously-admired public goods.

Throughout the 1930s, debate on the admirable universality of erudite culture raged amongst the massed ranks of those most hostile to bourgeois democracy and market capitalism, but was divided. Faced with critics who wanted to shatter the argument for the autonomy or relative autonomy of the artistic world within the social arena, the principle of universally-judged artistic merit won out. This same debate led the artistic and cultural value of products from the cultural industry to be challenged, as their production was likened to the strictly commercial manufacture

2. I have drawn on the following: Xavier Greffe, Sylvie Pflieger, *La politique culturelle en France*, Paris, La Documentation française, 2009; Jim McGuigan, *Rethinking Cultural Policy*, Maidenhead, Open University Press, 2004; Philippe Poirrier, *L'Etat et la culture en France au 20ème siècle*, Paris, Le Livre de Poche, 2000; Jacques Rigaud, *Les deniers du rêve: essai sur l'avenir des politiques culturelles*, Paris, Grasset, 2001; Andrew Ross, *Nice Work If You Can Get It*, New York, New York University Press, 2009; Maryvonne de Saint-Pulgent, *Culture et Communication. Les missions d'un grand ministère*, Paris, Gallimard, 2009; Dominique Schnapper, La démocratie providentielle, Paris, Gallimard, 2002; David Throsby, *Economics and Culture*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Philippe Urfalino, *L'invention de la politique culturelle*, Paris, Hachette, 2004; *The Economy of Culture in Europe*, Rapport pour la Commission Européenne Bruxelles, 2006; *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe*, Strasbourg, Conseil de l'Europe & Ericarts, 2009. I was also able to consult a collection of monographs collected for a forthcoming publication by Philippe Poirrier, *La culture comme politique publique. Essais d'histoire comparée*.

of alienating opiates. The arena of public cultural action was therefore defined in opposition to the arena of cultural industries and the entertainment culture, dominated by market forces. However, a history of the arts might also show that the market had moved artistic innovation away from the academic arena and its state protection and into the plastic arts. Literature and cinema were moving into the marketplace and in accordance with economic principles by which innovation finds its niche.

In democratic nations in the post-war period, in newly democratised countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, and in post-communist Eastern Europe, the invention of cultural policy as we understand it today presupposed an anti-institutional approach to supporting artistic creation[3]. This approach made its way into all public action models. In the 'arm's length' model, based on delegation to independent bodies, it was the composition and decision-making procedures of expert committees which were responsible for asserting the principle of representing the diversity of artistic communities under the remit of public action. In the model based on the direct political exercise of decision-making power, with or without expert guidance, it is the disputability of choices which has gradually embodied the legitimate principle of anti-institutional criticism and which has always overshadowed centralising public action.

What does an anti-institutional model for supporting creativity signify? The public decision-making authority (whether ministry, administrative office, independent council, etc) had to learn to dissociate their support from the majority view (or that perceived as such) of opinions on aesthetic matters. In other words, whilst the universality of aesthetic values which is the basis for treating works as public goods is based on the expected support of the entire community, support for creators has also had to treat as legitimate any distance or mistrust which might separate creators from their potential public. The impetus that transforms creations of uncertain value, whether controversial or not, into constituent elements of public heritage lends a particular tension to cultural policy. With the passage of time, the history of the arts looks more settled and citizens benefit from the guarantees offered by the convergence of opinion. At close range (contemporaneously with creation) citizens are exposed to the infinite variety of artistic creations in existence: they must admit that public action is affected by a strong degree of uncertainty and that the vast array of artists to support, either directly or indirectly, must reflect, at the reduced scale imposed by minimal budgetary resources, the surfeit of artistic works available at any one time. However it is hard to avoid the contradiction here: the allocation of public aid can directly affect an artist's reputation, if such support seems like an endorsement of the value of the recipient artists or organisations and if they quickly trigger a process of cumulative benefit.

Fundamental public action was overall more certain of its values than its procedures. Neither Keynes, the founder and first Chairman of the British Arts Council, nor French statesman Malraux doubted that the guiding principles of public action should be excellence and the widest possible democratic participation in frequenting works of the greatest artistic ingenuity. The situation was the same in the German *Länder* and Northern European democracies when, thanks to economic growth, cultural politics began to figure as a priority for welfare states.

How did the policy of supply affect demand behaviour? In Northern Europe, there was no doubt about the aim: the social stratification of tastes and preferences, which creates huge class divisions, could be curtailed. This is the 'escalator' model of slow ascent: social groups are situated in different markets, depending on their budgetary and educational means, but when growth is strong and its fruits efficiently distributed, the stairway elevates everyone. What is available to the upper classes at point t, will, at point t+1 be accessible to those lower down the social scale. The widespread application of Engel's Law should ensure this dynamic. Improvements in a society's overall quality of life and education standards favour such demand, and make it possible to predict future consumption: once basic needs are covered (food, housing, transport, health) a disproportionately higher amount of expenditure is then directed towards secondary or higher requirements such as leisure and culture, spatial mobility, personal care, domestic services etc. The machinery of the welfare state promotes culture as a fundamental right and an essential part of personal and collective growth, ranking it alongside other rights such as education, health and social security. France and Great Britain's philosophy relied more on the ripple effect of territorial dissemination through supply on demand, according to the principle of aesthetic shock and conversion to the benefits of erudite culture.

Ambitions for this supply scenario based on ripple effect were challenged as public action was deployed. French and English cultural militants and sociologists pointed out the profound inequalities in cultural consumption and questioned the virtues of a supply-based policy. Among the determining factors for consumption, relative proximity to facilities was relatively low down on the list of explanatory factors. However now that the current provision of facilities, organisations, festivals and cultural events is so spectacularly abundant in most European countries it makes the question of the failure of the supply policy seem like more than the mere mantra of widespread and depressing disappointment.

3. On this point I refer readers to the now classic work by Philippe Urfalino, *L'invention de la politique culturelle*, Paris, Hachette, 2004.

On the one hand there are genuine differences between countries. These differences relate to the significance of those popular education traditions that help shape the concept of cultural transmission (in Northern Europe), or to the importance of amateur practices and artistic education, which distinguishes the British or German idea of cultural action from that prevalent in France, where the ministry's action plan broke with amateur practices and community adult education networks. On the other hand it is too simplistic to measure the efficiency or even the inefficiency of all public investments by the yardstick of abstract egalitarian coefficients of social diversity. The supply policy has been effective, but within a much more limited social field than that of its systematic universalism and unrealistic voluntarist philosophy.

Drawing on existing European literature on public cultural policies and other available data, it is possible summarise the issue of the public action efficiency in three points:

– there are winning sectors, which vouch for the success of public action: when looking at cultural outings, heritage-related activities rank highest. The culture-consuming public is now greater, and comes from more socially and geographically diverse backgrounds. Without heritage, there would be no cultural tourism, something which has considerable economic importance. This seems particularly to be the case for Southern European countries, whose cultural heritage is considerable;
– there are trends within practices, with some starting off positively then recently falling off: reading practices and literacy levels have long distinguished the Northern European countries, where adult education and the network of public libraries have historically been the key to local and central cultural policy. The recent change in reading practice (defined, admittedly, in the traditional sense of reading books) is a result of the growing competition from the growing range of digital technologies;
– finally, there are sectors in which supply has far outstripped demand: this is the case for theatre and other such live entertainment. These sectors embody one of the historical origins of public cultural policy throughout Europe, and remain central to them. However, these sectors have continued to remain restricted, both in terms of the size and social diversity of their public. The erudite music of classical concerts and opera remains particularly symbolic of the voluntarism which is always necessary, always reasserted and always disappointed. To some extent this typifies all public action-related dilemmas Music is an erudite art par excellence, an esoteric art which, at its highest point, represents a level of specialisation and a mastery of knowledge and skills which only a long and precocious education and practice can bring; it is also however an art which, under certain circumstances (festivals, high profile concerts, productions of famous operas, etc) can act as a big draw for audiences other than the music-loving bourgeoisie, and which can often act as a powerful political and social symbol. Erudite music remains the most potent symbol of the intrinsic limits of the aim of democratisation whilst remaining the darling of public policies: no other artistic sector has recourse to such levels of subsidy, nor have they benefited from such lessons as the work of US economists Baumol and Bowen presents for the public authorities, in their exposition of the 'cost disease' in live performance, providing proof of the necessity and legitimacy of public subsidy.

Decentralisation and Decentration

A supply-centred policy involves local authorities in Northern Europe and in federally-governed countries, earlier and more dynamically than those in Southern Europe. However, by taking into account issues of territorial balance and spatial equity, the hierarchical and universalist philosophy of public action has gradually been undermined. The involvement of local players fairly quickly prompted the question of the definition of culture to be supported.

The centralising model aimed to encourage interactive initiatives between cultural supply and demand which originated in major urban areas. However there are three main characteristics of the major urban areas which mask what has become obvious through surveys into inequalities in cultural consumption. On the one these urban areas, and the capitals of traditionally centralised countries in particular, see the highest concentration of artists and professionals from the world of art, and the most costly cultural organisations and those also the most accountable for the national prestige of cultural excellence. On the other hand, inner city populations have a higher-than-average proportion of upper social classes: these are the categories which feed into the herds of visitors, those whose consumption is both significant, addictive and focused on contemporary creation[4].

4. In reality, the concentration of artists and culture-lovers follow the critical mass theory: if we look at the supply and demand of culture in relation to town size, we can see that the number of artists, diversity of available culture and volumes of erudite culture increases disproportionately to the size of the overall urban population. In other words, erudite culture requires a critical mass of art consumers to develop more quickly in a town and to benefit more easily from the leveraging effect of public support. This mechanism relates to what is called the agglomeration economy: the quantity and variety of works are higher where the concentration of players facilitates interaction, the exchange of information and ideas and the mobilisation of human and financial resources required for project-based production. This argument is now more relevant than ever as art and culture are now seen as major contributors to the innovation and creativity economy.

The welfare state and its cultural administration were certainly well equipped to disseminate the universalist and unanimist principles of their philosophy at local level and to persuade the local authorities to adopt a rational catalogue of cultural facilities such as libraries, museums, live entertainment venues, art and music schools, theatre companies, symphony orchestras, opera houses, etc. In this form of decentralisation, the unique nature of local action is perhaps down to the speed at which a coherent range of cultural facilities and initiatives are put together: here, as a straightforward scheduling process, it is assumed that the catalogue of artistic facilities and initiatives is modular and can be broken down into those components which meet local needs, but that it will be designed such that cultural life can only reach its local potential when the catalogue is amply provisioned across the board. Under this system, the spatial distribution of cultural goods and services was bound to fall short of the welfare state's egalitarian ambitions.

Public action aimed to fulfil an increasingly diverse range of objectives. The decentralisation of cultural policies which took place in the 1960s gave rise to three issues: the distribution of skills at different levels of public action; the local authorities' increasingly broad definition of culture as they advocate a more anthropological definition of cultural identity and an increasingly diverse approach to promoting demand through a policy of cultural mediation and organisation.

In short, as territorial action progresses, the issues involved change: the public action agenda should make allowances for the growing tension between universalist principles and specific demands: how is the principle of excellence in artistic valued to be adjusted locally and, more generally, on what criteria should local cultural action be assessed? Moreover, who has the necessary expertise to establish supra-local cultural action criteria, or, conversely, to defend a particularist view of available goods and services, to disengage it from the vertical hierarchy of values? Relationships between artists and local powers bring to the fore conflicts of interest between artists with a local career and reputation, often on the periphery of professionalism, and artists with a national or international career, who are somewhat seduced by a local and ongoing place for their work. The negotiations that have to be conducted by local representatives cause dilemmas: to what extent should one stray from the objective of excellence to define other criteria for public support which are not solely about the artistic merits of projects and teams? And on what expert basis should public policy issues be reoriented towards what is more locally relevant?

The resulting controversies stem from conflicts over legitimacy between various levels of government and the inequality of central bureaucratic and local authority powers. Where federalist models of political organisation prevail, controversies remain at local level without recourse to a central arbitration body. In those countries with a strong centralising administrative tradition such as France, Italy and Finland, complex co-financing and co-decision-making systems tend to favour the central segment and universalist professionals. However when supply-based policies reach their limits, it can also lead to a range of voluntarist measures being introduced: a socio-cultural policy of organisation and mediation starts to differentiate the aims of democratisation, identifying and classifying priority recipients of public action and experimentally linking cultural policy to education and urban policy. Thus the chasm of cultural relativism slowly yawns: in the face of the hierarchical classification of arts legitimately deserving of public support and the glacial speed of changing individual cultural tastes in response to newly accessible works, radical proponents of a cultural policy counter-model propose instead a re-evaluation of popular culture, or more radically still, suggest treating cultural action like an exercise in political mobilisation, with its roots in community initiatives and with the theatre remaining its predominant form of expression. Militant and political cultural undertakings aimed at transforming a culture in the process of de-alienation need to challenge the exclusive admiration for the fine arts and their creators, the cult of which makes all non-erudite culture devoid of meaning, as well as curbing the disordered impulsivity of inconsequential experimentation. One of the magic formulae was hit upon in mid 1970s France, with the call for public creativity, where creativity meets action. [5].

And what about Northern Europe? Denmark created a Ministry of Culture in 1961. Here, support for the arts, in the limited definition of culture, was at once grounds for opposing the populism of those parties hostile to public support. However, this argument was overturned when the stated aim of reducing the social inequalities endemic in erudite culture attendance started to look more like a regulating principle than a realistic mission, with tangible results foreseeable in the medium term at best. Towards the late 1960s, a public report helped to trigger a change of direction towards a pluralist view of culture, working in harmony with local authority involvement. The irony of the history of cultural policy under the social democrats became clear in Denmark, just as it did in Great Britain at the end of the Labour party era. Support for the arts can be understood and supported as something other than a project which showcases and gives access to the jewels of unequal, aristocratic or bourgeois societies, on condition that access to

5. Published fifteen years after the Ministry of Culture's inception, Jacques Rigaud's book *La culture pour vivre* (Paris, Gallimard, 1975) is an invaluable reference work detailing the ways in which cultural policy thinking evolved over this period.

culture has the same individual and collective virtues as access to education. Once a pluralist approach to culture is adopted, the trap of default egalitarianism is set: the equal dignity of individual arts, cultures and practices only makes egalitarian progress in a society in which the knowledge, practice and production of erudite culture are no longer the product of a particular social class. In reality, funding structures will invariably remain less pluralistic than the schemes' rhetoric or paradigm shifts.

The British 'arm's length' model is a completely different way of organising public action, but with just the same conflicting objectives. From its inception, and under Keynes' leadership, the Arts Council stood for the civilising influence of the arts, making the public support of artistic excellence its main aim, and saw the regions as proving grounds for this model, whilst prioritising the concentration of resources on London's finest cultural institutions. However, in the 1960s a huge regionalisation movement started to gather momentum. Involvement in cultural policy became the subject of open conflict. On the one hand, Arts Council resources tripled between 1964 and 1970; on the other, a network of twelve Regional Arts Councils was set up, with the primary aim of supporting the applied arts, socio-cultural initiatives and amateur group activities. Reconciling both missions, i.e. supporting excellence in the arts and facilitating access to them, should have been made easier by increasing the funding of them. However cultural policy tends to encompass a wide range of objectives, with the theatre sector being a good case in point. The major theatrical institutions certainly attract the majority of resources, under the continuing policy of excellence, but the financing of a growing number of community-based, alternative or militant theatre groups illustrates one of the effects of the territorial dissemination of culture and the involvement of a group of local actors and decision-makers (elected representatives, associations, artists, etc) whose aims are at odds with that of a consensual and unanimist democratisation process. The expansion of public cultural action feeds its differentiation and contestability: the question quickly arises as to whether there can only be one single, immutable definition of culture governing cultural action in the regions or whether, at grass roots level, the 'top down' public action model ought not to be changed for a 'bottom up' policy The relativist critique of seeing culture simply in terms of erudite culture does not just lead to a call to redefine culture and expand the range of artistic expressions and professional communities eligible for public support, but it introduces the politicisation of artistic expression as the means to bring about cultural democracy.

Open borders: Cultural Policy, the Free Market, the Economy and the end of Monopolies

Public action has become a victim of its own success. On the one hand, the current trend is towards differentiation of action, more direct support to artistic modernity, more systematic policies to support the most experimental creativity and innovation, whilst at the same time increasing initiatives dedicated to preserving and renovating artistic and cultural heritage and its sanctums (there is nothing that proclaims the grand ambitions of a cultural policy more clearly the creation of new museums). On the other hand, the multi-faceted notion of culture is starting to become enshrined in the geographical differentiation of public action. However, the expansion of interested parties, of groups, communities, forms of art and culture only adds to the need for democratisation, which is dependent on hierarchical differentiation. This is due to the fact that, in relation to the main pillars of cultural policy, there are few instances of direct substitution of one priority for another and from one spending plan and budgetary commitment for another. The basic trend is one of addition rather than substitution. Consequently, in the mid-70s when the first oil crisis led to an economic crisis which restricted the welfare state model to low levels of economic growth, culture, seen as a civilising force, could no longer remain utilitarian and outside the boundaries of market forces. Social and welfare democracy had created an opening for the deconstruction of hierarchies within the arts. The cultural industries went through a period of formidable development, above all in Europe, around the time when the first large-scale systematic programmes of public finance for culture were implemented. How could it be that consumption of culture was so strong in the commercial sector and yet so clearly inequitable and non-progressive in the public sector? How could the intrinsic value of the traditional arts be allowed to deflate in such a symbolic fashion? What justifications were there to stop this collapse in their value being followed by budgetary deflation?

In Europe, the 1980s were characterized by the divergence of choice in public spending and a proliferation of doctrines in regard to public action on culture. Local and regional authorities were involved and became key players with central government often being taken out of the equation. The development of the cultural welfare state in Northern Europe was also abruptly curtailed, owing to the sharp increase in welfare payments during a time of rising unemployment In the UK, the budget for the Arts Council went up by just 0.6% (in real terms) during the 1980s even though towns doubled their spending levels in the area. The utility of culture and of public action took on a new form. The economic and industrial valuation of cultural production, the impact on local development and urban regeneration, the development of corporate sponsorship and the diversification of resources which cultural organisations became joined up with through the 'matching funding' principle were the guiding ideologies that Thatcher's Conservative government imposed on the Keynesian philosophy of the Arts Council.

This served to create a critical and defensive spiral towards a practical economic rationality to guide public action on culture. Financial constraints brought about changes in public management. Cultural policy had been developed on the basis of opposition to market forces in order to protect sectors which had become structurally incapable of funding themselves and in order to try and boost demand by increasing the value for money. However, a subsidised economy is also prone to weaknesses such as the sedimentation of subsidies and the perpetual awarding of grants to favoured sector 'insiders', the unrealistic approach to quality mirroring professional aspirations, and the unreliability of evaluation initiatives which are run according to poorly-defined or impossible aims. The need for accountability in British cultural policy brought about a reduction in the opposition between public spending and free-market strategy, at a time when public spending on culture had stagnated in real terms. The key founding idea of the great cultural policy championed in humanist and universalist philosophy was the expansion of the welfare state. When the welfare state accountability is brought into question, and the level of public action remains constant, there is a change of focus towards performance-based contracts, with the focus on diversification of resources and cost reductions in cultural establishments, with competition being encouraged based on the criterion of excellence.

In France, the coming together of cultural policy and economic rationality took on an opposite profile, going on the offensive. In doubling the budget between 1982-1982, the then Culture Minister Jack Lang did the exact opposite: a unique situation in Europe in the 1980s. The surplus in the budget strengthened the additive nature of public action over substitution. The aim of growing interventions to support traditional arts and heritage was maintained, to the extent that there was increasingly centralised expenditure by the Ministry of Culture on Paris and its surrounding area, with unprecedented support of large scale architectural and heritage works, at a time when the prevailing trend was supposedly for de-centralisation. At the same time, paradoxically, at the end of the 1960s it was on the basis of French cultural policy that relativist English *cultural studies*-inspired critics, and critics springing up throughout Europe, drew the most strident conclusions on bourgeois culture and its dependence on public action. The examination of cultural industries and the denaturing of creative activity (whether within erudite or popular culture) through its commercialisation were themes in the Marxist critique of cultural capitalism. The cultural industries have given rise to numerous musical innovations (the birth of pop and rock music) since the end of the 1950s, and these effervescent adolescent sub-cultures were epitomized by values of cultural, critical, hedonistic and anti-establishment liberalism, in stark contrast to what was denounced as bourgeois culture, transmitted in a quasi-hereditary manner. Within plastic arts, those at the forefront were drawing on catalysts for innovation from much more than just the inherited formulae of abstraction. For example, they allowed themselves to indulge in an ironic critique of mass-produced products or the art market, being able to mix with their subject close enough to give value to that which they were nevertheless denouncing.

The Ministry of Culture's scope grew beyond and in an opposite direction to its original domain, into the production of the cultural industries and the deployment of artistic forms into markets of mass consumption which would maintain their success and pace of innovation. Public action, accused of failing to become more democratic, understood that its context was changing.

Public action is not prone to massive redirections of spending towards the domains of organised cultural production in accordance with free-market competition. It is symbolic, but also and above all regulated and regulatory. The example which is valid across the whole of Europe is the political and economic fate of the audiovisual industry. The monopoly of public control over television came to an end over a serious of dates spread out over nearly a thirty year period. Italy lead the way in authorising the creation of private channels in 1976, before the UK, and, over the following decade, many other European countries followed suit. However, continued public sector dominance remained the cornerstone of public action in Northern Europe, for example in Austria, the Republic of Ireland and Switzerland, for a lot longer than in other countries. The huge growth in supply which followed had a significant effect on people's spending and free-time habits. In all national statistics, the proportion of households' time and money spent on television rose continually until the start of this century, when it started to face the challenge of the digital networks. It remains striking how strongly correlated the increase in television viewing is to the decrease in cultural activity.

The television production and broadcast industry has long been considered the desired domain of effective and healthy competition between two systems of cultural production, public and private, and as the medium for a true test of the viability of a public sector cultural production industry, set within the context of ever-increasing supply and continuous technological advancements. The terms and conditions for public service channels were largely based on cultural policy guidelines, while the provision of public services retained a dominant position, and a healthy balance of television services was seen as playing a role in helping to achieve the objective of cultural democratisation. The exponential growth of the supply of television programmes and the increase in formats through which services could be offered as a result of digital networks changed the situation. Wherever dual provision (public and private) was set up and developed, it became a lot more uncertain to marry a "demanding" (or balanced) provision of public service

television with a popular and unbalanced market supply when the wave of programmes can be broken down and reconstituted at will by consumers in keeping with their immediate preferences

Public action has though shown itself to be effective when it developed a regulatory mechanism of contracting and control by independent authorities, which set a framework for the expansion of the audiovisual industry through maintaining or promoting political, religious, cultural and linguistic diversity. This was done to make the television industry financially dependent on the film industry, whose production and heritage it could exploit, by setting quotas to protect national production in a market dominated by the American industry.

Furthermore, economic justification for cultural policies has replaced disillusioned thinking on the limits of desire for democracy with a voluntarist argument. The call for the social and economic benefits of culture, which have been visible since the 1970s in the behaviour of villages and towns, consecrated the evolution: local cultural policies could not be legitimised in the same way as national policies. It is on a local level that cultural policy overtly resembles a social policy, an urban policy, a policy for economic development or education. Debate on the economic impact of investment in the culture sector is better received where there is greatest local authority commitment. On this point, France and the UK are in agreement. The impact of cultural action on the economic development of towns, on employment levels, on the tourism industry, gradually makes public expenditure into a measurable investment.

It was essentially in the 1980s that the first means of measuring cultural policy were devised. Evaluating and measuring the effects of cultural policy is too big a subject for me to explore here. I will merely state that the efforts to do so have taken differing approaches: analysis of the economic impact of culture and the support to its provision, study of the effects of local spending, the application of tools for public policy evaluation and expenditure rationalisation to culture, and the international evaluation of national public policies as instigated by the Council of Europe. As the ways of measuring impact developed, so did the disagreements over the neo-liberal capitalisation of culture as well as the downward spiral of public action, in regard to the lack of relevancy or even the poor performance of cultural policies in areas where they had aspired to create wealth, reduce inequality and bring about social cohesion, tolerance and good democratic practices.

At the other extreme of territorialized public cultural action is the protection and promotion of national cultural industries in the international economic and commercial marketplace. This is the third dimension of the economisation of cultural policies. Here, what initially appears to be merely the result of French protectionism battling the dominance of the American film industry, has gone on to provide the platform for a new repertoire for the justification of public action, namely cultural diversity and sustainable cultural development[6]. One of the strands of the economic justification for public action support and regulation thus emerges: the recognition of the major international challenges for public intervention in the culture sector and the battle for the re-legitimisation of the action of international bodies such as UNESCO.

The shift in focus of this argument towards the issues of power and the economy within culture owes a great deal to the role played by cinema in the symbolic reclassification of the cultural industries. In the majority of countries which have implemented culture policies, cinema occupies an important position. The management of cinematic heritage is subject to specific requirements. It is an industrial art recognised as a fine art. But its success reveals two facets of the changes in the cultural industries market.: The number of people who go to the cinema plummets when television audiences grow by large numbers and national film-making, which enjoyed a golden age in terms of production and aesthetics in the post-war period, has, wherever competition is subject to free-market forces, been progressively overtaken by Hollywood. Here, public action was tested on a truly huge scale. In countries where original self-financing mechanisms had been set up, e.g. France, production and consumption fared much better than in those countries without such mechanisms, to the extent that they offered protection for European film-makers and producers for many years through co-production. The example of cinema shows a new regulatory function of public intervention in the industrial culture markets (music, literature and television are equally protected in France) which has continually shown its worth in this way since the 1980s. This regulatory function provided yet another national justification for a grass-roots culture policy based firmly on international competition, as highlighted by the position adopted by France in the GATT negotiations (and by Jack Lang's famous speech in Mexico in 1982). Rather than appearing to be an outdated protectionist measure, public regulation legitimately necessitated a balance in cultural diversity, at a time of considerable growth in trade and deregulation in what had become the dominant sector, namely the audiovisual industry

6. The work of David Throsby has led the way in the idea of culture being a factor of sustainable development. See his forthcoming *Economics of Cultural Policy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Cultural Policy, Industrial Policy and the Knowledge Society: from the Cultural Industries to the Creative Industries

As the social and economic justification for public cultural action has been through a series of adjustments, the very definition of culture itself has changed. We are familiar with the distinction between a limited definition of culture, based initially on the erudite arts, then incorporating all of the erudite arts and their popular forms (in music, literature, dance, etc.), and an anthropological, relativistic definition which comes from a long tradition of an expressive view of culture[7]. These two different views are more complementary than contrasting, rather like a light source and its halo. On the other hand, bringing the cultural industries into the sphere of public policy moves it in another direction entirely, making a more far-reaching ideological revision, after all the legal proceedings against the cultural industries and the reduction of art to the status of mere merchandise. The Nordic countries, which firmly espouse a thoroughgoing philosophy of decommodification public goods and social entitlements, have not been so keen to extend their cultural policy to the cultural industries as those who support either the regulatory position of public intervention in the cultural goods trade or the liberal philosophy of encouraging the development of the cultural market.

The situation evolved rapidly when the flag was flown for the creative industries. Cultural policies in most European countries have adopted this requalification of one part or even, as in the United Kingdom, the entirety of their field of intervention. The movement started in Australia under the left-wing Keating government, which promoted the idea of a 'creative nation' in the early 1990s. This revamped cultural policy had two main objectives: to work towards the complete recognition of multiculturalism and to promote the creative industries, whilst moving towards the information and communication technologies sector's industrial policy.

In Europe, this doctrine was revised and implemented by Tony Blair's government from 1997 onwards. When devising a cultural policy, ever since the 1980s this has also involved a redefinition of one's scope. The policy implemented in the UK distinguishes between two areas of intervention, namely heritage and the creative industries; these include architecture, music, live performance, publishing, the art and antiques market, music, arts and crafts professions, television and radio, film and video, advertising, design, fashion, video games, software and IT services. The argument is simple: according to its usual definition, culture as covered by policy materialises as goods, services, performances and practices all of which are of utility to the consumer. Under this definition, culture is an end product and its consumption should be as geographically and socially equitable as possible, in order that individual satisfactions coincide with social benefits. In redefining it to place greater emphasis on creativity, culture, in the sense used here, becomes a sector in which qualities which are also a resource for the economy as a whole are sought and implemented. For this reason, activities which can be defined as both utilitarian and functional forms of production are associated with the arts, although they must be exercised with enough inventiveness to ensure a profitable quotient of originality and innovation: industrial and software design being good cases in point[8].The cultural domain is certainly a remarkable hotbed of creativity, as it takes the originality, inventiveness and freedom required when working on existing models and constraints to such new levels that it seems to put the technical skills required for higher specialist activities into the shade. However, creativity must been seen as a generic part of the inventiveness common to all economic activities which constantly require knowledge, its unceasing renewal and a technical approach to the production process to ensure innovation and competitiveness.

Cultural policy thus becomes an "industrial" policy: culture should not only cease to be seen as an activity which can only blossom away from the pressures of the marketplace, (which the inclusion of the cultural industries in the public agenda had already officially challenged), but it should also legitimately occupy the avant-garde position assigned it by Saint-Simon in the early 19th century when he announced the artist, the engineer and the entrepreneur the three heroes of the modern age. The state is there to assist it. I do not have the time here to detail the changes ushered in by this policy, nor to evaluate their precise impact, nor even to examine the terms of the controversies which it may have engendered. I wish first and foremost to emphasise some of the key aspects of that new model which emerged when the new sectoral identity of public action was adopted in Denmark and in Sweden (the strategy was entitled *Culture and experience economy*, 2003) in the Netherlands (*Our creative potential*, 2005), the German *Länder*, in Lithuania and in Poland.

It was at the point of three changes that the cultural sphere started to be seen as a "creative industries" sector. Firstly, cultural policy became the product of societies whose growth model is based on technological innovation and on

7. For more on this issue, see also my work *Le travail créateur*, Paris, Gallimard / Le Seuil, Hautes Etudes, 2009.

8. It would be interesting to see if this political innovation does not bear some relation to Ruskin's aesthetic and social philosophy and his commitment to the idea of art as a socially useful and progressive activity.

raising the country's scientific and intellectual capital. Initially more or less ignored by the Lisbon treaty, culture inveigled its way into the knowledge society. However, it is cultural production which, as the Anglo-Saxon model shows, has to prove its viability in the marketplace, by relying on the supportive public environment essential for company growth, staff training, protecting sources of financing and notably for revenues raised through the consolidated exercise of intellectual property rights.

On the other hand, this model bundles cultural policy in with economic and social policies at national and international level. As of 1998, in Great Britain, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport has charted a statistical picture of its domain, its economic performances, its social base and its contribution to domestic production. Similar initiatives have subsequently been taken in Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. The 2006 report entitled *The Economy of Culture in Europe,* prepared for the European Commission, shows the international scale of the operation: it likens culture to an investment sector rather than one of straightforward public patronage and thus recommends the adoption of suitable evaluation and control tools for this new model of public action. The public management of culture and the arts should no longer be this evidence-free zone in which the manipulation of statistical measurement and objectification is seen as reducing the sacred to mere figures, creative uniqueness to mathematics and what Kant referred to as the 'purposive without purpose' to the utilitarian tools of revamped public accounting principles.

What can be found in this statistical mapping which might provide proof of the legitimacy of public expenditure? The cultural sector, the scope of which varies from country to country, must be able to be described in comparable terms and with a standardised set of accounting techniques and statistics: the normative aspect of the task of objectification and measurement is really put under the spotlight when the cultural sector's economic and social performance indicators form the basic technology behind international comparison and evaluation, recommendations and decisions adopted by supra-national public organisations and by their economical and statistical services such as Eurostat, OECD, UNESCO, etc. This index-based technology, and the practice of benchmarking which it drives, applies the honours-list mentality (in its most varied forms, from lionization and the reward and prize-giving industry to the production of hit parades and best-seller lists) to the practice of wider international comparison and competition between those seeking public support. Any polemical critiques of the cultural decline of a purportedly too self-satisfied country, or more generally, of the value of public action models in terms of observable performance, can only be an impressionistic portrait of what should logically be an international indexing of cultural excellence and health. Recent thinking emphasises that excellence should once again become a priority when allocating public resources and does not just apply to academic and scientific policies, whose agendas are upset by international classifications: in the last decade it has started to infiltrate the professed priorities of culture ministries across various countries.

What do these constructed indices measure? The economic value of the cultural sector resides in its contribution to GDP, in added value, in growth rates, in the proportion of jobs directly or indirectly related to the sector and in the quality of these jobs, in the characteristics of businesses and micro-businesses and in their competitiveness (productivity and profitability) and in the volume and structure of cultural consumption expenditure in household budgets. However, the argument that culture is also an intermediate good also leads to the attempt to pinpoint all of culture's indirect contributions to the economic growth and social cohesion of countries, territories and towns. The simplest measure of this indirect contribution is that cited by local authorities since the 1970s: the leveraging effect of available cultural goods and services on the development of local tourism and on urban regeneration. Valuing the exact knock-on effect of tourism has long been the subject of controversy, when the exact returns on cultural investments were being examined and compared with alternative investments. It is perhaps no more certain than it ever was and it is regularly subject to criticism by those who see it as largely rhetorical justification for the too-high levels of public expenditure or who are alarmed at the lack of evaluation of public action. However the commitment of states, towns and regions, after three decades of local cultural policy, has passed a turning point beyond which it seemed possible to start questioning opposing models and more effective local development models. It is significant that one of the main outcomes of action supportive of the so-called creative industries was the proliferation of urban regeneration schemes and the redevelopment of industrial sites within major urban areas. Examples abound: Helsinki, Amsterdam, Manchester, Lille, Marseille, Lodz, Barcelona, Dublin, London and Milan to name but a few. Similarly, for medium-sized towns the emergence of 'creative clusters' has provided a possible response to the competing draw of large urban areas for artists and cultural enterprises. This increasing trend towards spatial concentration within major urban areas or urban districts supplies a range of justifications supporting cultural action which the local authorities previously associated purely with the economic management of their city and their social ecology. The agglomeration economy is one of the characteristics of cultural entrepreneurship, with its base of micro-businesses, flexible and interdependent resource-sharing networks and with its working population whose structural surplus makes

it possible to organise a system which work on a project-by-project basis and on the basis of flexible specialisation with lower fixed costs.

The 2006 report *The Economy of Culture in Europe* mentions another indirect contribution, evidence for which is practically irrefutable, but which highlights one of the quandaries of public action in the face of the digital revolution. The cultural industries are industries of content: their work has sustained the development of information and communication technologies. The supply of musical, audiovisual and information content constituted the best loss-leading product strategy to speed up the household adoption of technological goods and to quickly change consumption patterns. However, this development pattern was not equitable. Rather than being a positive sum game (win-win) the digital revolution led to conflicts of interest, when the creative industries' essential fuel was no longer the physical sale of goods but their exchange as disembodied data flows which can then be pirated, exchanged and freely consumed. In those countries whose creative industries are sufficiently advanced, one of the *leitmotifs* of cultural policy is the quality of the legal and regulatory framework supporting intellectual property. Without this, the consumption of cultural goods and services becomes a fool's game, with the heart of the value chain - the artists and producers of content- becomes a legal no-man's land in which everything is up for grabs and on which the computer network and telecommunications industries build their fortunes. All of the legal apparatus surrounding literary property was developed thanks to some important international agreements in the latter part of the 19th century; this was the first global regulatory action in the cultural domain. In modelling itself on industrial policy, the creative industries' policy appears to create an effective regulatory system; rather, it is more one akin to the party political strategy of submitting to the most troublesome and most vocal voters.

A number of British studies have been conducted which attempt to show the most intangible indirect contribution: that which attempts to imbue a country's cultural vibrancy with a power of attraction over multiple sectors of the economy and at various social levels. The thinking behind this is not new: it is part of the rhetorical arsenal of political persuasion. What is new is the attempt to evaluate it, inspired by economic thinking on endogenous growth and on self-sustainment through creative and destructive innovative impulses. The argument for the catalyst effect of cultural creativity fuels an entire population of consultants who beam this quasi-psychological, quasi-managerial talk about creativity at local politicians and companies. Creative indices are offered to public and private bodies to encourage the emergence of a new social ecology. Academic works offer to enrich nations' accounting tools by constructing a gauge of the cultural value of all social and economic realities, and to contribute to the definition of sustainable development policies. The commitment to an ecology of cultural diversity has thus become the cornerstone of the re-evaluation of culture as a public good.

The third evolution concerns employment in the cultural sector. One of the arguments of the creative industries' policy is the consecration of key values associated with creativity: a flexible and compliant personal approach, an appetite for risk, the ability to cope with the unexpected, lateral and intuitive thinking, the championing of diversity within teams. What do the jobs and employment markets which promote such qualities look like? Monographs on national cultural policies as produced by the Council of Europe and Ericarts invariably highlight the disparity between the vigorous growth of this employment sector, which is far higher than that of the service industry, and the individual situation of those in the job market: educational qualifications are above average but there remain huge inequalities in pay, when viewed from a Paretian point of view (four fifths of profits and volumes of activity are enjoyed by less than one fifth of professionals), and has led individuals to resort more frequently than elsewhere to multiactivity. However they also value independence (there are far more freelancers or self employed individuals here than in other higher professions) and a lack of routine in their work, and take a risk management approach to employment, combining keen competition for jobs based on reputation and multiple forms of diversification of resources and intra-professional solidarity. Artists and those we shall henceforth refer to as creative workers are aiming for the high earning power of the top one fifth of professionals in the hope that the overestimation of their chances of success will end in self-fulfilling prophecy.

These characteristics indicate the source of an economy whose production of artistic and cultural goods and services is endlessly contrasting and varied. Their impact on the employment situation represents a challenge for welfare state social policies, as the combination of flexible project-by-project working patterns and the individual risk of under-employment is pushed to the limit, overtaxing social welfare mechanisms. In countries actively promoting the creative industries, there is an unequal adoption and application of specific protection measures. Denmark, the champion of flexicurity, does not accord artists special status, to ensure that all sectors are treated equally. The Netherlands trialled a long-term artists' wage scheme, but had to downgrade the scheme's ambitions radically in order to avoid overspending. The UK and Germany have recently implemented some special measures, with limited scope. However no other country treats the unique and exceptional nature of cultural employment as favourably as France, without, moreover, the cost falling to public players.

In the 1960s, France came up with a proposal for bridging the employment/unemployment gaps experienced by theatrical workers, and in the 1970s created a special social security arrangement for authors. This artistic flexicurity mechanism was so successful in supporting the arts and live entertainment industry that the growth of employment has started to work paradoxically work sought and remunerated by employers in the live entertainment, audiovisual and cinema industries has increased continuously, but compensated unemployment has grown even faster, against all the usually-observed employment markets trends. Two lessons can therefore be drawn from the conflicts engendered by the French system.

The first lesson is the formidable efficacy of an employment-unemployment model, ideally suited to project-based artistic working practices. This system would make a fine model if it didn't actually have the effect of spreading the risk of unemployment which it is there to protect against, by speeding up the fragmentation of employment and encouraging the dispersal of demand for work across a professional population that is growing faster than the work available for it. The second lesson is drawn from the observation that cultural policies have had a spectacularly successful effect on cultural availability and encouraged the rapid growth of professionals working in the cultural sector, but essentially have only been able to offer stable employment to administrative and technical employees of artistic organisations and bureaucratic central and local cultural institutions and those various professions built around the artistic supply side (teaching, organisation, intervention, conservation, dissemination). The only sector which offers permanent artistic employment is classical music, with its orchestras and opera houses, and is precisely that which represents the biggest disparity between the public subsidy levels and the remarkably enduring depth of social inequalities in attendance.

Conclusion: Dynamism and Inertia in European Cultural Policies

The historical basis of national cultural policies gives rise to clear political and administrative organisational differences, and the authorities' role in providing essential public goods (e.g. education, health, culture, security, social protection) is determined by differing philosophies on the welfare state, which all influence public cultural action and the justification for it. In my presentation of the European situation, I have made a brief comparison of the organisational models which have come out of Europe's histories and philosophies. These models are clearly important to each country's framework for action, but do not provide any explicit set of operational criteria which might help guide political decision-making towards more visibly effective solutions.

I have spent even more time examining the similarities between the paths cultural policy has taken, at the risk of considerable exaggeration and perhaps questionable compression of their chronology. In presenting change as a four-phase process, I risked overemphasising breakdowns, upheavals, new priorities and the slogans of political voluntarism. We should perhaps now look at the other side of cultural policy, that of the inertia factor. In those countries which have vigorously pursued their cultural policy for over half a century in the wake of the construction of their welfare state, public intervention has generally developed by accretion and sedimentation and very rarely through the radical implementation of aims and spending priorities when it came to the main areas of intervention. Merely by listing the permanent duties of states and local and regional authorities shows the extent to which a growing part of their action has gradually been consolidated and entered onto the balance sheet, viz: the maintenance and renovation of historic heritage and the extension of heritage policy to new areas (industrial, ethnological, natural, etc) in tandem with the extended definition of culture suitable for public intervention, the classification of immediately contemporary achievements as heritage and museum pieces, the provision of towns and territories with museums, archives, libraries and multimedia libraries, opera houses, concert halls, theatres, dance venues and multi-purpose spaces, the financing of their staff, recurrent support for orchestras, theatre troupes, artistic ensembles, and the recurrent volumes of aid, purchases or orders for creators and the financing of the multiple mechanisms, facilities and personnel involved in socio-cultural action. The idea of heritage can, on another level, be seen as this sedimentary part of public action which includes its very routines, the automatically allocated expenditure, and the programmes supporting all that which has been built, reshaped or modernised and which, when accepted as a public good, becomes inalienable and indestructible.

It is thus very easy to see how one of the most recurrent themes for change in public action has become the diversification of resources and the control of the good governance of those supplied by public institutions. All countries have put culture into the same realm as public policies, to be programmed, controlled, evaluated and supposedly revised in the same way that an industrial, educational or health policy might be. They have all more or less openly discussed the need to use new public management tools and have everywhere sparked resistance, created strategies for reconciling the new and the old, and the practical difficulties of achieving and demonstrating efficiency which have accompanied this change.

Few countries have consistently managed to keep their cultural public expenditure down. Usually, it involves reallocating the mutable parts of their budget commitments when there is a shift in political power. In most cases, the reality is more like a gradual curbing of both the state and the regional authorities' scope for action. The reclassification of culture as a series of creative industries is more understandable. It indicates a new dualism. Cultural policy is clearly divided between the heritage sector, the symbolic locus of non-destructive accumulation, and that of the arts and the practices henceforth in the grip of technological innovations and their creative power to destroy.

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French cultural policy and European cultural ambition: an uneasy relationship

Jean-François CHOUGNET

European cultural policy has not always enjoyed the greatest of reputations in France. This is rooted in more widespread reservations about European integration and its cumbersome bureaucratic and discursive processes. Favourable commentators are loath to bring up the issue of identity, considering it to be a matter for each country to deal with in its own way, spurning Jürgen Habermas. In a recent speech, Habermas stated that "a common European identity can only emerge if each individual state can learn to open up the dense fabric of its national culture so as to integrate citizens of other religious or ethnic origin. Integration is not a one-way street; when it works it is as a two-way process, invigorating already-strong national cultures so that they become porous, receptive and sensitive to both internal and external influences"[1]. This view is not widely shared in France and the issue of Europe is viewed quite differently. Indeed, it is rare to see the sort of critical distance expressed by writers such as Haberman in his collected writings *Ach Europa*, which built on Hans Magnus Enzensberger's earlier *Ach Europa!*[2]. It is, in its entirety, a splendid summary of European cultural policy.

In the building of this complex relationship to European cultural policy, we cannot omit to mention the trends of the immediate post-war period. There was of course the period of federalist conferences, starting in 1947 in Montreux and ending in December 1949 in Lausanne. Various different federalist movements, with strong personalist leanings, initially fed into these meetings, with Denis de Rougemont on the Swiss side and Robert Aron and Alexandre Marc on the French side. At the conclusion of the Hague Congress in May 1948, participants passed a cultural resolution[3] to create a European Cultural Centre[4]. However, as rapporteur for the Commission, Denis de Rougemont (1906-1985)[5] in particular ensured that cultural issues were given equal consideration alongside economic and political issues. Several months later in Lausanne, he was aiming to achieve tangible results: "I want our conference to spurn the academic debates from which these definitions [of culture] derive. To all intents and purposes, it will be founded on the notion of culture as those intellectual and spiritual realities which have made Europe something other than and far greater than its physical reality, and not simply the "Cape of Asia", as it is often referred to. If we are to do a decent job here, we shall waste no more time asking what culture is. And, just as one judges the tree by its fruits, culture will be judged by its harvest."[6] From this triumphant phase (already less so at Lausanne than at Montreux, if one reads between the lines) the Council of Europe was born. "a. The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress. b. This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms(...)"[7] Moreover it is undoubtedly through Resolution (49) 28 of the Committee of Ministers that the Council of Europe made its first formal cultural act, if not quite simply the first European cultural policy. It is also worth pointing out that the Committee of Ministers also took up a Recommendation

1. Jürgen Habermas, acceptance speech for the North Rhein Westphalia state prize at Petersberg.

2. Jürgen Habermas , *Ach, Europa*, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Ach Europa!: Wahrnehmungen aus sieben Ländern,* Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987.

3. Congress of Europe: The Hague-May, 1948: Resolutions. London-Paris: International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, 1948, p.13-15. Many of these texts are available online on the Luxembourg website www.ena.lu

4. The ECC was actually set up in 1950 by Denis de Rougement but never effectively got beyond being a talking-shop.

5. Denis de Rougemont, "Le sens de La Haye. Pour sauver nos diversités", in *Fédération*, June 1948, no. 41, p.14-15. See also Rougemont, Denis de, "La Haye, 7 mai 1948. Lorsque tout commençait", *Communauté européenne*, May 1968, no. 118, p.31-35.

6. Denis de Rougemont, "Presentation of the Conference", in *Fédération*,January 1950, no. 60, p.19-35.

7. Statute of the Council of Europe. London, 5 May 1949. See Grosjean, Etienne (ed.), *40 years of cultural co-operation 1954-94* (1998), Council of Europe, 1994.

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issued by the Consultative Assembly –later to become to the Parliamentary Assembly- with a view to establishing cultural agreements between the Council of Europe's member states.

However, this co-operation turned out to be very selective until the adoption of the European Cultural Convention on December 19, 1954, which was ratified by France in March 1955, and the rest of Western Europe the same year. It incorporates such concepts as that of a "common cultural heritage of Europe" and in Article 6 sets up a Committee of Cultural Experts of the Council of Europe which in 1962 became the Council for Cultural Cooperation (CCC) which was to be one of the major future cultural policy think tanks.

At the same time, de Rougemont was forming a "club" of influential European figures committed to European unification, in order to propose to them the idea of a European cultural foundation whose primary objective would be to foster European educational and cultural initiatives. The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors was held on 16 December, 1954. The foundation began life in Geneva, under the initial presidency of Robert Schuman, and implemented a resolutely European grants programme.

President of the Foundation from 1955 to 1977, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands managed to get corporate sponsorship for the Foundation's first projects, with a further percentage for European projects coming from the Lottery, football pools and Dutch Lottery.

This history of European cultural policy, although often Francophone, does not see particularly strong French involvement, and it was on the basis of very Francocentric thinking and in the context of the Treaty of Rome lacunae that the new French minister would be inaugurated in 1959.

The second period had a much more markedly French flavour, and yet seems now to have unjustly fallen into obscurity. It started in the early 1970s and its geopolitical and economic background was then very different.

Of course, its roots lie very much in that cultural unmentionable the Treaty of Rome, with its actual inception being the European colloquium on The Future of Cultural Development held in France between 7 and 11 April 1972 at the Centre du Futur (then based at the Royal Saltworks at Arc-et-Senans) and attended by some twenty futurologists and researchers from across a broad range of disciplines and hailing from a dozen different countries. Under the patronage of Jacques Duhamel, French Minister for Cultural Affairs and led by Augustin Girard and the then new *Service des études et de la recherche*, the aim of the meeting was to come up with proposals for ministers in charge of culture, meeting in Helsinki in June 1972. There was then a paradigm shift, with the emphasis changing to extolling the virtues of cultural development, seen as one of the major forces for wider change. The "crisis of civilisation" not only presents governments with merely economic and legislative problems, but it also calls for new social strategies and the drafting of specific cultural policies to deal with them.

The final statement is indicative of the preoccupations of the time, throwing into relief the fact that "policies for cultural action can and should henceforth play a key role in shaping the future. (…) If there can be no question of halting economic growth (if only for reasons of the situation in the third world), it is imperative that there be a wave of cultural initiatives which will see this quantitative growth translate into an improvement in quality of life. This being the case, cultural action is that which enables new ways of thinking within society and which prepares individuals to take responsibility for its possible evolution, to deal with crises and to manage their destiny rather than submitting to it. All cultural policies have an indispensable ethical dimension." The declaration which follows this statement is both realistic and utopian: "If cultural policy alone cannot be ambitious enough to resolve the overall crisis, it can and must help everyone to deal with it and society to manage it".[8]

Unfortunately, at the Copenhagen Summit on 14 and 15 December 1973, the energy crisis led member states to re-examine their priorities. This turn of events, and an impromptu meeting forced by the unexpected arrival of a group of Arab delegates, eclipsed the publication of a statement on European identity which was drawn up through a process of political cooperation and approved by the various foreign affairs ministers.[9] It included this fundamental declaration: "The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism."

8. *Analyse et Prévision, Futuribles,* special report for the "Prospective du développement culturel" conference, October 1973 (proceedings from the colloquium held at Arc-et-Senans, April 1972). Michel de Certeau opened the conference with an 'ABC Guide to Culture ["*Abécédaire de la culture*"].

9. Declaration on European Identity, in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, December 1973, no. 12, pp. 118-122.

At the same time, reports such as the Karasek report[10] were springing up under the aegis of the Council of Europe, questioning the efficacy of action within this forum. Prevarication then prevailed between developing within the Council of Europe and working with the Communities, the latter seeming more arduous but also more liable to yield concrete results, even though the phase of relative euphoria on the inclusion of a cultural (or at least, identity-based) theme within the Communities terminated in 1975 with the Tindemans report[11] which dismissed culture in a single paragraph on European citizenship.

As soon as the idea of a "federalist" Europe apparently fell from favour, it was the pace of cultural policy synchronisation which was to dictate the rate of common cultural policy proceedings.

As Anne-Marie Autissier was to note in one of the only publications on this issue[12], there is a certain convergence: "Whatever the extent of the resources or the type of organisation they adopt, Western European governments, from the 1960s onwards, show similar ambitions whose patterns emerge in waves over time: from cultural democratisation to cultural democracy (1950-1980), support for the professionalisation of the sector and adjusting to the cultural economic and industrial environment (1980-1990), a wider focus on the private sector and debate on the renewal of cultural policies against a background of economic globalisation and advancing information technology, contradictory approach to intercultural processes (1990-2000)." As the author herself acknowledges, this view clearly underplays the contradictions and discrepancies in the way different countries work. However, she deserves credit for suggesting that beyond political and administrative differences, (elaborated upon at length), some common aims do exist within the cultural sphere. One might add, a certain financial convergence, or in any event the idea of the predominance of public finance, a matter to which we will return in due course.

Between 1950 and 1980 specialist administrations were starting to pop up everywhere. Without borrowing (lest we live to regret it) Malraux's elegant euphemism "Cultural Affairs", their designation illustrates these disparities, along with the commonly-recognised ambiguities and misinterpretations to which the often untranslatable terms "culture" and "arts" are subject. Under this moniker we find the arts, culture, cultural goods, heritage and entertainment. Cultural administrations accommodate a number of curious bedfellows: education, sport, the environment, research, the media, communication and sometimes even health. Their monikers betray the priority given to a heritage or artistic programme and even the term "culture" draws attention to a form of cultural democratisation. Moreover, the levels at which these responsibilities are divided up varies: national cultural administrations in the UK, Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Ireland national play a largely advisory role, with distribution of financial assistance and management of national institutions falling under the control of autonomous organisations, along the lines of the British "Council" model.

In another tradition, the early 1980s saw a number of centralised states with a predominant ministry of culture, including France, Greece, Portugal (the latter two drawing on the French model after the collapse of their dictatorship governments), and Luxembourg. This was also clearly the case for the "popular democracies" of the Eastern Bloc. In Italy, the dividing up of cultural duties between two ministers and the Prime Minister aimed at ensuring, within a relatively centralised system, that there was to be no return to the Mussolini-era *Minculpop* model. It was only in 1975 that *beni culturali* were[13] regrouped under a single minister for cultural assets and activities, minus responsibility for cinema and live entertainment.

Finally there is a third system of federalisation, or "Communitisation" of cultural responsibility as seen in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Austria, Belgium and, in a completely different context, in Spain. In Germany, cultural and educational decentralisation is clearly constitutional as it is covered by the *Grundgesetz* of 1949. In Spain[14],

10. In late 1974, Franz Karasek, Austrian Chairman of the Committee on Culture and Education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, submitted a report in which he condemned the inadequacy of the results achieved after a quarter of a century of European cultural cooperation. *Report on twenty-five years of European cultural co-operation* (13 December 1974), in *Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly.Texts adopted by the Assembly. 13 December 1974. Doc. 3525*. 1974, pp. 1-19..- Rapporteur: M. Karasek, 13 December 1974. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Cultural Commission had already adopted Recommendations no. 567 (1969) and 649 (1971).

11. On 29 December 1975, Leo Tindemans rend delivered his Report on European Union drawn up on the basis of instructions given by the Nine at the Paris European Council (9-10 December 1974). Report on the European Union, *Bulletin of the European Communities.* 1976, No Supplement 1, pp. 11-35..

12. Anne-Marie Autissier, "Politiques culturelles des États européens: pour une nécessaire refondation", *EspacesTemps.net*, verbatim, 29 March 2006 http://espacestemps.net. By the same author, Anne-Marie Autissier, *L'Europe de la culture. Histoire(s) et enjeux*, Paris, Babel – Maison des cultures du monde, 2005

13. The post of *Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali* was created under the law of 29 January 1975 and decree 805 of 3 December 1975)

14. Lluis Bonet and Emmanuel Négrier (ed.)*, La politique culturelle en Espagne*, Karthala, Paris, 2007 "Les Politiques culturelles en Europe du Sud": *Pôle du Sud: revue de science politique*, Montpellier: Centre Comparatif d'Études sur les Politiques Publiques et les Espaces Locaux, no.10, May 1999

the setting up of the 17 Autonomous Communities through the 1978 Constitution went hand-in-hand with a central cultural policy (the Ministry of Culture was set up in 1977) which was primarily designed to make a clear break with the Franco regime.

It should be noted that none of these organisations exist in a pure state, nor are they run according to the same principles: the British 'arm's length' approach is not the same as the Nordic hands-off administrative model, which involves very specific contracts, quite the opposite of what happens in the UK. Though Italy may have taken thirty years to translate the principles of the 1947 decentralisation into reality, it did, in the post-war period, confer "special status" on a number of regions and territories. France attempted to simultaneously conduct a programme of decentralisation and one of partnership with local authorities, notably at the behest of Minister of Culture Michel Guy (1974) Spain is a special case, being a unitary state with federalist tendencies, but whose federalism varies depending on the *Generalitat* in question.

In the UK, cultural policy is largely based on the independent Arts Council of Great Britain. The Council was set up in 1946, on the foundations of the Committee for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts which was itself set up in 1940 on the basis of recommendations by John Maynard Keynes. However, these positions have been far from consistent: in 1964, Jennie Lee, Labour Minister for the Arts under the Wilson Government managed to triple the Arts Council budget within nine years and presided over the renewal of its charter as part of a strengthened commitment to cultural democracy.[15] In the early 1970s Germany saw a burgeoning local cultural political enthusiasm (under the *Neue Kulturpolitik*), which was also coordinated at federal level, reflecting Willy Brandt's position.[16]

A report submitted to the Commission of the European Communities in 1987[17] concluded that there were tremendous disparities in Europe in terms of structures and resources.

The 1990s can be seen as a time of numerous reforms and changes to European cultural administrations. Most ministers coming into their new roles spoke of the need for increased European cooperation, whilst placing renewed emphasis on national culture. Between 1996 and 1998 Walter Veltroni emphasised the ministerial role in consolidating national identity before finally in October 1998 creating the post of Minister of Cultural Assets and Activities (MiBAC). Similarly German reunification led to a desire for federal arbitration, despite the opposition of some *Länder*. Recognition of the underground role of Culture during the postwar period cannot be understated: "In den Jahren der Teilung waren Kunst und Kultur - trotz unterschiedlicher Entwicklung der beiden Staaten in Deutschland - eine Grundlage der fortbestehenden Einheit der deutschen Nation."[18]

The UK created an entire Department of National Heritage in 1992, which in 1997 became the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS, 1997). In 1994 the Arts Council of Great Britain was disbanded and was replaced by three discrete entities: the Arts Council of England (including 10 Regional Arts Boards which were also then disbanded post 2000), the Arts Council of Wales and the Scottish Arts Council. In 1993, Ireland established a more or less independent Minister working with the Irish State Agency under the name "Culture Ireland/ Cultur Éireann" Other countries refer officially to European obligations. Hence ministers in the Netherlands and Austria lead state administrations which have been reformed with a view to better European communication. The synchronisation of European ministerial institutions went a step further in 1998 with the German creation of the post of *Beauftragte des Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien*, attached directly to the Chancellery. This move was aimed at providing the transitional measures set out in the Reunification Treaty of 1990, which ended up taking longer than anticipated.

Finally, the old Eastern Bloc countries which in 1989 all had Ministers of Culture were entering or preparing to join the Union with both existing administrations and those which had been variously reorganised so as to disengage from a system of what Hungarian Miklos Haraszti refererred to as "controlled culture" [19], which intellectually and economically integrated artists into a centralised system. The size and complexity of both the organisations and financing mechanisms under the old communist regime made for a tricky transformation process.

Convergence was to gradually take the most unexpected route, with a rapprochement between public finance mechanisms and levels of authority freeing up a certain space for a European cultural policy.

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15. Patricia Hollis, *Jennie Lee: A Life*, Oxford University Press, 1998.

16. Olaf Scwencke, "Kleine Geschichte der Kulturpolitik in Europa", in Institut für Kulturpolitik der Kulturpolitischen Gesellschaft, *Jahrbuch für Kulturpolitik*, Bonn and Essen 2007, p.21.

17. Antonio Ca'zorzi, *Administration et financement publics de la culture dans la Communauté Européenne*, Brussels, Commission of the European Communities publication, 1987.

18. "During the years of separation, the arts and culture have remained, despite different developments in the two German states, the basis of continuing unity of the German nation." Article 35 of the *Einigungsvertrag* (Unification Treaty) of 31 August 1990.

19. Miklos Haraszti, *L'artiste d'État*, Paris, Fayard, 1983. Text dated 1977.

In France, since the 4th Republic, and most certainly since the 5th, government funding has been at the centre of controversy around cultural policies: it has therefore taken a long time (despite government department studies having made this point for quite some time, and even though the elected "cultural" authorities have known it since the late 60s), to take on board this fundamental truth: when a Minister speaks, it is the local authorities who act. The last published survey, drawing on data from 2002, confirms the size and importance of local and regional authority assistance, totalling some 5,879 billion euros. With 4.1bn euros in 2002 (of which 3.3bn was spent on administration), municipalities with a population of over 10,000 saw much higher than average cultural expenditure in comparison with other authorities. French ECPIs (*établissements publics de coopération intercommunale*, public bodies which oversee inter-municipal cooperation on issues such as public transport) spent almost 286m euros. Départements spent 1.1bn euros and the regions 358.5m euros. To put this cultural expenditure into context, it is worth pointing out that the Ministry of Culture budget for 2002 was 2.6bn euros and funding for cultural activities from other ministries was calculated at 3.6bn euros, excluding audiovisual[20]. Expressed as a percentage, municipalities with populations of over 10,000 allocated on average 9% of their overall budget to culture. Départements and regions respectively allocated 2.8% and 2.4%.[21]. The federation of elected cultural representatives might well trumpet the slogan "10% for Culture", a figure clearly to be reconciled with the mythical "1%" of the state budget.

With this distribution between central and local authorities, France actually finds itself, in practical if not philosophical terms, in line with the situation in a good deal of other European countries, namely in terms of the scale of local financing.[22] In fact, European countries currently fall into two camps: those which are highly regionalised such as Germany and Spain, and those in which central financing (whether via state or agencies) predominates. In the case of France, if one excludes state funding from other ministries, the distribution (for 2002) showed 30.5 % for state contributions, 17.6 % for départements and regions and 51.8% for municipalities. In Spain, 2005 data published by the Ministry of Culture estimated the central government contribution to be 15.2%, compared with 28.5% for the Autonomous Regions and 56.3% for municipalities. In Germany, the state contributed only 13.4%, the Länder 43.5% and the municipalities 43.2 %[23]. In the UK, if one includes the most significant contributions from the National Lottery (set up in November 1994), in 2005-2006, the state contributed £2,570bn (of which £2,145bn went to England alone), with local authorities contributing up to £2bn in 2001, showing some parity in funding[24]. In Sweden, according to 2007 figures, central government contributed up to 45.9%, the regions up to 12.8% and municipalities up to 41.3%.[25] In Poland, decentralisation reforms in 1999 led regional and local authorities to increase the amount of funding given over to culture in relation to that given by central government. In 2004, the state budget for culture was made up of 21.9% of public contributions, 20% from *Voivodships*, 27.6% from the provinces and 30.6% from municipalities

It is largely commonly held that public financing of culture should be based on a number of different authorities: the exact proportion depends on administrative structures and the persistence of prevailing political traditions. All 27 Union states have a minister responsible for culture, with a few (notably Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal) taking their lead from the "French model". A great number have (to a greater or lesser extent) taken their inspiration from the Arts Council model[26]. Even they however have felt the need to increase state regulation. All countries, despite unequal per-capita levels of finance, have, since the late 1990s combined a predominant local contribution with a "legitimate" state. However, one should not rush to conclude that the existence of ministers of culture is consensually-approved of throughout Europe, as evidenced by the Catalan separatists who in spring 2009 appealed to Parliament to abolish the "central" post of Minister of Culture, arguing instead for a compete transfer to the *autonomías*, which would also present the benefit of saving money[27].

Thus, the pragmatic construction of a space for cultural policies – scaled down for reasons of resources, but without ideological constraints - has become possible. It has progressed in terms both of the importance of culture within

20. *Effort financier de l'État dans le domaine culturel, État récapitulatif annexé au Projet de loi de finances pour 2002*, Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry.

21. "Les dépenses culturelles des collectivités locales en 2002", Paris, Department for Statistics, Research and Planning Ministry of Culture *Note statistique nº 21*, July 2006: these figures are not entirely comparable with previous studies as the methodolgy has changed; however, having cross-checked with government accounts, the author can confirm that their order of magnitude is consistent.

22. Cf. les données recueillies par le site ERICarts, regroupant différents centres de recherche européens qui ont créé un « Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe » www.culturalpolicies.net

23. Institut für Kulturpolitik der Kulturpolitischen Gesellschaft, Bernd Wagner and Norbert Sievers *Jahrbuch für Kulturpolitik*, Bonn and Essen 2006.

24. Department for Culture, Media and Sport, *DCMS Annual report* 2007 and Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses, Treasury.

25. *Kulturen i siffror 2008:7*, Statens kulturråd (Swedish Arts Council), Stockholm, 2008.

26. Last model to date being the *Generalitat de Catalunya*'s Arts and Culture Council in January 2009.

27. Luisa Etxenike, ¿Política y cultural?, *El Pais*, 27 July 2009

the economy and, more pragmatically, in terms of creating fitting instruments for the European Union. In the burgeoning and crowded background, Union tools are indeed progressing. As of 1992, based on Article 128 of the Maastricht Treaty (now Article 151 of the Amsterdam Treaty), new Community instruments are increasingly being implemented. There is no room here to elaborate upon the implementation of these programmes, which are legion.

The most important point is that the theme of the importance of culture in the economy has become an ideological basis for many of the Union's "cultural" initiatives. However, a certain amount of opportunism must be acknowledged here: talking about culture and the economy legitimised the opportunity for cultural initiatives to draw money from structural funds and in general from a number of European schemes, particularly regional cooperation tools. This does not take into account European relations, taking up a trend prevailing in various national ministries After the progress made in France in 1980, culminating in a major conference in Avignon[28], but left fallow during the 2000s, it was other countries that went on to develop a study and analysis strategy, the British in particular, with the Blair government setting up the "UK Creative Industries Task Force", as well as the Netherlands and Baltic countries.[29] Other official initiatives came to light in the 2000s in Sweden, Spain and Italy[30].

An initial Council resolution of 20 November 1995 regarding the promotion of statistics on culture and economic growth, translated into policy the process launched under the Belgian presidency in 1993 on "the economic aspects and job-creating role of culture". In its preamble, the Resolution, a little awkwardly, begins by stating that "culture has an intrinsic value which should not be measured primarily by its economic utility but basically by qualitative criteria in the conviction that its value is not diminished by estimating its potential economic dimension".[31] A European Union Commission conference on this subject was held in Viareggio in October 1997.[32] On 17 December 1999, the Council adopted conclusions which emphasised the importance of the cultural industries for employment within the European Union, as well as a resolution aimed at promoting mobility for cultural sector workers. In 2002, the European Parliament focussed on the theme of cultural industries.[33] In 2003, the Council urged the development of "synergies" with other sectors, particularly in the use of structural funds.[34]

Entitled "Study on the Economy of Culture in Europe", the assignment commissioned in 2005 by the European Commission aimed to improve understanding of the economic aspects of "traditional" artistic activities and the creative industries, as well as how the cultural sector might contribute to economic growth and social cohesion. The study was conducted by the Brussels-based firm Kern European Affairs (KEA) in association with Media Group of Turku, Finland, and the German company MKW.[35] The study aimed to demonstrate what is often bureaucratically referred to as the "Lisbon potential" of the cultural sector. The Lisbon Strategy, or the Lisbon Agenda, sets out the focus of economic and developmental policy as decided at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 by the then fifteen member states of the European Union. The series of reports does not end there. There is a wealth of texts, such as that on the Impact of Culture on Creativity, a study prepared for the European Commission and analysed by the Council on 12 May 2009.[36]

This initiative aimed at linking culture, creativity and the economy henceforth became the official discourse adopted by the "Culture" Council in 2007, based on proposals presented by the Commission in May 2007[37]. This European cultural agenda is based on three main principles: alongside the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, and culture as an essential element in international relations, we see the "promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon strategy for growth, employment, innovation and competitiveness".

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28. Department for Statistics, Research and Planning, *Économie et culture*, Fourth Conference on the Cultural Economy, Avignon 12- 14 May 1986, la Documentation française, Paris, 1987.

29. Department for Culture, Media and Sport, UK, *The Creative Industries Mapping Document* 1997 and 2001; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Education of Netherlands, *Our creative potential – Paper on Culture and Economy*, 2005.

30. Ministerio de la Cultura, *El Valor Económico de la Cultura en España*, 2005. Commissione sulla Creativitá et Produzione di Cultura in Italia, MiBAC, *Libro Bianco sulla Creativitá*, 2007.

31. Council Resolution of 20 November 1995 on the promotion of statistics on culture and economic growth, 95/C 327/01

32. Xavier Greffe, *La culture comme nouveau gisement d'emploi?*, Colloque de la Commission de l'Union européenne, Viareggio, 2-3 Octobre 1997.

33. Myrsini Zorba, rapporteur, *Report on Cultural Industries*, Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport, European Parliament, Brussels, A5-0276/2002(Final), 21 p.

34. Council Resolution of 26 May 2003 on the horizontal aspects of culture: increasing synergies with other sectors and Community actions and exchanging good practices in relation to the social and economic dimensions of culture 2003/C 136/01

35. KEA, *The Economy of Culture in Europe*, European Commission, October 2006 – *www.keanet.eu*

36. KEA, *The Impact of Culture on Creativity*, June 2009.

37. "First-ever European strategy for culture: contributing to economic growth and intercultural understanding", Commission, IP/07/646, 10 May 2007; Communication from the Commission of 10 May 2007 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world; COM(2007) 242.

Culture as a catalyst for creativity? Nothing could be further from the underlying principles of the 1959 decree. In the almost untranslatable words of Portuguese philosopher José Gil, this is more a case of *chico-espertismo* [38], a fad for chic and flashy expertise, strategies for avoiding answering the real questions, namely those of European identity and financing.

38. José Gil, *Em busca da identidade - o desnorte*, Relógio d'Água, Lisbon, 2009. "Que faz o chico-esperto ? Age por pequenas sequências, por pequenos troços de acção, para obter pequenos resultados – que se revelam, muitas vezes, nulos."

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The three historic eras of cultural heritage

Pierre NORA

Our generation will, in total, have passed through three eras of Heritage.

It was at the end of the 1970s that we moved, suddenly, without being too aware of it, from the first era to the second. And the "year of heritage" could be taken as the central symbolic date. Around this date we need to consider a variety of indicators all pointing to the new investment which was taking place in this area. They include:
– the creation of a heritage directorate, led by Jean-Philippe Lecat, then Minister of Culture;
– more importantly still, the official amendment of the decree setting out the responsibilities of the ministry on the arrival of Jack Lang in 1981. The decree which dated back to the time of Malraux gave the minister of state the primary mission "of making accessible the major works of humanity, and of France in the first instance, to the largest possible number of the French people" and "of providing the widest audience for our cultural heritage"; the minister for culture is now mainly responsible for "conserving the national, regional and communal heritage to the mutual benefit of the community as a whole." The difference is plain to see;
– the well-known article by André Chastel and Jean-Pierre Babelon which established the genealogy of the concept up to the creation of a general inventory of the historical and aesthetic wealth of France, and which opened the debate on just this uncertain and uncontrollable dimension which the concept was in the process of acquiring;
– the same year, the creation of the Museum of Popular Arts and Traditions, which crystallised the turn towards rural ethnology and which constituted, in my view, the tipping point.

Heritage changed its meaning. It had previously been a matter of identifying the oldest, finest and most exalted productions of the "national genius". These choices had been the province of the Historic Monuments department since the time of Mérimée; they were framed by the Laws of 1913, and by the Supplementary Inventory of 1927. And despite decentralisation, the system was satisfied with 90 protected monuments annually and around a hundred listings on the Inventory.

In just a few years, as we know, the concept was expanded drastically:
– Chronological expansion towards the present, after the outcry which followed the destruction of Baltard's Halles in 1970, and which has led to the protection of 19th and even early 20th century architecture;
– geographical expansion, which has culminated in the protection of sites, town centres, and landscapes (such as Bougival for the impressionists or the Côte Sauvage at Belle Ile);
– an expansion of categories, to include - because they are *characteristic* of a vanished world - all kinds of evidence of daily life: farms, wash houses, rural craft tools, cinemas, shops, factories, everything which has found a place in the eco-museums;
– who knows, I may myself have contributed to this expansion through the concept of "Site of Memory" in 1984, on the basis of which - as Marie-Anne Sire has shown - 250 "sites" have been protected;
– the expansion of the concept above all, to include an "intangible" heritage of oral traditions, live performance, and ways of life: all those things summed up by the English under the heading "intangible cultural heritage". The UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage has begun the work of compiling a list of these achievements, alongside the world heritage list: it includes, for example, the Cambodian Royal Ballet and Georgian polyphonic singing.

The concept may be being stretched to its limits, without mentioning its metaphorical expansion, since we now hear frequent reference to linguistic, genetic or constitutional heritage.

In summary, the concept of heritage has been transformed into something which is roughly speaking the reverse of what it used to be: once reserved for the most exalted and rare creations, it now applies to the most traditional aspects of everyday life. It used to refer by definition to that which was out of use, removed from the markets, belonging to the world of archives and museums.

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It now plays a key role in the economy of democratic societies. It used to be the expression of the highest of high culture; it has taken over nature itself. In short, it used to refer to the most remarkable traces of the past; today, it is the totality of traces of the past precisely *as* past. Heritage has left behind its historical, national and monumental phase to enter an era of memory, society and identity.

In thirty years, the new age has itself clearly undergone a shift of emphasis from memory to identity.

Heritage as memory is bound up with time, with incessant change, with feelings of loss and thus with a conservative impulse. It is also linked to a new awareness of time, and to a darkening future which has become frighteningly uncertain, which has given us a categorical imperative to preserve for the future expressions and evidence of the past somewhat indiscriminately - like treasure whose purpose is unknown, but which may prove to be of value.

These two movements, the acceleration of history and the rather anxious accumulation of all traces of ourselves, are responsible for a striking explosion in the forms and institutions of memory. One example: the INA holds 600,000 hours of audio-visual material, and 500,000 hours of broadcasts. Digitalisation demands a choice in terms of what we imagine will be wanted in the future. Choices are stressful, but so is the prospect of destroying some of this material, because we instinctively want to keep it all.

Contemporary democratic societies are powerful generators of heritage: at the public level, we are witnessing the exponential multiplication of museums, libraries, archives, and the expansion of the Louvre, the Bibliothèque National and now the national Archives. But the same thing is happening at the individual level, in a turn from the communal to the private, with the multiplication of administrative papers, family albums etc. The ethical duty of Shoah memory seems to me to be a manifestation of a much wider and more profound idea which is a deep-seated constitutive element contemporary societies.

Heritage as identity is bound to a social movement, to the contemporary emancipation of minorities of all kinds - social, sexual, religious and regional; and this ultimately makes the heritage the immanent and laicised version of a sacred object. A very powerful, perhaps irresistible movement which accompanies the rising prominence of the 'victim' as the principal actor in history.

Accumulation lies at the very heart of heritage-as-memory. Quite another series of factors underpin the concept of heritage-as-identity: emotions, passions, conflicts. The issue of recognition, of the ownership of this heritage becomes central. We may recall, for example, the conflict between Algeria and France concerning colonial archives, now held in Aix en Provence, or the famous case of the Jewish records claimed by community organisations and eventually lodged in the national Archives. But the same problem arises internationally, with the Australian claim on Maori heads or the demand from the new museum in Athens for the return of the Elgin marbles.

A good current example in France is the struggle around the place of regional languages in the Constitution. Last year, Parliament met in conference at Versailles to begin the reform of the institutions. In future, regional languages will be mentioned in the Constitution under regional authorities, Article 75-1: "The regional languages belong to the heritage of France". Militant associations had hoped to replace Article 2 of the Constitution, "the language of the Republic is French" with this phrase; "The regional languages belong to its heritage". The importance to the associations of this mention in the Constitution and, secondarily, its location, is obvious. Equally obvious is the historical significance of the struggle: the way it echoes, ten years on, the refusal of the then French government to sign the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, a formulation which unites genuinely 'regional' languages with languages without a geographical basis, such as Yiddish, Arabic and Berber. Above all, we can see what is at stake in the battle, for now half-won, half-lost, over the definition of national identity.

This example clearly shows how the willingness to respect, promote and defend a heritage which is constitutive of identity ultimately shifts from the notion of *heritage* to that of the *claim*, if not *fabrication*.

After the arrival of new technologies, digitalisation, the Internet and mobile communications, we now appear to stand at the dawn of a new heritage era, a still more radical metamorphosis of the concept and its treatment. On this point, I would refer you to the excellent work which has recently appeared, *Mémoire année zéro*, by Emmanuel Hoog, president of the INA. It shows something of what lies behind the emergence of a totally fabricated heritage:

1. Unlimited storage capacity. The hard disk has effectively made it possible to conserve the trace of everything. The ideology of any utopian or dystopian memory has become a real possibility: keeping track of all humanity. This

is not a mere expansion of the potential of memory and thus of the enrichment of heritage; it is an absolute revolution.

2. With the generalisation of networking, with miniaturisation and the individual democratisation of these new technologies, it is the whole system of production, conservation, consumption and sharing of the components of heritage which has been overturned. Just think that in a single year, 2007, 420 billion individual photographs were taken, 50 million every hour.
3. Furthermore, with advances in indexing, it is possible to find anything that has been input in a few clicks. And that this input, must it be added, is definitive, eternal, you might say. In the digital era, in effect, the survival of content, of whatever kind, has freed itself from the lifespan of its medium. Anything can be migrated from one container to another.

We could highlight many other characteristics of this digital revolution, such as the removal of the borderline between public and private heritage, since there will no longer be any form of authority or regulatory hierarchy.

In a word, we have moved from a heritage of stock to a heritage of flows. Until now, heritage has referred to the *real*, established through the storage, collection, sorting, conservation and destruction of stable physical media. None of that applies to the explosion of new technologies, which offer the prospect of a purely *virtual* heritage, but one which results from a near-automatic recording of itself which humanity will wear as a carapace of heritage. A vision of hell.

But, at this stage, does it still make sense to speak of heritage?

At the conclusion of the initial heritage discussions organised by Mme de Saint Pulgent in 1994 on "Science and awareness of Heritage" I believed that the problems then posed by the state of the heritage could be summarised in the form of three questions: rupture or continuity? unity or fragmentation? a provisional or a definitive phenomenon?

Today, fifteen years on, we could ask these same questions, but with a different content. Because the most interesting aspect of the troubling question of the heritage, for an historian, is that the new questions which it poses have not replaced the old ones. They have added to them. We still need to control visitor numbers at Versailles and Mont Saint Michel, we still have to manage the Archives and the ordinary library, at the same time as regulating the Internet heritage.

These are the issues which I hope our two round tables will explore.

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Cultural heritage and national identities

Krzysztof POMIAN

Whether individuals or groups, the concept of identity answers a question relating to our relationship not with the past but with the future. In fact, when I ask myself: "Am I the same person today that I was years ago?", I immediately open up the prospect of asking myself: "In a few years' time, will I be the same as I am today?" These questions are complementary. Yet with the following difference – translation of the asymmetry of time – that the former contains a reply in the form of a report, while the reply to the latter can only take the form of a forecast based, at best, on reasoning by analogy, which supposes that the future will be related to the present just as the present is related to the past. This is far from being an infallible basis; but we have no other.

1.

In the case of identity, what is valid for individuals is just as valid for social groups and, first and foremost, for the nation. In this case however, it should be specified that this is a future conceived in qualitative terms and that therefore cannot be grasped using statistical techniques, with variable results, to describe the future state of the population or the economy. From a future that will incarnate the generations of which we ourselves will no longer constitute a part and of which it is the link with our own generation that is precisely the problem. Not the simple link of ancestry which enables certain predecessors to be considered forebears and certain successors descendants, but that identificational, emotional and intellectual link and that constitutes the consciousness one has of oneself, that includes both this one and that one in an expanded Us, consisting on the one hand of contemporaries with whom one shares a surname, a language, a territory, a heritage, a set of symbols, a past, a future and, on the other hand, past and future generations and who consequently impose with respect to the ancestors a duty of memory and with respect to descendants a duty of anticipation. Will this identificational link that incorporates us into the chain of generations be reproduced by our successors? For a very long time, we seem to have had no doubts on the subject. As for we ourselves, if we are speaking so much about national identity, it is because we have ceased to be sure of it.

For many centuries, the future was no problem for people. They were ignorant of where they stood and what would happen to them, for they believed everything to be predetermined, and that this had always been the case, through divine will or through the stars in their courses or both, acting on soul and body respectively. The position of the stars at the starting point of a great cycle was believed to trace the courses they travelled while simultaneously fixing all their conjunctions and oppositions. By placing one's faith in the story of *Genesis*, one acquired knowledge of the whole history of the world, including the way it would end, of which only the date remained a mystery. So it was not the future – the terrestrial future, of course – which was important in this perspective but, on the one hand, the distant past, the time of origins where what happens here down below emerges from the beyond and, on the other hand, the moment of passing from down here into the beyond: that of death for the individual and of the apocalypse for the human race.

It was in the eighteenth century that the balance of time was switched. Its centre of gravity moved from the past to the future. This is translated into the constitution of nations in the modern sense of the term, who are less and less united by the feeling of a community of ancestry dating back to a legendary age, which was the principal cement of the ancient nations, but to an increasing extent, to paraphrase Ernest Renan, through the will, reconfirmed on a daily basis, to live together in the tomorrow, through a shared project, a shared mission that they believed they were called upon to accomplish or rather that their poets and prophets, sometimes even their statesmen and public opinion, called upon them to accomplish. This is still true today of the United States, and to a lesser extent of France, but there are many other examples, even if in a residual state. This switching of time is also expressed in the constitution, alongside religion, ancient collective beliefs containing a deep attachment to the past and the supernatural, into new ways of thinking whose temporal orientation is material and futurocentric. These ideologies – for this is the name they have been given – have no doubts about the future, yet each of them offers a vision that contradicts the others. They also adopt different and mutually incompatible positions in the face of national identity. We shall come back to them.

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2.

The link between the question of identity and that of heritage - and more especially between the problem of national identity and that of the cultural heritage – becomes obvious as soon as one becomes aware that the former is organised with connections to the future. This also applies to the latter. This produces a set of objects that are sensitive, stables or unstable, that is to say, visible, tactile, audible, ones that can be smelled and tasted. A grouping of natural or artificial objects, movable or immovable, can only constitute a cultural heritage on condition that these elements have been extracted totally or partially from a utilitarian circuit of activities, constantly or regularly exposed to view and subject to special protection in order to be preserved for an indefinitely distant future. This is done by implementing technical and legal devices which, in the case of stable items, is done in order to save them from wear and tear, to preserve them in their original condition, to restore them if this is considered necessary, to protect them from depredations or theft and, in the case of unstable items, to enable them to be recreated at will by using the appropriate mechanisms.

This amounts to stating that the cultural heritage is primarily destined for future generations. It externalises and makes visible the attachments that unit us on the one hand with those who have gone before us and on the other with those who will follow us – links which cannot be reduced either to a succession over time nor to a simple genetic filiation but which are founded on a community of values and meanings.

Values because taking an item out of its circuit of utilitarian activity and surrounding it with protection presupposes that a distinguished status is being conferred upon it, separate from that of the usual items which we hold to be precious, exceptional, irreplaceable, uniquely worthy of being viewed, studied and admired; by conferring such a status upon it, we often distance ourselves, consciously, from our predecessors for whom several objects that we individualise in this way were merely utilitarian, and we assume that our actions will be continued in this way by our descendents.

Meanings because each object thus given an enhanced value is assumed to refer to the invisible – the beyond, the past – and that this is the case not only in general but when applied to a specific period, an event, even an individual, and that this gives it an interest that we assume will also be shared by our descendents. These meanings may change and they will effectively change over the course of time following our work of criticism. What remains invariable, however, it is a fact that all of the items of which the cultural heritage consists are full of meaning, "*semiophores*", objects that have no practical use but which are replete with meaning.

The objects that comprise the cultural heritage may have originally had a different status or may have changed their status in the course of their history; furthermore, neither their physical appearance nor their context remains immutable. But all have acquired a miraculous meaning, at the latest when they were recognised as having meaning for individuals or institutions because, by changing the manner of perceiving them and talking about them and the attitudes adopted with respect to them, such acknowledgement has simultaneously changed their function.

The cultural heritage also consists of institutions some of which collect, inventory, study, display, preserve and restore objects, others revive them, and still others teach how to admire them, decipher the signs they bear, explain them and enable an understanding of their meanings, and draw conclusions from all this concerning their genesis or their history. The boundary between these different purposes is blurred and has varied considerably. And the institutions themselves did not remain as they had been in the beginning. Their continuity is not an identity. Just like the meaning of the miracle-bearers, it is reproduced by successive generations. They also contain, in varying proportions, depending on the case, parts that are given, parts that are constructed, a part that is old and one that is new.

The story of the cultural heritage is different from that of the objects of which it is part. That story is a long one, dating back into the past as far as ancient fossils or at least as far back as the oldest human remains. And it consists of superimposed strata that represent the eras determined by the major changes in technology, habitat, population and collective beliefs. All this only began fairly recently with the emergence of an interest in the past as the past and with the adoption of measures protecting the remains thereof, in order to transmit them in good condition to future generations. It is a history of discourse and practices focusing on objects and the institutions that care for them; these scansions are the result of intellectual and political upheavals.

3.

In a country such as France, the elements of cultural heritage can have, as everyone knows, a status that can vary considerably in law. The only ones that interest us here are those that are subject to a protection that is so restrictive that it imposes limits on the right of ownership. Because only objects which are in this case, whether they belong to individuals, local authorities or the state, are also entitled to constitute part of the cultural heritage of the nation. But

this heritage does not exhaust the national heritage. Although there is a tendency to identify them with each other, the one does not boil down to the other.

Cultural heritage is only part of the nation's shared heritage. To identify the other part, let us look at the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. It is true that the word "patrimoine" [heritage, patrimony] is missing. But it is also missing from the Law of 31 December, 1913 concerning historic monuments and the law of 2 May, 1930 concerning the protection of natural monuments and sites of special artistic, historic, scientific and legendary interest or natural beauty; and it is only mentioned three times in the Law of 3 January, 1979 in the archives. These are the laws that are referred to as soon as regulations governing heritage are involved. It would therefore appear to be permissible to ask oneself whether the Constitution, even if the word is not used, should have something to say in some way on this very subject, that of the material and non-material property that living generations of the French, taken collectively, received from their forebears, and that can be considered as belonging to the nation or the people, both terms being taken here as being synonymous.

An inventory of everything which, according to the Constitution, belongs to the shared French heritage, produces the following results (in the order in which they appear in the text): "Rights of man and principles of national sovereignty defined by the Declaration of 1789, supplemented and confirmed by the preamble to the Constitution of 1946"; the Republic; the national emblem; the national anthem and the coat of arms of the Republic; the French language; national sovereignty, which is said to "belong to the people" and "that no section of the people nor any individual may attribute the exercise thereof to itself"; the principles of democracy; French territory in its entirety; the State, consisting principally of the administration and defence of the nation; the public sector; "the independence of the judiciary"; the regional and local authorities of the Republic (communes, départements, overseas territories).

All of the elements that have just been listed already existed when the Fifth Republic was born. And its founders considered them to be so important that they did not want or could not touch it. What we are dealing with here, therefore, is a heritage in the strictest meaning of the term. But it is only very partially that of the cultural heritage. Because, although there are indeed a few exceptions, the Constitution does not mention either "semiophores" or the institutions that have them in their care. The Declaration of Human Rights is clearly a "semiophore", if it is identified with a document preserved in the National Archives. The Constitution mentions this document, however, not as an object but because it defines the fundamentals of law.

The heritage that the Constitution is concerned with consists of rules, standards, prohibitions; of codified, formalised models, individual and collective behaviour in the conduct of the nation's affairs. We can speak in relation thereto of institutional heritage. This differs from cultural heritage by extension: it concerns the whole French nation because it defines the more general context of its public life. It also varies therefrom because it contains provisions with which anyone who does not wish to be punished for failure to comply with the law has to comply. As for the cultural heritage – setting aside compulsory schooling – it consists of what individuals are assumed to have imbibed of their own free will by choosing from its content those elements that are of interest to them.

Just like the elements of the cultural heritage, the elements of the institutional heritage superimpose themselves on each other, forming strata each of which represents an era in the history of France. Very schematically, the integrity of the territory, the official character of the French language and the State in its role as administrator and defender all originate with the Ancien Regime. The Declaration of Human Rights, national sovereignty and the Republic with its emblem, its national anthem, its coat of arms and its division into départements are the legacy of the Revolution. Democracy as well as the independence of the judiciary were bequeathed by the second half of the nineteenth century. And the preamble to the 1946 Constitution represents, along with the public sector enterprises, the contribution made by the immediate post-war period.

4.

The French institutional heritage thus records the significant stages of the emergence of the nation. Directed today against separatist particularism, the affirmation of the integrity of the territory has replaced the legitimacy of feudal parcelling of land and the transfer of territory for dynastic reasons. It signified that the population is not an item of property that can change ownership as the result of a transaction but is part of a political entity, in this case France, to which it is linked for the duration. And it has drawn a boundary between France and the neighbouring countries, a mental boundary even before it was written into the terrain. Of course, putting the principle of integrity of the territory into practice took centuries, during which the territory of France as a whole expanded considerably. But the only point that concerns us here is that effect of the principle was to reinforce the cohesion of the inhabitants of France in consideration of the progressive realisation by them that as a whole it constitutes their homeland.

In the same way, the affirmation of the privileged status of the French language in the territory of France, which entered into law in 1539 with the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts but which existed de facto well before that, presupposes that this is the language that enables all of the inhabitants of the country to understand each other and it is thus the language that should constitute the link between the population and justice. As everyone knows, for a long time the reality was very different. The affirmation of a privileged status for the French language was in fact a plan whose implementation operated in the sense of linguistic unification of the population of France, by first leading to a breakdown of the language barrier between scholarly culture and popular culture and later resulting in a policy of a battle against "patois" and the imposition of the official language upon all in the context of the republican school and an army supplied through conscription.

Now let us come to the State that provides the inhabitants of France with a focus of identification that may be even more important than the territory and the language since it incarnates the unity of the country in the person of the king, in the administration, the justice system and the army. As the carrier of continuity, diving deep into the distant past and extending far into the distant future, the State causes each individual to rethink his belonging to a much wider group than his lineage or family, village, town, city or province; he belongs to the French nation which, like the State and thanks to him, is immortal. Furthermore, the intention of the State is to deliberately reinforce the cohesion of this group, by organising the defence and dealing with the management of the territory, by imposing the usage of the French language, maintaining public order and deploying a whole cult of personality around the king and the institutions of the kingdom.

For it is to the king that sovereignty belongs. The French, as the king's subjects, in their immense majority, has no say in the institutions – the laws, taxes, peace and war, the decisions relating thereto being reserved for a small hereditary group. As for the nation, it is presumed to be united by the monarchy and to have no existence except as personified by the king. Without him, it is nothing. Consequently, it possesses nothing. The idea of a national heritage, whether cultural or institutional, was inconceivable when seen through this perspective.

This fiction of a nation held together by the monarchy was rent asunder in 1789. The Declaration of Human Rights and of the Citizen proclaims: "The principle of any sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body, no individual can exercise authority unless it specifically emanates therefrom". The reversal thus operated in the relationship between the king and the nation enters into the Constitution of 1791. "Sovereignty […]", it proclaims, "belongs to the nation, no section of the people, no individual, may attribute itself the exercise thereof". We should note in passing that heritage is also one of those formulaic expressions that a constitution was to copy from another, one hundred and sixty-seven years hence. And let us remember the conclusion drawn in 1791 from the new definition of sovereignty. From now on it was the king with a small r, who had to swear allegiance to the Nation with a capital N.

5.

But as early as autumn, 1789, the nation whose representatives from now on had given themselves the exclusive right to decide its affairs, acquired an almost tangible reality following the adoption of the principle whereby it was the owner of these absolutely material goods that were the property of the clergy. The law that turned this into "national property" – the first nationalisation law in the history of France – was intended purely to enable the kingdom's finances to be restored to health. Yet it is this that is at the origin of the national cultural heritage, the very expression "national heritage" having been invented, according to Edouard Pommier, in Autumn, 1790 when it was necessary to pass laws concerning the destiny of the "books, manuscripts, medals, machines, pictures, engravings and other objects of this nature" that had belonged to the clergy.

The search for a solution to this problem, as well as to a similar problem posed by the nationalisation of the property of the crown, led to a whole series of decisions of which only the three most important for the history of cultural heritage will be mentioned here. These are the Decree of 12 September, 1792 concerning the creation of the Louvre Museum, the Decree of 24 October, 1793 concerning the protection of the national heritage and the Decree of 7 Messidor, Year II (25 June, 1794) which founded the National Archives. To these should be added the creation, following a report by Guizot dated 21 October, 1830, of the post of inspector-general of Historic Monuments, a distant consequence of the nationalisation of the property of the clergy and the wave of demolition of monuments which was the result of the sale thereof. It was, in fact, during the discussion concerning the possible negative effect of the sale of national property that, according to Andre Chastel, the expressions "historic monuments" and "national antiquities" were first used.

The transformation of the French nation from a nation of subjects to a nation of citizens lasted for about a century. This can be seen very clearly in the history of the effective operation of a national cultural heritage. Because the decisions that have just been mentioned were those that created the ideological, legislative and material conditions

for the conservation of the *semiophores* that became national property. In this sense, they laid the foundations for the institution of heritage. But they only made access available to the public on a very restrictive basis. This continued to be the prerogative of a minority of the educated classes and notables.

Up until the 1870s, museums were rare in France, as they were elsewhere. And rare means remote, both geographically and spiritually from the mass of the population. Incidentally, it was often difficult to gain entrance. To visit the Louvre and the Luxembourg during the week, you needed to have an exhibiting artist's card or that of the pupil of a well-known lecturer or, in the case of foreigners, show your passport; the public were only freely admitted on Sunday. This was the case until 1855.

Despite article 37 of the Law of 7 Messidor, Year II, the National Archives were virtually closed; under the 1856 regulation, in order to have the right to consult the documents requested immediately or the right to a substantiated refusal, one had to be a civil servant, member or laureate of the Institute, doctor of a faculty, archivist-palaeographer or student at the Ecole des Chartes [the librarians' school of the Sorbonne]. It was not until 1887 that the right to consult documents more than fifty years old was granted to anyone asking for them.

Until the 1860s, there were very few classified historic monuments, as Jacques de Groote has shown, and to which the public's attention was drawn for this reason; true, the upkeep of many religious buildings, including cathedrals, was the responsibility, prior to the law that introduced the separation between church and state, of the Ministry of Religions. The number of buildings so classified increased from 1862, exceeding the boundaries of religious architecture in the direction of prehistory in the case of megaliths, towards military architecture in the case of the châteaux, and into mural paintings. According to André Chastel this did not prevent "the ancient elements being abandoned to the intellectuals, the artists, the scholars, who are eager to write their history, reconstitute their shapes […] No one cares when the upper storey of the marvellous cloister of Saint-Guilhem-le-Desert is moved, or half of that of Saint-Michel-de-Cuxa; we are surprised to learn one day that they have become ornaments in the Cloisters Museum in New York. France has justly been dubbed, to as great an extent as Italy, as "antique dealers' heaven".

6.

The time of the Third Republic marked a genuine turning-point in the history of our national cultural heritage. For it was then that it became *de facto* and *de jure* accessible to the French and it therefore ceased to be solely "national" in the sense that the items of which it consists were definitively attached by law to the territory of France and where the institutions that had custody of them became part of the State administration. The heritage also became "national" in the sense that these objects could from now on be viewed, read, admired or studied by anyone who wished to do so, citizen or foreigner, as if the right to have access to elements of the heritage had been recognised as a human right.

This turning-point which progressively placed heritage within reach of the nation –which in this case was considered as a set of individuals – cannot be separated from two legislative moves whose importance does not need to be commented upon. These are the Decree of 5 March, 1848 introducing universal suffrage for all men aged over twenty-one, and the Law of 30 November, 1875 that confirmed it. It cannot be separated, in other words, from the advent of democracy. For it is uniquely in an egalitarian perspective that it is evident that every individual should have the same access, in principle, to the semiophores the visiting of which will enable them to cultivate and cause to flourish that which is considered to constitute in each a person and more particularly a French person. And in a democratic regime it becomes essential for the elected representatives to abolish, in the public sphere, and thus with respect to access to the cultural heritage, any distinction between citizens other "than that of their virtues and their talents", on pain of being condemned by the voters.

There was still a wait of more than a century until right to access to the heritage was actually made use of on a grand scale. It is only in the course of the last few decades that exhibitions, museums and historic monuments have managed to draw such dense crowds that the question now arises of limiting the number of visitors in the name of the imperatives of conservation. This new interest in heritage has lasted for too long – more than thirty years – and is of too widespread a nature to be a mere vagary of fashion.

There is no doubt that the upheavals experienced during the Second French Revolution of the years 1965-1984, diagnosed and described by Henri Mendras, aroused a need to reaffirm continuity, similar to that aroused in their day by the violent upheavals of the First French Revolution and that translated itself into the vogue for the Gothic and the Middle Ages in general. But this explanation, although feasible, is not adequate. There is every reason to believe, in fact, that the interest in heritage is the result today mainly and above all of the deeper displacements which not only in France but throughout the West, have affected the way in which the very national identity is understood and experienced.

7.

On this point, we need to return to the ideologies. Setting aside those that baldly deny any national identity because the future they recommend should result from a breach with the present and the recent past, a breach which, according to the revolutionaries, will confer upon future society completely unexpected characteristics and especially it will dissolve nationhood into the human race; according to the reactionaries, it should bring back the distant past into force and result in the subordination of the nation to Christianity. Everyone else stands somewhere between these two extreme tendencies.

One person may believe the national identity to reside in a "spirit" that supposedly impregnates all those who belong to a particular nation and that expresses itself in their way of thinking that conditions all of their activities. This impregnation was supposed to result from the influence of traditional institutions as well as that exercised through climate and the soil. What are the traditional institutions that thus maintain the national identity? In every European country the answer has provoked violent political debate. In France, it set monarchists against republicans and Roman Catholics against secularists; subordinately, it also created conflict among the various currents within each camp.

Another tendency considered support for the national identity to be of a "national character" manifested in the psyche and conduct of individuals and that, being determined at source by the natural environment, was an inherited characteristic; according to a variation in this position, even certain physical traits are part of this "national character".

There was no symmetry between these two tendencies. The former incorporated in its very definition of national identity an opening up to the universal and consequently acting with a view to a future in which all the inhabitants of a country would be impregnated with the same "spirit". The latter was the obvious result of every universalism; according to this theory, nations were the equivalent of biological species and humanity was a fiction, leading its advocates to prepare for a future in which the nation would comply with its invisible essence at the cost of the radical exclusion of any who in their eyes appeared to have been born of foreign blood and was therefore rootless.

Over the course of time, more and more monarchists and Catholics have tended to subscribe to this belief. At the same time, racism and anti-Semitism have moved to centre stage, which, while bearing on political issues and institutions, claimed French national identity to be at stake. This confrontation, that has coursed through the history of France since the eighteenth century, becoming intensified under the Revolution, took a turn for the worse during the era of the Dreyfus Case and reached its paroxysm during the Vichy regime, resulting in civil war.

Remaining oneself thus signified for a nation either preserving its traditional institutions – for some this was the monarchy and the Church, for others the secular Republic – either "purity of blood" or "purity of race", or both. The cultural heritage in the narrowest sense of the term was held to be revelatory of the "spirit" of a nation, according to some, or of the "national character", according to others, but only played a subordinate role with respect to the institutional heritage or the "race" understood in an almost biological sense. Some saw the cultural heritage of a nation as the expression of its cultural superiority, others, as proof of its aspirations to dominate inferior peoples. But both groups only accorded it limited interest.

8.

Such a mentality can only foster nationalist and xenophobic excess of all kinds, a mentality shaped by ideologies that put national identity at the centre of often-violent controversy. But this does not make it any the more problematic. Even those who recommend a future in which nations shall have reincorporated the Church into an integral prospect of Catholicism, or one in which they have simply disappeared into a revolutionary internationalism, has not denied the reality of an identificational link between the living generation, its ancestors and its descendents in the context of a nation; they only wanted to extend it to the whole of humanity. As for the rest, they considered it as a natural progression. Things did not change until the gradual loss of the ideologies' hold over the masses and over the intellectuals as a result of the secularisation of the mentalities of Ultramontanism [the doctrine of papal supremacy] and fundamentalist Catholicism, following World War II in the case of monarchist and racist nationalisms and following the crisis of hope in the future manifested since the late 1970s by the dashing of revolutionary hopes. This also follows advances in European integration and globalisation. It is in such a climate that national identity has become problematic and that cultural heritage has acquired a centrality, when contemplating the subject, that it never had hitherto, when it were mere of interest to the specialists.

The problematic nature of national identity today results primarily from the disappearance, already touched upon, of the certainty that the identificational link that incorporates us in the chain of generations, in the context of a nation, will be retied identically by our successors, however remote they may be in relation to ourselves. In other words, it

results from the conviction that it is ours, that national identity is not a given, even less an immutable given, and that it is not guaranteed to last into an indefinitely distant future. In other words, that it is not borne by a timeless transcendental entity nor by a nature that is equally timeless. As the product of history, it bears the hallmark of historicity and finiteness like all human endeavours. This general philosophical affirmation says nothing of the expiry dates that come into being and that are the only ones of any importance for the politicians. As for myself, I am inclined to consider them in terms of centuries. But the fact that national identity ought not to be an immutable, does not mean that anyone has the right to hold it to be something artificial, imagined, invented, that can be manufactured or erased at will, with a little effort at most. Such a position is just as unilateral and simplistic as the reverse. The problematic nature of national identity is also related to the impossible position in which we find ourselves if we wish to avoid falling back into an ideology, to satisfy ourselves in relation thereto from a global and uniform point of view, whatever it may be. Unless we reduce it to a very general affirmation that national identity is reproduced from one generation to the next that each creates in its own way.

If this is so, then in each case we are dealing with a complex work of transmission and receipt, repetition and modification, rejection and re-updating, recording and innovation – work from which national identity would not emerge unscathed and that would force us to replace the global and uniform point of view with localised studies, sensitive to diversity. This would lead us to determine that, strictly speaking, national identity is not a single entity. The term *identity*, with its Leibnitzian association with the principle of identity, is to a certain extent misleading. For what we are really dealing with is a succession of changes which in fact, generally, are relatively small on the scale of human life and which, only under exceptional circumstances, are perceived as being catastrophic and menacing. We are therefore dealing with a succession of changes which, for some people, cancel themselves out, for others are added and amplified, with a succession of continuities and breaches, of looming up, of disappearance. In short something pretty complicated and whose changing nature is not well covered by the word *identity*.

9.

It has already been said: both approaches to national identity, the spiritualist and the naturalist, have discredited both in philosophy and in the human and social sciences, while World War II deprived them of any political legitimacy. As ideologies, they have lost much of their power of attraction and find themselves marginalised. And this is what has enabled the promotion of cultural heritage to the role of the main prop for a national identity.

This translates, in fact, the new way of thinking of it, not in metaphysical but in historical terms. And this makes it possible to see in it not something that is transmitted through heredity, virtually automatically, but something that each generation needs to acquire through its own effort, by appropriating to itself the legacy of preceding generations, who have left their imprint upon it and to which it adds its own contribution. This also makes it possible to see something that is more open-minded that is not transmitted untouched but which varies over the course of time, assimilating new elements and losing some of the oldest of them. This also makes it possible to take into account the intrinsic diversity of the nation, the fact that it consists of groups that differ in terms of their income and levels of education, their occupations and lifestyles, their beliefs, their culture linked to their age range, their origins, in short, with whatever they may possess in terms of languages spoken, religions practised, customs, memories and expectations. Unlike the “national spirit” and the “national character” that smack of uniformity and centralisation, cultural heritage is pluralistic, singularised by local conditions and the individuality of groups. The national identity that it carries may appear to be more fragile than in former times and this may well be the case. Hence the disquiet concerning the reproduction of a sufficiently strong identificational link to hold the plurality of groups together of which the nation consists, and counteracting the action of the centrifugal forces. Hence the strategic importance vested in educational establishments and cultural institutions both of which have been made responsible for ensuring the transmission of that without which one can no longer speak of upholding nationhood.

The interest manifested in cultural heritage today, both in politicians and in the general population, also translates a new way of perceiving nationhood, that accepts – not without resistance or difficulty – its internal diversity, or even its conflictual nature, and its inclusion in far more extensive entities – Europe and the world.

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The Internet: innovations, illusions and the need for the state

Jean-Noël JEANNENEY

Despite the fact that Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres has just said that we should always try to look to the future, which is generally a good idea, I would like to start with a reminder of the past. All publishing historians know that the invention of printing in the 15th century was met with mixed, if not violently conflicting feelings amongst those concerned, such as the growing Humanist movement, academics, those involved in intellectual and artistic processes, and those involved in what had until then been the main media for the dissemination of culture, meaning largely, manuscripts. Contemporaries, then, were caught between excitement over this magnificent expansion of religious and cultural heritage and the concomitant spread of new ideas, and the very real fear that the existing order of things might be overthrown and cultures crushed by overwhelming new forces. This upheaval also manifested itself in dramatic changes to people's jobs: the rapid decline of copyists and illuminators, with, on the other hand a boom in typographers, many of whom were re-skilled precious metal workers, and also booksellers, who at that time both made and sold books.

Well now, it seems to me that you don't need to be a history buff to conclude that what we are seeing today, as we are buffeted by the knock-on effects of new technologies, is the expression of similarly mixed feelings at the dawn of our own revolution, and one which is only just beginning.

We are experiencing a justifiable sense of joy, often even intoxication, recalling Borges: on learning that the universal Library comprised all books, he said "the first impression was one of extravagant joy". I would like all thinking about the cultural industries, and the effects that new technologies have on them, to be fundamentally (in the true sense of the word) underpinned by a sense of immense satisfaction in response to the overwhelming evidence that for our generation, and those which succeed it, this is in many regards a marvellous and beneficial resource.

And yet at the same time we also see that same uncertainty which those early humanists felt and which can sometimes express itself as anxiety: does not an entire system for disseminating truth and beauty risk being dismantled because it is too radically altered to ensure that human evolution continue unchallenged? Of course we often reassure ourselves with the reminder that each time a new medium appears, the naysayers thereby sound the death knell for all existing media, yet all instances of such backward-looking hand wringing, (collected examples of which might easily form a comic anthology), have gone on to be proven wrong, and the existing media have continued, albeit in modified forms, to confirm their usefulness and vitality.

It remains the case however that just because this has always been so, whether recently or in the dim and distant past, does not mean that the stability which reigned over successive generations of media is destined to continue for all time. Perhaps this situation will be entirely different? Historians are always torn between two tendencies, the first being to cry "There's nothing new under the sun!" and then "History never repeats itself, every new situation is different". In such a spirit, one of our teachers, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, a professor at the Sorbonne, liked to contrast a verse by Leconte de Lisle, "What worth is there in that which is not eternal?" to another by Vigny, "Love that which you will never see twice…"

I don't know which of these approaches you will choose to take to the amazing innovations we are now seeing emerging. But in order to throw out a few ideas to you in response to this polarised investigation, I shall look successively at three major innovations, then the dangers of three widely-held and pernicious illusions, and finally the need for three public resolutions, and by that I mean through the state, and more specifically, the Ministry whose fiftieth anniversary we are here to celebrate.

I wish to cite three major, if not radical, innovations which concern the public's relationship with artistic works, with creators, with authors and of course with the industries and businesses which disseminate them, which is our main theme.

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It seems that firstly we must highlight, if not actually celebrate, a different relationship with posterity with regard to accessing works. I am thinking less of the speed at which technical innovations take off –after all, the internet was not much quicker to become part of our contemporaries' everyday lives than the telephone or radio, as a recently-published survey showed[1]. I am thinking more of the speed at which this cultural data circulates, which until recently and since the existence of the telegraph, was reserved solely for certain type of information; this speed is now what determines the singular dealings that each individual can have with cultural works.

I am thinking especially of the freedom which this offers us in relation to the transience of information flows, in the audiovisual sphere: until now, their scheduled outputs could not interrupted, save for a few rare tape recordings, and therefore be made available to us at the precise time we wanted them. This is now common practice thanks to downloadable broadcasts - I nearly used the proscribed English term *podcast* there!- which instantly frees us from the tyranny of rigidly fixed schedules, a privilege which previously only the medium of books and records granted us, allowing us the freedom to use and enjoy them at our own leisure.

Another major evolution, relating to similar issues, concerns the relationship which we have with the uniqueness of artistic works. Of course, for some time now print reproductions have generated money and fame for many original artworks. And of course Élie Faure and Malraux, in the evocation of an imaginary museum, have already discussed the remarkable transformations made possible through the most recent innovation allowing the dissemination of as many copies of reproductions of major works as one might wish to be known. However this phenomenon has been heightened exponentially with the advent of the most recent technologies. Moreover, it is striking that for a generation now at least, photographs have been trying their best to resist the infinite multiplication effect by trying to identify print runs, thereby restoring to each work a sense of uniqueness. It's hard not to see this as a vital protest against this phenomenon.

The third innovation lies in the different relationship with the integrity of the works themselves. I am well aware that Marcel Duchamp had already put moustaches on the Mona Lisa, but this only really represents a fairly limited act of creativity. However, we know that everything, or almost everything, becomes possible through the handling of works across the Web, and not just music, which tends to be the first example that springs to mind. This opportunely opens up a new arena to works which could turn out to be extremely valuable, yet the focus remains on the easy and quickly unbearable violation of the creator's moral right, a right which is staunchly defended within the European system and which, since Beaumarchais, - notwithstanding European Commissioner Mrs Viviane Reding's views on the matter, obsessed as she is with the USA – has differentiated our system from that of *copyright*.

Such upheavals and radical transformations are bound to lead even the wisest of souls into three major illusions. However, these should be quickly dispelled if we wish to prevent the ambivalence inherent in this innovation from leading to disaster, whether for the cultural industries or for culture itself; and moreover, for an enlightened Republic.

The first illusion, which is all too familiar to us, is the idea that an Adam Smith-style invisible hand will guide everything to work efficiently; the notion that through some strange alchemy of selfish individual and corporate impulses, through the confusion of such a maelstrom of new enthusiasms, opposing forces and feverish imaginations, the sum of these interests might spontaneously lead us to the best of all possible worlds. This is no time to cite Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*[2], we should not be content to think that the sum, the outline of "private vices" (let us see this not in moral but in anthropological terms) might guarantee "public virtues". No, the conviction that a society in which public authority did not intervene would spontaneously become a happy one on the basis of tensions which are quite otherwise must be dispelled; to protect us from it, the light of history merges with a clear view of the new landscape which unfurls before us.

The second illusion would have us believe that collective creation will henceforth be the rule, frequently relegating individual creation to the background, and that it would therefore have to be specifically promoted. No-one would deny that teamwork can bring invaluable results, as long evidenced by artistic endeavours in theatre, radio, television and cinema; the web now allows the proliferation of collaborative work between geographically distant parties.

1. Olivier DONNAT, *les Pratiques culturelles des Français à l'ère numérique,* Paris, Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, DEPS/La Découverte, 2009.

2. *The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits,* published 1714, developed the theory of the social utility of selfishness. This text served to inspire a number of writers.

Yet it is abundantly clear that the individual creation loses none of its worth or virtues, despite the influence of the internet.

Whilst I don't want to get embroiled in the wider debate about Wikipedia, let it suffice to say that the collective gathering of knowledge, conducted voluntarily and therefore honourably, has failed to overcome the two major drawbacks of this exercise, namely the lack of peer-reviewed information and the problem of prioritising what information is and is not essential to a clear understanding of human evolution and civilisation.

The third and perhaps gravest illusion would have us believe that we are currently passing into an enchanted universe in which everything is free of charge. Oh yes indeed! We must fight tooth and nail against this illusion, for should it triumph it will undoubtedly lead us directly into cultural atrophy. Culture would thereby become "Jivaroised", raped and pillaged, leaving in its wake the dead husks of burnt-out industries.

This takes us back to the ferocious debates which took place in the 19th century regarding intellectual property rights. Various proponents defended the perhaps extreme notion that intellectual property rights should be eternal and equivalent to immovable property rights, the immaterial merging with the material. Others, such as Louis Blanc, took the opposite view, reducing the creator to a mere conduit for Truth and Beauty, bringing them forth from a world which already implicitly contained them. An artist could only then take the credit for somehow bringing forth what was already latent in the world around him and his talent, and therefore basking in the reflected glory of this exalted task should be adequate recompense for him. The latter view has since fallen from favour, and rightly so! I am well aware that in France there has long been an unwavering belief that life cannot not be patented; if you happen to grow an unusually blue carnation you should not be seen as having the right to possess the principle behind it, although if you write *Madame Bovary*, it's a different matter entirely…

It therefore bears repeating endlessly, and if there is a single conviction which should underpin all of our discussions I would propose this one: the notion that culture comes free of charge is a nonsense. Citizens always pay for it, whether they pay as buyers, on a per-piece basis as it were, or whether they pay as a taxpayer, paying a more or less fixed fee, or whether indeed they pay as consumers through advertising (it is imperative to remind them of this repeatedly). This then only leaves the issue of which of these methods is the most efficient in terms of the prosperity, vitality and diversity of culture.

All of this inevitably leads us to consider the roles and duties of the state in connection or even in conflict, but most often, one hopes, in agreement with the cultural industries. The state being understood, of course, to comprise all national authorities, central government, the ministry that we are here to celebrate, as well as local authorities and all that which is invested with public authority.

And so, it falls to the state to couple its own forces to those driving the quest for profit, to regulate its effects (here, and in all other areas), without ever allowing the forces of both collective interest and private industry to contradict or destroy each other. It is certainly not a question of having to act heavy-handedly within an area, the web, whose network-like structure is its overriding strength; nor is it a question of ever neglecting any aspect of the state's unique civic mission, whether it intervenes through regulatory means or, if necessary through direct action, as we see for example in the audiovisual field.

The state's primary function from the point of view of what we are here to discuss, and we do not stress this highly enough, is to ensure that those aspects of knowledge and culture which the web and other digital media bring us endure. I am thinking for example of the archiving of that which is available online and the collection of new archives which are also available online. How can we accept, that all that information concerning, for instance, what has been done, said, expressed on the occasion of referenda or the last presidential and legislative elections simply vanish or be erased? We would be condemning future generations to understand nothing of how democratic options are formed, if they cannot retrospectively access these treasures, carefully harvested and indexed.

The state has a further duty which does not receive enough attention, that of carrying out, or at least guaranteeing the "migration" of data, (as specialist librarians refer to it), that is, the ability of data to keep up with evolving technological formats over time. It is the function of the state, as the "master of clocks" to oversee this evolution. This goes not just for music but for the entire digital audiovisual field. France's *Institut national de l'audiovisuel* (national audiovisual institute) has amply demonstrated the price of the mission which it oversees, particularly with regard to the law on statutory deposit of 20 June 1992, which I was proud to take to Parliament and which was implemented in France, leading the way for all other countries concerned about preserving for posterity traces of radio and television.

This media migration should certainly be done with the support of the cultural industries, but without ever consigning to them ownership of the metadata, or exclusive control over their preservation and exploitation. It's not hard to see what I am referring to, even if I don't want to use this platform to reiterate the views just expressed by Mr Donnedieu de Vabres and in support of which I have campaigned hard elsewhere both recently and in the past, as part of a crusade for the European digital library.

The state's second main mission in its dialogue with the private cultural industries is to help guide citizens through the chaos, the sea of knowledge. When we use that precious tool the computer, the main risk we probably run is descending into chaos. To know everything is to know nothing. The ultimate danger is to not have that thread to guide us through the labyrinth; this is the inherent danger for all of us and the greatest cause of inequality between users. This "digital divide" separates those who, like most of us here, perhaps for reasons of merit and probably through social privilege, have a guiding principle which helps them plot a route to what they want through this immense resource, to select it and to classify it, from those who are not fortunate enough to have that.

The state must offer other classification criteria than those defined by the quest for profit, by counterbalancing the effect of advertising and destroying the success mechanism which automatically favours those who have already succeeded. I would like to borrow a phrase from Françoise Benhamou, who herself borrowed it from an idea by sociologist Robert Merton; she refers to the "Matthew effect" of culture, citing the Gospel of St Matthew, (25-29): "For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath". This is the natural order of things, where, if left unchallenged, wealth attracts wealth, like iron filings to a magnet, and where the best-known works, through the well-known snowball effect, are always the top of the rankings. A living culture feeds on opportunities given to those things which are yet to take their place in it: Stendal, who thought he should be read long after his death, would never have made the top of any search engine page rankings…in an arena in which the *Da Vinci Code* outranks Leonardo.

The issue of access to journals provides another example. You know how powerful the JStor system is within many universities, which allows subscribers (through institutionally-provided access) to browse all manner of Anglophone journals. As soon as this system starts to be installed in a monopolistic way, it begins a vicious circle which disadvantages us: by only having access to articles through this route, French researchers could only then get themselves known and recognised in English, thereby strengthening a dominant system violently opposed to all hope of cultural diversity. Having now created a system which we called Cairn[4], (with which the *Bibliothèque nationale de France* recently got involved at my behest) the equivalent of JStor in French, and by encouraging other major world languages to do the same, we have contributed to at least limiting somewhat this train of events, and all through a state-sponsored initiative.

More generally speaking it is down to the public authorities to bring order amidst chaos, to propose the organisation of approval systems, without in any way restricting intellectual freedom, on the basis of long-standing skills whose efficacy it is to co-ordinate.

Finally I come to the third mission which falls to the public authorities: combating all private monopolies within the cultural industries, and indeed any oligopolies, with a view to improving that very diversity I have just championed, and whilst staying alert to the threat posed by private actors who, as is natural, tend to exercise their powers as far as they can. I have no moral judgement to make on this matter, it is enough to simply state that this is the way things are.

Although Americans themselves have been aware of this for some time now and are using solid antitrust legislation to combat monopolies within their own country, it is perfectly natural that they are not similarly aware of the risks of this kind of monopoly at a global level. Consequently it is down to others to tackle this in international terms. Moreover, lots of regional bodies and cultural powers are involved in similar ventures: I give an example here from Japan as I just happen to have returned from there, where I learned that to avoid leaving their heritage to the mercy of a single foreign search engine, the *Diet*, which is responsible for its National Library, has just decided to invest 90 million euros in the digitization of over a million works over the next year and a half.

3. A method of calculating the popularity of a website page.

4. Cairn.info was a joint venture between four publishing houses (Belin, De Boeck, La Découverte and Érès) responsible for publishing and distributing social science and humanities journals; their aim was to improve their online presence and offer the technical and business tools to do so to other parties wishing to make their publications available electronically. In February 2006, France's national library, the *Bibliothèque nationale de France* got involved with this project by helping to develop a Francophone publishing service in a digital format. JStor (short for *Journal Storage*) is an online archive of academic publications. An American company, it was founded in 1995.

This kind of state regulation clearly implies support to all those, whether creators, publishers or mediatory bodies of any kind, (including of course libraries) who run up against Google's arrogant robbery, something which goes hand-in-hand with monopoly; an arrogance clad in moral considerations, claiming to be working for the good of humanity whilst making a fat pile of cash. On this matter, the economist Edmund Phelps recently said to me "In America we are wary of those who behave like this and we say to them "If you want to do good, you mustn't do well". Three centuries ago, La Rochefoucauld was saying the same thing: "Virtues are lost in self-interest as rivers are lost in the sea".

Without wishing to downplay its importance, or indeed the risk it represents I have kept until last the issue of piracy, which needs to be combated unflinchingly and unremittingly. The great search engine robbery which I have just referred to, digitising without authorisation huge passages, well beyond the right of quotation, from books which are still under copyright, is clearly a form of piracy which should be fiercely denounced and combated.

To conclude, I would like to warn against several temptations. The first is to suggest that the nation and Europe are outdated systems; this is to cheapen the outstanding value that collective action at this level can represent and to ignore the fact that the internet is simultaneously a worldwide globalisation movement and a defence and illustration of cultural specificity.

It is also tempting to say that we should abandon regulation because it might in many ways be unworkable, taking into account globalisation itself, and consequently be contravened, at least at the fringes. To my mind, this is rather like those who, in Joseph Caillaux's era on the eve of the First World War, were resisting income tax, by saying: "Income tax is a good idea, but alas, the bourgeoisie will always find all manner of convenient ways to evade it. You will thus pass a futile law on the basis of excellent principles, thereby bringing the state into disrepute. So it would, regrettably, be better to abandon the entire exercise". It seems on the contrary, imperative in this instance not to give up. Rules can always be bent and infringed, but neither in symbolic or concrete terms should one see this as a reason to abandon them entirely.

The final temptation is to be put off by the enormity of the task in hand. I have often cited General de Gaulle –and I do so again with even greater pleasure on the fiftieth anniversary of the Ministry of Culture which he founded- when he christened the head of one of the major evening papers "Mr It-Must-Fail"…

My parting wish is to exhort you to refuse to allow the "It-Must-Fail" brigade to dominate our thoughts and actions; they await us at every turn, every turn of the path that takes us into the future and forward to success through civic action and the ambitions of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs.

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France's Cultural Influence

Hubert VÉDRINE

When Maryvonne de Saint Pulgent invited me to attend a conference meticulously organised and chaired by Elie Bamavie to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Ministry of Culture, I of course said yes, it would be my pleasure. Of course, the Ministry and I go back a long way: it is there that I first started out as a young civil servant straight out of France's National School of Administration, the ENA, ending up as Jérôme Clément's successor. I have such positive memories of the four years I spent there that I was happy to be associated with this event; I therefore come here not only as a political analyst but also as a friend and colleague. I don't know what you envisaged, Maryvonne, when you first conceived of these seminars, but I see the potential for them to be innovative and creative events, rather than simply commemorative landmarks.

It is with a great deal of affection that I wish to speak of the Ministry where I have so enjoyed working, and the remarkable people with whom I worked, their determination, their convictions and their ideals. However, I also approach this conference in a spirit of enquiry, because, for some time now, I have been asking myself, what on earth is the Ministry of Culture's role, in the current climate? However, not having had to work as a Minister for Culture, I haven't been called upon to put my own thoughts on this matter into words. Now that I am to do so, I hope that my contribution will serve to further enliven the debate here.

From the 1970s onwards, I have kept a close and interested eye on what goes on at the Ministry of Culture. And I have asked myself what a minister or ministry can hope to do, in a world in which your average person spends four hours each day in front of the television, watching programmes which we know but not Arte, the Franco German culture channel – You know those surveys where they ask "What is your favourite television channel?" and people respond "the Arte channel", well, when we compare the response rates to the actual viewing rates, this is clearly not the case. Not to mention the time spent gazing at other screens, which beam out both the best and worst content. A world in which we spend our lives communicating without ever talking. Never mind the maelstrom of globalisation which has created a whole new world order.

So I ask myself what impact a ministry of culture can hope to make, as the world we now live in has so little in common with that in which André Malraux planned and organised this ministry, nor with the remarkable work carried out by Jacques Duhamel and Jacques Rigaud There is still nothing in common even when I consider, given the slow and mysterious processes which form our notions of it, cultural heritage still retains the same significance in the French psyche. Nor do we any longer have anything in common with the situation in which Jack Lang famously came to say that "everything is cultural", greatly assisted as he was by Mitterand's budgetary arbitration, without which this policy could never have come into being.

There is a risk that a Minister of Culture might ultimately end up merely as a minister of creators, whether subsidised or not; which, whilst this is fundamental, important, -and I do not say that lightly- it is imperative that that is not its sole function, that it does not have control of all the other issues, indeed that no-one does. It's one heck of a challenge.

I am not sure that anyone has managed to come up with an answer to that problem. Each minister deals with it as best they can in the circumstances: the latitude the government of the day allows them, laws to be passed, the technological onslaughts which force new policy decisions, and so on.

When I was head of the Quai d'Orsay, I spent five years dealing with this issue as part of my job, itself a legacy of the old Directorate General for Cultural Relations. The Directorate changed its name thirty six times and was restructured thirty six times, before being changed for a thirty-seventh time. The situation then presented itself as a series of paradoxes but was fairly similar to that which I have just described at the Ministry of Culture.

First of all, some parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn't recognise the existence of culture at all; for the traditional central diplomatic arm, it didn't matter; for others, it was a passion, but a purely private one. This was the age of the diplomatic writer but once the diplomatic service started employing ENA graduates, just as other sectors

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were, they started writing like ENA graduates. So the diplomatic writer is now a rare beast, except for those writers who are appointed ambassadors, and the latter are in a different class anyway, having already honed their writing skills elsewhere.

There are countries in which the influence of culture was scarcely acknowledged and others in which it was seen as the be-all and end-all; countries in which France's reputation, as accreted over time, had helped to smooth over times of diplomatic tension, just as, conversely, there were times when this isolated us; there were times when we were held back by certain elements of the network which were more representative of the past than the future; and, above all, there was the interminable and widely-acknowledged problem of the mismatch between the audiovisual system and the media world.

So how are we to connect up the whole system, namely, secondary schools abroad, cultural centres, new networks, television (whether watched or not), etc. and get it working? It's a real challenge, and one which is further complicated by internal debates over supply and demand: should France's external cultural policy respond to demand? whose demands? the French-speaking public? the cultured elite? older people? Such groups generally did not request what was on offer, often indeed rejecting it and requesting things which Paris did not want to supply, namely the same old repertoire of overly-familiar works.

There was therefore some distortion. Thence came the arrogant but easily workable idea that it was not up to the public to dictate the rules, but up to us to determine what ought to be transmitted, as, this way, we might hope to provoke new, different reactions, thereby upsetting the established order, and thereby opening people's minds. Discussions were conducted along these lines, so much so that at the much-vaunted "network seminars", the minister was treated as the "network minister", the one who was supposed to perpetuate the network, its jobs, its appointments, see to the opening rather than the closing of centres, budget increases rather than cuts. Yet all of this was in the wider context of budget threats and attacks at the Quai d'Orsay – a situation which continues to this day and which is utter folly given that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget represents only a tiny 1.2% of the overall state budget. In terms of value for money, it's pretty good compared with other budgets.

So, that's the situation I was dealing with, and I did so with great interest and pleasure. What was remarkable was the passion which the centre managers, the cultural advisors and other administrative staff brought with them; all these talented people who had competed for these jobs and for the chance to be a part of France's cultural development, but who then came to find themselves stuck when it came to organising events and achieving their objectives. It is a time which is both exciting and a little frustrating to recall because, -and I'm seizing the opportunity to say this right here and now- I never felt in complete control of the situation in the way that I often did when I worked in diplomacy and foreign policy. In that field it was clear to me what I needed to do, and what I needed to say to get things done, what was needed to get things done, whereas in the field of external cultural relations, this wasn't the case at all. We did try –and Catherine Tasca will back me up on this- to create something simple (but perhaps unusual), to lay the foundations of something, to create a climate of understanding, synergy and true co-operation between the Culture, Education and Foreign Affairs ministries, particularly with a view to managing common activities, departments, etc, and thereby transcend any territorial mistrust between the three ministries.

I think that what we did was inspired and was honourably done, but this did not automatically lead to a truly shared vision. Today, there is still no consensus: if we consider the ministries involved, the various bodies, autonomous and quasi-autonomous organisations, not to mention the cultural industries which have their own impetus, we did not succeed in creating any kind of consensus between these parties, something which might result in a more relevant external cultural policy, which might take on board the industrial and technological side of things, a post-digital approach, if you will. We have not really succeeded, no-one has really succeeded; it seems that each minister engages according to their own rules within their own sphere of responsibility. The Quai d'Orsay is now perturbed to see a vast agency being created and thinks that, given the new globalised order of things, a tiny committee might be set up within this to help guide relationships strategically. But if the resources are lacking, how could this have any influence?

All of this was incredibly exciting, yet I still feel that there was still so much more that could be done. And if I am able to put it to you in such bald terms now, it is because I am not currently responsible for it. If I were, I would be forced to couch it in entirely different terms.

So, I am able to make these observations completely freely. I put them before you in the hope that they will provoke a reaction, make some waves.

Of all the parties I have previously referred to, it is the Ministry of Culture, for which I have the utmost respect, that must be, due to its very name and vocation, be key to the thinking around this subject. This is however, on one condition, namely that the original disconnect between Culture and Foreign Affairs be overcome, as the powers of the

latter are now failing with alarming rapidity. Moreover, thinking needs to change in line with France's view of its place in the world. If France sees itself as a poor vessel tossed, rudderless, hither and thither on the stormy waters of globalisation, merely an average power (in the pejorative sense of the word), simply another country among the 192 United Nations, and if, ultimately, there is only Europe left to deal with the situation, in this chaos in which no-one any longer has any idea who decides what, then yes, everything will lose momentum, the levers of power will be used less and less, each little entity within the ministry will pursue their own little tasks with their own little budgets, their own little networks, and there will be no opportunity for synergy.

But, if France starts to realise that within globalisation, yes, it is a free-for-all, yes it's a competition, and, yes, with the G20, the competition extends into a whole new arena…yet it does have its own individual strengths on which it can capitalise, (not just because we have a special, self-appointed mission but because it is in our own vital interests to defend ourselves by any means possible, including the influence and prestige of our own culture), and that the engines of European power can be harnessed to work efficiently and productively and thus create opportunities for synergy.

Therefore, if Europeans, and the French in particular, start to say to themselves, "yes we can make globalisation work for us; we can learn how it works and strike the right balance between protection and creativity, between controlling negative forces and capitalising on the positive ones, and this also applies to culture", then yes I believe that the cultural policies of tomorrow, both the "Culture version" and the "Quai d'Orsay version" can be united, and through their union, be stronger. But if we fatalistically see globalisation as a bad thing and France as doomed to failure, dragged down by the weight of its own illustrious and unique past, we will never succeed.

I will make this connection, as I don't think it's obvious: I think there is a common thread linking the fact of regaining some self-confidence within the chaos of globalisation and the cultural response to it. I am all for exploiting all these elements, all the European mechanisms at our disposal, but no more than that, as not even the Lisbon Treaty says that cultural policies (knowing that many countries don't even have any) would become the prerogative of European institutions. Therefore it falls to us, not to hope for the machinery of state to deliver salvation but to know what we are going to bring to it, to boldly say "in such-and-such an area, we will never tackle this problem unless we have this influence or this alliance with this group of countries, if we do not work actively within the European Parliament, within the Commission", etc. We need to go on the offensive. What is crucial in my eyes is the link which I see between a restoration of confidence and the cultural policy which might embody this.

Finally, I would like to thank Bernard Faivre d'Arcier who is here today. When I met him on entering the Ministry of Culture, he was already one of its most influential figures.

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Culture and Territory

Jacques REVEL

Over the last forty years, following a series of complex changes, an often profound transformation has been observed in the relationship between culture and territory in France. This breaks with traditions which are firmly rooted in our historical experience, such as: the existence of an ancient centralised system which is both Parisian and curial and which has resulted in an exceptional concentration of producers, publics and intermediaries; the secular hold which the state has over cultural education, production and distribution institutions, explained by the precedence and power of state education and training and the effects of political, administrative and economic centralisation associated with it; the fact that cultural works have long been considered (well before the existence of the nation state) as illustrations and indices of sovereign pre-eminence. As a result of this, there has been a persistently Parisian bias to the system of cultural production[1]. The mechanisms of this concentrated system rely at once on political and administrative structures, on the existence of a market, or rather, a series of markets, and ultimately on the forming of a large environment confronting creators and their publics. In this respect, the privileges of the capital confirm the advantages enjoyed by other such centres throughout Europe and the world, although, due to its indubitably unique history, Paris has long pushed these to the extreme.

It was crucial to take into account the urban and state aspects of this phenomenon, as this is what allows us to understand that to the concentrated and centralised Paris area was linked a ruling power based on a governance of taste, or more specifically, on creating and imposing values to which our history bears many witnesses. We will take just one of the more recent examples: the "Malraux doctrine" is seen as having proposed a blueprint for a form of cultural democratisation designed and organised from the top.

As a note from the principle private secretary bluntly put it in 1968:

> *The state is also best placed to ensure not only creative freedom, but also the freedom to offer and choose quality, which is the key to the new cultural policy* […] *This cannot spring forth from a spiritually alienated mass. Hence the decisive control over intermediaries, particularly the municipalities, so long as municipal authorities fail to grasp the true nature of the cultural issues of our age*[2].

Over the last few decades these ideas have been forcefully challenged on various different bases, the effect of which has been cumulative. Well before the denunciation of the "cultural state", in its various forms, was at the top of the public discussion agenda, transformations were occurring more discreetly. New protagonists were therefore appearing on the cultural scene, first amongst which were towns and cities themselves through authority-led initiatives. More generally, the French territory was partly restructured through a reorganisation which was not limited, far from it in fact, to successive decentralisation laws. From the 1970s onwards, the Ministry of Culture backed a movement which initially seemed to run contrary to its previous decisions, taking a new approach to voluntarism, namely that of "cultural development". This was done so much more willingly given it undoubtedly did not have the means, solely through its own resources, to boost the power of cultural activities. Partnerships and contractual forms thus made new forms of concerted action and specialisation possible at all levels. We can therefore see this as a gradual deconcentration, followed by a genuine decentralisation of public cultural action, which has been, and continues to be, the subject of fierce debate.

We might also add to this summary three pertinent observations. Although, forty years on, the significance of the transformations currently taking place seems clear, we should not forget that, whatever the declarations of intent may have been, the current situation is the (temporary) result of various accreted and often rather muddled initiatives which have undergone an empirical and often inexact adjustment. The history of these transformations and their

1. Pierre-Michel MENGER, "L'hégémonie parisienne. Économie et politique de la gravitation artistique", *Annales ESC,* 6, 1993, p. 1565-1600, cited in *id., le Travail créateur. S'accomplir dans l'incertain,* Paris, Gallimard/Le Seuil/Éditions de L'EHESS, "Hautes Études" collection, 2009, p. 539-581. Based on data which is now slightly outdated, this contains an analysis which remains quite remarkable in its analysis of the mechanisms of the centralised Parisian area.

2. Text quoted by Philippe POIRRIER, *l'État et la culture en France au XX^e siècle,* Paris, Le Livre de poche, 2000, p.104.

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effectiveness cannot moreover be understood without taking into account the role of specialist intermediaries in cultural life. They are present at all levels and their justifications and operating methods are often very different to those of cultural public authorities.

Professions have emerged whose territorial influence is clear, although this does not limit them purely to this narrow definition. Ultimately, these transformations are inseparable from a very profound redefinition of what "culture" means. There are two forces at work here: on the one hand, in contemporary society everything seems to have become cultural and culture is a crucial political issue; on the other, the concern with reconciling what is culturally available with those who are to enjoy it has been one of the cultural political *leitmotifs* of the last four decades. From these two forces, there has been a huge expansion of cultural repertoire, a diversification of uses, as well as a significant segmentation and division for which the evidence is only too clear, whatever one's views on the matter. Such observations lead us to question such ideas as "cultural production" which are key to this debate, as one of the consequences of the changes taking place is that the boundaries between cultural production and consumption have become blurred[3].

Territorial Reconstitution?

Towns and cities have been crucial in shaping cultural life in France. They were undoubtedly the first to benefit from a policy of deconcentration and, up to a certain point, of decentralisation of cultural policies, which long sought to strike a balance between doctrinaire assertions and empirical constraints. However this still constitutes a genuine breakdown in the history of the culture/territory relationship.

On the basis of recent research by historians used to reconstruct experiences in 19th and early 20th century France, one might cite the time-honoured urban privileges which have long relied on the existence and vibrancy of regional elites. However, despite the initial moves towards decentralisation initiatives in the post Second World War period, the dominant model was still that of a centralised system safeguarding a unified cultural standard. The marked defiance then expressed towards local initiatives was inseparable from demands for a rigorous programme which it was felt should be made accessible to all. Such was the role given to arts centres, flagships of the project which "in each French département will transmit what we are trying to do in Paris".

The fight against territorial as well as social inequalities was therefore expressed through the assertion of common availability and repertoire.

We therefore need to view the cultural initiatives undertaken in towns and cities in the light of this centralised and singular conception, and the tensions which it engendered. Still in embryonic form in the 1960s, these initiatives went from strength to strength in spectacular fashion over the next decade, towns and cities relying on what were still localised municipal experiments, as well as on the assertion of a general movement which found its expression in the creation in 1960 of France's national federation of local arts centres, or on the doctrine of cultural development implemented in the early 1970s.

It was therefore a combination of factors which, ultimately boosted by a favourable political situation, led to what Philipe Urfalino called the "municipalisation of culture" [4]. Municipalisation is a complex phenomenon, its common features increasing as it gradually becomes more widespread, since in 1978 over 42% of public cultural expenditure was already covered in towns and cities, mainly small and medium-sized ones. Whole new categories of players were entering the frame: cultural organisations were on the increase within local authorities, a new breed of specialist professionals played an increasingly important role, and before long a professional industry was in the making. At the same time, those cities and towns involved were setting up the facilities which their projects required. These projects which were thenceforth part of the assertion of urban identity became essential and highly visible aspects of not just local but regional and national political agendas, all the more so when the provision of cultural amenities became a matter for competition between towns themselves. Finally, as has often been pointed out, the urban bias of cultural policies ended up questioning, often explicitly, both traditional and modern canons. At a point when the socio-professional mix of towns and cities was changing markedly, they were keen to match the provision of cultural goods and services to their potential target markets, which resulted in a spectacular expansion of the cultural repertoire, often denounced as a process of fragmentation or confusion, an overly-inclusive "everything is cultural" approach, dubbed in French *le tout-culturel*, which was even seen as a threat to culture itself. What is clear is that the concept

3. Need there be any reminder that as early as 1982 the *Rapport Querrien* linked cultural heritage and creativity? Given the proliferation of innovative cultural heritage in the intervening 30 years, it seems to have been spot-on.

4 Philippe Urfalino, *l'Invention de la politique culturelle,* Paris, French Ministry of Culture History Committee/La Documentation française, 1996, republished 2004, chap.10.

of a common standard, which underpinned the Malraux doctrine, was replaced by a multiplication of schemes, a policy of visibility and incentive.

Thanks to the spectacular government cultural budget increases from which towns and cities benefited, the 1980s were the high point of this redefinition. Even if one does not subscribe to the thinking which led Jack Lang to vaunt an era of "36,000 Ministers of Culture in France", nevertheless the share of cultural expenditure going to municipalities with a population of over 10,000 has continued to grow: in 1982 it was at 45.2%, and 50.8% in 1990, before budgetary constraints started to slow down municipal voluntarist initiatives. The city is however still at the heart of the French cultural system In 2006 these same municipalities devoted 8.1% of their budget to it –an average which covers a wildly divergent set of figures- to which should be added the recent (since 2002 and the law of 2004) but sharply increasing share of inter-municipal expenditure through ECPIs (*établissements publics de coopération intercommunale*)[5]. This unflagging dynamism might very well be seen as evidence of those changes which Pierre Grémion, with remarkable foresight, long predicted within the French political administrative system[6]. Nor should we fail to recognise that, aside of any initial situations which might indicate considerable differences, such tendencies are to be seen in most European countries.

Well behind towns and cities, départements are the second-biggest spenders on culture (5.3% in 1978, 8.5% in 1990, and 9.1% in 2003). Despite all that, of their rapidly increasing budgets of the early 2000s, the percentage devoted to cultural expenditure remained low (2.2% in 2006) This is down to several factors: firstly, this is a traditionally functional level to which successive decentralisation laws formally transferred additional limited and frankly modest departments –central lending libraries and archives in 1982-1983, blueprints for art education and the safeguarding of unprotected cultural heritage in 2004. However this is not the vital issue. As was the case with municipalities, départements have over the last thirty years invested heavily in a policy of cultural visibility which is most often conveyed through an assertion of identity which is designed to be a territorial investment and promotion. Although varying wildly from one department to another, this policy does however have some common features: it focuses primarily on cultural heritage conservation and distribution (museums, archives and traditional and multimedia libraries represent 54% of spending) and partly redistributed in the form of grants and subsidies to municipalities or groups of municipalities as well as to private organisations.

With regard to the regions, relatively recent administrative and political bodies, their recognition has been slow, both in representation and in usage. This is even more true for culture, which has long been excluded from regional authorities' priorities. It was only under the law of August 2004 on local responsibilities and freedoms that they were granted certain responsibilities in the cultural sphere. The state and the regions did not however expect this text to encourage initiatives. Since the late 1970s, regional Cultural Affairs directorates (*Direction Régionale des Affaires Culturelles*, DRAC) were charged with taking over ministry policy at this level with a view to improving the planning and structuring of the cultural economic sector. The idea was to deconcentrate political power, and not to decentralise it. A decree of 1992 made profound changes to territorial administration, thereby strengthening this movement. Furthermore, DRACs were given a key role in implementing regional cultural policies, further boosted by an increased culture budget from which they were allocated a significant portion. And that is not all. In the 1990s the development of a contractual policy substantially changed the order of things. Contracts between the state and the regions, and cultural development agreements –instituted in 1982- had started to evolve into genuine partnerships, whilst the regions were focussed on the assertion of their identity and investments, for which they were waiting for their visibility and of course their appeal to become manifest.

The implementation of such a policy was not straightforward however; disparate authorities needed to gradually be drawn together. Those in charge of them expected an expert knowledge of the resources, public expectations and the scope for action within this territory. The regions had to draw up a specific repertoire, despite the fact that they were ultimately working on an already fairly overcrowded stage. Priority was given to live entertainment and supporting visible cultural events such as festivals, numbers of which have grown considerably over the last three decades. Not forgetting that over 80% of resources allocated for culture by the regions are distributed in the form of grants and subsidies to local and regional authorities at other levels or to associations incorporated under private law. However, these resources, which remain quite modest in comparison with city and département cultural expenditure, (only representing 2.5% of the overall budget for the regions, budgets which we know are themselves relatively limited) have recently been hugely increased in line with overall regional budgets and have kept pace with them over the last few years (over 10% per annum, an average which covers some huge variations).

5. This data(and that which follows) is taken from a survey by Jean-Claude Delvainquière and Bruno Dietsch, *les Dépenses culturelles des collectivités locales en 2006,* Paris, Ministère de la Culture et de la Communications, Deps, coll. "Culture chiffres", March 2009.

6. Pierre Grémion, "Introduction à une étude du système politico-administratif local", *Sociologie du travail,* n° 1, January-March 1970, p. 51-73.

Territorial Politics?

This many-tiered system has been further enhanced with the recent promotion of intermunicipality and the promotion of regional policies. Over the last thirty years, the position of culture has steadily risen in local and regional authority budgets, not forgetting the fact that this phenomenon has also benefited from the growth of the overall culture budgets and transfers made from it. Legal and technical instruments have been defined and their implementation has enabled the setting up of a partnership at different levels. Cultural action has been given an increasingly high profile in political programmes… Is all of that enough to guarantee that the cultural development policy, so obstinately claimed by the various protagonists in this whole scenario, is a reality? The answer, one suspects, is not straightforward and demands a sophisticated approach. Behind the customary hype, beneath the cut-and-dried judgements, it might be better to try and look for the processes that Guy Saez helpfully termed "territorial transition" [7].

As evidenced by the size of their cultural budgets, the commitment of the various local and regional authorities varies considerably, attesting to the crucial role of cities and towns, one which is long-acknowledged and makes them key players. These are not just quantitative but qualitative differences, as the major trends within public cultural expenditure show: départements tend more towards to financing cultural heritage conservation and promotion; regions are more biased towards live entertainment and artistic and cultural events; cities and towns (and the communities of municipalities which join them), having much larger budgets, look to a much broader repertoire, not just in terms of function but also investment, and try to take a more balanced approach to promoting both "artistic expression" (the creation and distribution of works, education, etc.) and the management of cultural heritage. With such diversity in their spheres of activity, towns and cities, at the other end of the chain, share the Ministry of Culture's more generalist approach to cultural policy. In this sense, their centrality is ample evidence that there has been a profound change within cultural politics.

This distribution of roles is the product of very recent history and is probably not yet entirely stable, despite being partially (and only partially) the result of legal and administrative action. Amongst those revisions underway, it is hard to see what the future role of the département may be, so controversial is it, nor that of the new intermunicipalities, and even less that of entities which are yet to gain any real status but demand for whose recognition has been particularly strident over the last few years, namely the "local regions". Not to mention European intervention, but I shall come back to that point. Moreover we need to redress any overly-rigid aspects of this arrangement, whilst remembering that through a system of co-financing, a proportion of local and regional authority resources is redistributed, largely towards the municipalities (75% of these sums in 2006) and groups of municipalities (20%), the least specialised authorities within the territorial system[8]. The local levels thereby find their resources strengthened through the support of the départements and regions.

More generally, this territorial restructuring, which took place over the course of a generation, seems indissoluble from the decision initially made in the 1970s to ensure co-operation between all parties, which formed the basis of a new form of governance. As Guy Saez wrote, "co-operation is not simply an effect of harmonisation and consistency between projects, but it accentuates the territorialisation of cultural policy[9]". I shan't recount the lineage of this policy, let it suffice to say that it underwent a series of increasingly standardised contractual forms within the scope of planned actions within a diverse range of institutions. This process of change was backed by the Ministry of Culture, which deconcentrated and then decentralised its action and resources. Undoubtedly it didn't have any choice in the matter, in the face of inflation of cultural expenditure, but it should be pointed out that it did have the nous to understand and, up to a point, to anticipate and then back the transformation which it was no longer able to control. It is also worth pointing out that the transfer of resources and decisions was only possible through a major transformation of the powers working on territorial policies. At various levels, particularly at town and city level, administrations were set up which were capable of attracting professionals through a rigorous and competitive recruitment procedure which was far from local.

At various levels, particularly at town and city level, administrations were set up which were capable of attracting professionals through a rigorous and competitive recruitment procedure which was far from local. The prevailing approach was clearly entrepreneurial and left no place for amateurism, which, it goes without saying, in no way prejudges the quality of these policies' products. However it was largely through these players that the new cultural governance was drawn up at various levels.

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7. Guy Saez, "L'action publique culturelle et la transition territoriale du système politique", in Anne-Cécile Douillet and Alain Faure (ed.), *l'Action publique et la question territoriale,* Grenoble, Pug, 2005, p. 229-250.

8. J.-C. Delvainquière and B. Dietsch, *les Dépenses culturelles des collectivités locales, op. cit.,*p. 24.G. Saez, "L'action publique culturelle et la transition territoriale du système politique", art.cit.

9. Guy Saez, "L'action publique culturelle et la transition territoriale du système politique", art.cit.

Such a profound change will inevitably entail a number of problems. We will consider here only those which are helpful in guiding thinking on territorial policies and those which can be usefully form a basis for comparison with what happens at European level. A number of questions arise.

How effective are the policies implemented over the last forty years? This question is especially pertinent as the policies were subject to caustic criticism fuelled by accusations of impropriety, unsuitability in addressing existing problems, and their fragmentary and ideologically inconsistent nature. We will confine ourselves here to simply wondering whether these policies were capable of remedying some of the major inequalities which they hoped to address. No-one would argue for example that over these five decades, the period currently under consideration, a considerable readjustment to not just resources but also powers of decision-making and initiative implementation, has occurred between Paris and the provinces The part played by the various local and regional authorities in public cultural expenditure should be ample evidence of this, although this powerful joint action covers what continue to be considerable regional and local differences. However is this transfer enough to question the singularity of Paris? Nothing can be more certain. This is not just about a historical heritage or accrued privileges, but a whole set of advantages which international metropolises have when it comes to cultural production – Pierre-Michel Menger has examined their typical components: the concentration of professions and businesses involved in artistic production, information flows, evaluation authorities, to which is added the state's ongoing intervention[10]. No matter how overwhelming the continuing Parisian hegemony might be, we should nevertheless not forget that the major cities, at French level, have also themselves benefited from the new order, the opportunities of which they were often quick to grasp.

They are not alone in this however, and within a few years, medium-sized towns were headed in the same direction, often choosing an area of cultural activity which they thought would help enhance their individual identity. Carried out along these lines, the movement was taken up by regional authorities, who in the space of a few years became highly visible cultural players; this is now happening at the level of countries themselves, as recognised under law since 1995, with entire nations aiming to become the base for a new territorial network. Does all of this add up to a territorial policy? It is hard to give a cut-and-dried answer to this. Despite the fact that it is probably not within the means of cultural policy to really implement genuine physical planning, diagnoses vary considerably. By and large, the cultural landscape clearly continues to present noticeable inequalities. Also clearly evident are such things as duplications of effort or abortive initiatives, due to problems with either resources or protagonists. However if we look at it from the point of view of those drawing up and implementing these policies, the picture looks rather different: locally-elected representatives and those to whom they delegate responsibility, as well as the public, now very much feel that they are partners, (which does not rule out frustrations or complaints, far from it in fact) and, for a large part, feel they are responsible for them. This is quite a striking revelation[11].

But which culture are we talking about? Again, the answer to this is not clear-cut. There has quite rightly been great deal of attention paid to the proliferation, diversification and the fragmentation of the availability, management and consumption of culture. The desire to anticipate incipient public demand, particularly local demand, plays a decisive role here. Undoubtedly what Friedberg and Urfalino called the "catalogue game[12]", which since the 1980s has resulted in the expansion of the repertoire of resources available for urban and regional promotion, resembling a wide-scale competition. Increasingly, these initiatives claim to be an expression of the spirit of the territory itself, all the more so since one expects investments to be made in return for political and identity-based benefits, as well as in concrete terms an increase in tourism and visitor numbers.

Indeed these initiatives aim to create territory, which does not mean that they do it with local cultural resources. Quite the opposite, the fierce nature of the competition pushes the quest for recognition of productions promoted by towns or regions to national (i.e. often Parisian) level. Moreover, the strategic position henceforth occupied by professionals managing public policy also tends towards delocalisation due to resources, as this workforce is mobile, as are, to a certain extent, cultural creators and industries, in response to the opportunities and incentives they are offered. It is not the development of unique territorial features which do not respond to such systems. In the wider business of reinventing cultural heritage, which often looks like reinventing tradition, local associations, whose role has been so important, must nevertheless learn to compromise with specialised businesses that deliver largely stan-

10. It is worth pointing out that in 1981, 44.3% of Ministry of Culture expenditure went to Paris, 15.5% to the l'Ile-de-France and 40.2% to the provinces; in 1988, these percentages were respectively 57.3%, 10.2% and 32.5% ; in 2003, 51.4%, 6.8% and 41.8%. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the scale of the major facilities and building works to understand these figures whose distribution is still nevertheless somewhat arresting.

11. In this respect, one might concur with those commentators who regret that surveys too often fail to take into account the residential space of cultural practices and the possibilities they may offer.

12. Erhard FRIEDBERG et Philippe URFALINO, *le Jeu du catalogue. Les contraintes de l'action cultu relle dans les villes,* Paris, La Documentation française, 1984, 153 p.

dardised turnkey development projects. It is possible that this constitutes a considerable corrective to cultural decentralisation, at least in its more ambitious areas of work.

This undoubtedly brings us to the limits of the word "culture", which is too all-encompassing and all too easy to use. The best approach, which is not always the most obvious, might be to more clearly distinguish, on the basis of specifically gathered data, between that which falls under local politics and that which falls under wider competition.

Does the recent inclusion of the European dimension change these conditions? It is limited in the resources it can provide, i.e. 0.03% of the Community budget, and this percentage doesn't take into account much larger financial contributions from structural programmes opened by directorates other than Culture and Education. Since the treaties of Maastricht and Nice, and particularly that of Lisbon, the Union has recognised its competence to "carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States" within the cultural domain, the importance of which cannot be underestimated when it comes to principles, as these interventions are subject to the subsidiarity principle. Their area of application remains very broadly defined: protecting cultural diversity and promoting intercultural dialogue, safeguarding and developing cultural heritage, as well as promoting culture as a catalyst for creativity and deciding to make this a central tenet of Union external relations.

Above these very vague slogans, from the 1990s onwards, programmes emerged to support this policy, and were reorganised through the framework programme Culture 2000, reprised for the period 2007-2013. Its stated aims included three support initiatives: assisting cultural actions through the framework of medium-term co-operation projects; assisting cultural organisations at European level; and finally assisting analysis activities (i.e. defining cultural policy) and dissemination activities.

Faced with these initiatives, the real cultural Europe seems diverse, for reasons which are rooted in its history, administrative traditions and political decisions. The study conducted twenty years ago by Mireille Pongy and Guy Saez gave an account of this variegated landscape through the analysis of regional policies in four European countries[14], a pattern of diversity which was undoubtedly further improved by the entry into the EU of new member countries from the former Soviet republics, whose experiences and structures were the product of another history entirely. As far as the old guard of the Community goes, it is pertinent to recall Anne-Marie Autissier's observations that despite the differences which characterised both the initial situations and forms of organisation it is possible to identify common evolutionary changes over the medium-term: beside the fact that in all these countries, culture is still seen as an aspect of public policy, divergent systems often follow comparable aims within it. It is true that these transformations make sense within the wider context of ongoing globalisation and the problems posed to the cultural industries in particular (as Jean- François Chougnet reminded us), and this context eclipses national politics, and Community initiatives are understood in relation to it.

Does Community policy offer the opportunity for a new cultural order? It is certainly too early to say. The debates which are to follow will perhaps allow us get a better idea of what the main issues are. I shall confine myself here to simply asking a few more questions within the remit of this subject, namely that of the relationship between culture and territory.

A long and commonly-held view of the use of Community resources might be defined as that of a "cash dispenser": at all levels, it is a use which tends to favour established knowledge and positions but which can also lead to inconsistent distribution, even when this is, we must recognise, partially redressed by stated priorities, for instance in favour of Central and Eastern Europe, or even the mobility of people and works.

Until very recently, and undoubtedly still today, Community policy has had to try to ensure it is compatible with the cultural policies of states which remain privileged partners of European authorities. It is therefore incumbent upon it to find common ground between them: hence the defence of Community cultural productions in an increasingly competitive world market, or the implementation of internal regulations -even though we often feel that, from Brussels, compliance with the rules on competition overcomes concerns about regulation. The idea of the "relevant market" which was so fashionable a few years ago is, as far as the problems it poses goes, a good indicator of these concerns and the problems encountered in drawing up guiding principles. This idea is now subject to growing criticism, no doubt because it is always harder to identify stable territories defined by specific production and consumption. Moreover, the precedence of states and their legitimate concerns over defending their own interests serves only to confuse matters, a factor which should not be underestimated.

Are things any different at regional level? at city level? For some fifteen years now, consideration of these levels has become standard in Community policy, inasmuch at least as it is acknowledged as an issue, although the flow of capital remains low. It is also because cities and regions are dynamic authorities and are themselves organised into powerful and active networks, thus becoming established as essential protagonists. This process of change does however

pose a problem of scale: which towns and regions are today equipped to start lobbying at European level to finance national or international co-operation initiatives? Clearly a reclassification is required to deal with these unequal forces.

I will finish with one last question. Networks are all the rage now. They are also, in very diverse forms, realities, and their numbers are constantly growing. They come in all shapes and sizes. In European partnerships such as national or regional frameworks, they tend to become prominent protagonists as they don't just enable common projects to be defined and resources of all kinds to be secured, but they are increasingly becoming institutional protagonists. They offer unique possibilities to public-private partnerships, whose proliferation we know they are bound to seek.

These networks, associations and groups draw much of the attractiveness that they hold for cultural players from their accessibility and proximity. However within the framework of Europe, their effectiveness also depends on the ability to exceed their local affiliations and work collaboratively. Whilst it is undoubtedly too early to say whether the proposed restructuring will feed into the general trend of increasing fragmentation or will foster new unity of purpose, it is certainly not to early to start considering.

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Modern tastes, good taste and cultural diversity

Élie BARNAVI

We have reached the end of this seminar - three days of intense, fascinating, enlightening and - who knows? - maybe even useful debates.

It falls to me to bring it to a close. As someone who is not a specialist in any of the aspects which formed its substance, as a simple 'consumer' of culture - as we say nowadays -, as someone who is not French or even European, I am obviously especially well-placed to do so.

So I have done what every dunce does in their baccalaureat philosophy exam: I have fallen back on the general subject, which, moreover, I have defined for myself - without even knowing where it would lead me: "Good taste, current taste and cultural diversity". It's not a bad approach: whether in the kitchen, in dress or in the arts, there is nothing more French that the notion of taste.

My starting point was Voltaire, the author of the article on 'Taste' in the Encyclopédie. Voltaire is the theoretician of 'good taste', that immediate grasp of 'beauty and flaws in all the arts', which he defined as 'a discernment as prompt as that of the tongue and the palate, and like physical taste it anticipates thought; In common with physical taste it is sensitive to what is good and reacts to it with a feeling of pleasure, it refuses with disgust what is bad...'

Taste, quite clearly, is not relative, except in matters of sensual taste: 'of the revulsion one experiences for a certain food and the preference one feels for another. This is not subject to argument because it is impossible to correct a flaw that is organic. '

This is also true of things without importance, matters of mere fashion, ephemeral by definition - fabrics, finery, coaches, and everything which is distinct from the fine arts. For good taste is not the taste of the day. Good taste follows objective, timeless and unquestionable principles; 'it is whim', says Voltaire, 'rather than taste, that produces so many new fashions. '

But 'the same is not true in the arts: since the arts have genuine beauty, there exists a good taste that discerns it and a bad taste that is unaware of it, and often the flaw of the mind that produces wrong taste can be corrected'.

Naturally there also exist 'cold souls and men incapable of sound reasoning; these can neither be inspired with feeling nor corrected in their thinking; with them one should not argue about matters of taste since they have none.' Taste is thus perfectly, almost scientifically defined. A 'shapeless statue, a bad picture in which the figures are distorted' could never be regarded as a masterpiece; a 'paltry, ill-proportioned house' could never be considered to be 'a fine architectural monument'. So, despite the differences of opinion, customs and habits which can me observed among men, there are nevertheless 'good and bad taste'.

But how can we know which is which? There is one infallible guide: nature, 'la belle nature', idealised nature: 'The best taste in any genre is to imitate nature with the greatest of faithfulness, strength and grace.' There is nothing arbitrary in this, since grace 'consists of bringing life and refinement to the objects represented. Between two men of whom one is coarse, the other refined, there is general agreement that the one has more taste than the other.'

Thus provided with a sound guide, taste has models: it 'develops gradually in a nation that has hitherto lacked it because, little by little, men come under the influence of good artists. They become accustomed to seeing pictures with the eyes of Lebrun, Poussin, and Le Sueur. They hear the famous recitation of Quinault's scenes with the ears of Lully, melodies and symphonies with the ears of Rameau. They read books with the minds of the best authors.'

So there is progress in taste, because there is progress in the arts, just as there is in sciences and technology. This is perhaps Voltaire's strangest claim. But perhaps we should understand progress not as an improvement in the beauty, the intrinsic quality of the works - I find it hard to believe that Voltaire seriously thought Rameau's music was more beautiful than Lully's, simply because time has elapsed between the two - but as an improvement in public taste. For taste can be acquired: 'Thus Lucilius was a favourite of the Romans until Horace drove him into oblivion, and Régnier was appreciated by the French until Boileau appeared. If some ancient authors who fumble on every page have

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nevertheless retained their great reputation, it is because in these nations no writer ever appeared whose style was pure and elegant and who opened their eyes, as Horace did for the Romans and Boileau for the French.'

Time must be left to do its work, 'time and example instruct a nation with deficient taste'. Similarly, ‘an artist who gradually forms his taste, thus does a nation form its own. It stagnates for centuries at a time in barbarism; then comes a faint dawn; at last, broad daylight appears.' There is a hint here of Boccaccio's 'return of the muses', or of Gargantua's famous letter to Pantagruel on the renaissance of the arts and literature.

Of course, there are still 'vast countries into which good taste has never penetrated' either because there is no society, or it has not sufficiently developed, or because some arts are forbidden by religion. Whatever the reason, the result is the same: 'When some of the fine arts are absent, the others rarely manage to exist, because all the arts are interdependent and sustain each other. This is one of the reasons why there is scarcely any kind of art in which the Asiatics have ever excelled, and why good taste has only fallen to the lot of a few peoples in Europe.' Moving swiftly on...

However, even among these peoples, all are not alike. Above all, progress gained is not achieved for all time. Taste can be lost. After the timid dawn which follows the dark centuries of barbarism, after the full light of day, dusk lies in wait, the 'long and dismal dusk'. The taste for novelty at any price distances the artist from nature, and the herd follows, losing its way. Sometimes the decline is irreversible, as is the case of the Greeks, the Italians. Sometimes, there is room for hope: 'Thus the Spanish have begun to reform their theatre, and the Germans to develop one'.

And if good taste is a matter for connoisseurs and bad taste the province of the common people, and if the former are necessarily less numerous than the masses, this is not necessarily an effect of class, or at least not as we would be tempted to understand it. The illuminating difference for Voltaire is rather the opposition between Paris and the provinces: 'The capital of a great kingdom is the home of taste', he declares. It's a very French conclusion, of course, which leaves aside the Italians or the Germans. In France, he observes that the provinces are a desert where no one reads, no one bothers with books, the ecclesiastical and administrative elites are no better than the lower classes: 'In the provincial capitals, even those which have academies, how rare is taste!' he laments. In short, 'there has been no progress since the 12th century'.

There remains Paris, the capital of the kingdom - and of good taste. But we should not deceive ourselves: even in Paris, good taste is the preserve of 'a very few' - perhaps some three thousand souls in a population of over 600,000 form 'le Tout Paris', the people who count, and 'all the rest are excluded'. Just the lowest classes, the 'mechanicals', as they were known in that era? No. Because good taste is also entirely absent in what he calls 'bourgeois families', 'which are constantly occupied with their financial position, domestic details and a crude idleness, amused by a round of cards. All those places which value the judicature, finance and commerce close their doors to the fine arts.'

This is unfair, obviously, and patently false, especially in Voltaire's day. But let us accept as read this contempt for the bourgeoisie, understood here in the sense - rare in the 18th century - of a well-defined class rather than a legal status, and regarded with a scorn which has a fine future ahead of it. The fact that Voltaire himself came from the bourgeoisie, and by no means from its most brilliant ranks, changes nothing; then as now, the most severe hatred of and contempt for the bourgeoisie came from within the bourgeoisie itself.

However, we would be wrong to believe that Voltaire welcomed this condition of the arts and good taste. He merely observed it: a cultural elite would always be necessary to 'lead the crowd'. What was needed was a certain critical mass, as in Paris, and then it would have a chance of educating these masses. Because - and I find this phrase quite extraordinary - 'It is a source of shame to the human spirit that taste, ordinarily, only finds a foothold in conditions of wealthy idleness.' Reactionary, Voltaire? Two centuries later, would Malraux have said otherwise when he founded the Ministry of Culture?

As Antoine Compagnon reminded us in his opening lecture, the role he assigned his ministry was one which reflected this notion of good taste inherited from Voltaire: major works, the enduring works - classics, in other words, which form a compulsory cultural canon which defines it; a narrow elite of connoisseurs which acts as its guardian; a patron state responsible for its protection and propagation.

This was a battle lost in advance. At the moment when he founded the Ministry of Culture, all the elements of good taste as defined by Voltaire were already losing ground. The Romantics had already launched the attack: 'The beautiful is always bizarre', wrote Baudelaire in 1855. I do not mean that it is intentionally, coldly bizarre, because in

that case it would be a monster derailed from life. I mean that it always contains a touch of the bizarre, naive, not deliberate, unconscious, and it is this touch of the bizarre which makes it particularly beautiful. This is its keynote, its defining characteristic. Reverse the proposition, and try to imagine a commonplace beauty!'

But if the core was new, the form remained traditional, and good taste could recognise its descendents. It has shattered since. There are no more guides, no more models, the very concept of beauty has become indecipherable, and nobody concedes the authority of a connoisseur to anyone else. Art itself is sacrificed on the altar of its own search for meaning, of its own proud desire to exist only through and for itself - we even speak of 'anti-art'. Marcel Duchamp, to mention but one, took that path, with his 'readymades: the bicycle wheel, the bottle-rack purchased at BHV, and the most emblematic art-object of all, the famous urinal, which it would be wrong to see as a straightforward slap in the face of good taste - it is rather the proclamation of its death. After all, did he not say that 'good taste is the great enemy of art'?

In the mid-1990s, Yasmina Reza made the entire world laugh with her play "Art", in which three friends fall out over a painting bought by one of them - 'a canvas measuring around one metre sixty by one metre twenty, painted white. The ground is white and if you half-close your eyes you can detect fine horizontal white lines.' But four decades earlier, Yves Klein had painted the empty walls of a Paris gallery. At that time the press was still outraged by a César sculpture made of crushed and compressed cars exhibited at the May 1960 salon. It would take care not react that way today.

Under this generalised assault, in fact, the defences of 'consumers' have been blunted, their capacity for outrage has subsided. In the absence of criteria, how can they judge what is art and what is not? The imitation of nature at least offered the philistine a point of reference. Maybe he responded with the same enthusiasm before a daub and an old master, but at least he could read something in both. How could he distinguish the genius of a Pollock from the daubings of an imitator?

And who today would dare to mention good taste, or a lack of taste, in discussing some artistic 'installation'? In Sex and the City, a character lost in a gallery raves about a fire extinguisher, assuming it to be a work of art. It would be wrong to mock him. One day in the MOMA I saw a pile of apples in the corner of a room - I carefully noted down the name of the installation and the artist, but unfortunately I've lost the note. Just as I have lost the name of the video director, who I saw many years later filming himself at the Tate Gallery in London, wearing underpants and striking himself in the face until he drew blood. I listened to the comments coming from the group of young people led by a guide who were admiring the work. “Interesting”, “amazing” and “powerful” the most frequent. You can ever over-estimate the influence of snobs. Without them there would be no market for art, or for feigned art.

In the passage from culture understood as all the works of the spirit which make up the foundations of a civilisation to culture as social practices, from 'cultivated culture', in the words of Antoine Compagnon, to culture as a field of ethnological investigation, from the 'democratisation of culture', in other words culture for all, in the sense of the enlightened ideal of emancipation through major works (I am still quoting Compagnon) to 'cultural democracy', culture by all, in the sense of the development of minority cultural practices, from otium studiosum to cultural leisure, the very concept of culture has been expanded until it includes everything and reduces everything to the same level. Anything goes, because 'everything is cultural'.

Worse, under the assault of the social sciences, 'cultivated' culture is accused of elitism and reduced to a strategy for reproducing social hierarchies. While what my friend André Versaille neatly calls 'structuralism's hostile takeover of the arts and literature' buries pleasure beneath the thick layers of its hypercritical pedantry. Ah! French theory, idolised on the American campus! Just read David Lodge's novel, in which the literature professor from a prestigious East Coast university has just dazzled his colleagues at a modest redbrick university. 'He even knows about that', they think, gasping in admiration, 'that' representing the exalted vaguely mysterious knowledge cultivated across the Channel, at whose prodigious riches they guess while understanding nothing. As a result they invite their learned foreign colleague to head their department…

Transposed into the world of the arts, the great fear of right-thinking people becomes a terror of being left behind by modernity and a headlong chase after its slightest manifestations, real or imagined. At the same time, it is no longer a matter, as Rousseau hoped in the article on 'Art' which he gave to the Encyclopédie - and as Malraux hoped after him - of expanding understanding of the fine arts, believed to 'increase and ensure the happiness of mankind, down to the humble shack of the least of citizens'. It's quite another matter, because culture is something quite different. 'In its anthropological version' - here I am quoting Maryvonne de Saint-Pulgent in a recent article -, 'which records in the same reassuring statistics on ‘cultural practices’ attendance at avant-garde theatres and galleries, roller skate parades, the celebration of Halloween, the love of old stones and of rave parties, culture is incontestably one of the markers of identity to which the public authorities are now required to grant equal dignity and equal public-

ity, and between which it is forbidden to discriminate...' And thus cultural diversity is no longer an objective fact, a commonsense observation; it is now an ideal, inscribed in international treaties.

In such a cultural landscape, everyone cobbles together their own criteria as they may. So here are mine, not very original: intelligence and emotion. Sometimes they go together, sometimes not. But one or the other there must be. Whether I spend an hour deciphering the van Eyck brothers' Adoration of the Mystic Lamb in St. Bavo's Cathedral in Ghent, or listen to a Bach oratorio; whether I read Grossman's Life and Fate, or see Renoir's Rules of the Game. I know that this is great art because these works teach me something about the world I live in, or they bring a lump to my throat, or both. As you can see, I am simplifying matters here: the tastes of the day validate good taste, because these works have stood the test of time – they have become classics. But that is the least of my concerns; they give me pleasure, and that is enough. But, proof of my great independence of mind and my intellectual boldness, I apply the same criteria to contemporary works. It works very well for me.

Of course the Ministry of Culture cannot get out of it so easily. It is obvious that the shattering of the criteria of 'good taste' and the complete change in the notion of culture have greatly complicated its task. It is equally clear that the Ministry cannot define 'good taste'. But that does not absolve it from the duty of determining a policy. Even it wanted to, the mere weight of the 'cultural state', inheriting a tradition which goes back to the monarchy, and the expectations of the cultural players and the public generally, would not allow it.

I shall not here address budgetary considerations, or the always troublesome division of responsibilities across different ministries. I shall merely observe that the French state spends a good deal of money on culture, considerably more that any other major democracy, while all the statistical studies, whether French or foreign, suggest a map of the world in which French influence is everywhere in decline. "Can you name a single living French artist who is of world importance?", asked the US Time magazine on 26 November 2007. The accusation is harsh and certainly unfair, but still...

I shall also set aside the question of the decline of the nation-state in general and the French nation state in particular, caught as it is between larger and smaller entities - between Europe and the world on the one hand, and the region, the city, the community on the other. All this is well-known and others have said it here better than I could. I shall merely suggest three lines of action which I think are both indispensable and urgent. At the end of his lecture, Antoine Compagnon asked why we should not learn to live with the ambiguities which pull the state's cultural interventions this way and that. Why choose between them?? Why not, and I quote, 'retain them as much as one can: what Malraux called the 'imaginary museum' and artistic education, the national cultural heritage and 'primary cultural life', the development of cultural supply and the expansion of cultural demand, interventionism and liberalism, the culture of results and culture for culture's sake'.

I am less qualified than him to judge. But I believe that ambiguity is never a guarantee of sound policy. Maybe this is a matter of temperament; perhaps it is the result of other, deadly, ambiguities at work under other skies.

However, I have always thought that politics consists precisely in taking these decisions, and I do not see why cultural policy should be entitled to escape the fate of policy-making in general. Understand that I am not talking here about the ambiguity of a work itself, because such ambiguity is inherent in artistic creation. It is the ambiguity of state intervention, which must be firmly sited in the field of policy.

I think, therefore, that the task that Malraux set his ministry still retains all its relevance, at least for two of the three goals he gave it. Because in the light of all that I have just said, I admit my embarrassment at the third, aid to contemporary creativity. Doubtless it is necessary. We need to know what deserves support, which a bureaucracy, however brilliant, dedicated and aware it may be, is ill-placed to do. Running after artistic fashion exhausts it, and its budget too.

However, it seems to me obvious that the state should continue to be the meticulous guardian of the cultural heritage of the nation, in other words its memory (I do not mean its history, let Pierre Nora and his Liberté pour l'Histoire committee rest assured...) Here again, in the vast and constantly expanding field of heritage, there are certainly choices to be made, as has been discussed here at length. However, memory risks becoming, in the words of Régis Debray, a costly faculty. For if 'industry is an accelerator of obsolescence, and culture a guarantee of permanence', if 'industry destroys what culture should preserve', the question, in Debray's own words, is 'How can we give longevity to the ephemeral?'

And it seems to me obvious that what is needed is education in that culture, that it must, in the founder's words, 'render accessible all the major works of humanity, and first of all of France, to the greatest possible number of French citizens'. To be able to understand the subject of a picture in a gallery, a fresco in a church; to read the architecture of a cathedral; to hear the difference between the music of Bach and Stravinsky, even if you cannot identify them... is this really an unachievable objective? And why would it be reactionary to open this culture to the children from working class districts, and progressive to condemn them to their ghetto? Why, in short, should Malraux's educational ambition be obsolete? Because it has ended in failure? But the failure of a policy does not necessarily mean that the policy was ill-conceived in principle. Is it so difficult to understand that it is easy to go from Bach to jazz, rock and rap, but practically impossible to make the journey in the opposite direction?

There is more. Not only is it this culture, as outdated as it may seem to impatient spirits, what defines a French way of being; it is also essential to national cohesion. I have spoken elsewhere of the dangers of the multiculturalist ideology, the best possible recipe for breaking a nation into a collection of communities which are ignorant of each other where they do not detest each other, prohibiting, through the absence of a common language, any possibility of communication and leading inexorably to violence. Only consider developments in the Netherlands, hitherto the most tolerant society in the West...

The other task of the state is to promote the French heritage abroad. I know that this is not the responsibility of the Culture Ministry, but foreigners have not the slightest interest in the division of responsibilities in Paris. The article by Maryvonne de Saint-Pulgent which I quoted just now is entitled 'France, a cultural power?' Seen from abroad, it undoubtedly is, as even the Time article demonstrates in its way. And that is all it is, alas, but that's another discussion.

To defend the French heritage abroad means defending the French language - not by a Don Quixote-like battle, lost in advance, against English: the spread and pre-eminence of a language are the effect of the power of the nation of its speakers. It is not thanks to England the that the world speaks English, but to the United States, just as in the 17th and 18th centuries the European elites did not use French because of the Francophone cantons in Switzerland, or the French-speaking southern parts of the Low Countries. We can console ourselves with the thought that the English pay a heavy price for the hegemony of their language, since the 'globish' mumbled around the world is a poor caricature. Nevertheless, the fact remains that when I first received a driving licence, then my first passport, these two documents were drawn up in French as well as Hebrew; they are now in English.

But this is not a reason to give in. French remains a great language of culture, and at the same time it is spoken by almost 200 million people across the world, in around thirty states on five continents. Yes, the place of French in the world must be defended – not by systematically chasing out Anglicisms which slip into the language – some of them are useful – nor by legislating (I remember a conversation which I had with my friend Jacques Toubon in a Jerusalem hotel at the time that he was preparing the law which bears his name). But by a proactive, concerted and vigorous approach to the teaching of French. That works: I myself am the living proof.

Finally, to defend the French cultural heritage abroad means defending the major works of this heritage, without shame and without reservations. I do not think for one moment that defending this heritage would be viewed abroad as an arrogant or post-colonial enterprise. Everything depends on the spirit in which it is presented. And then again, if it were so perceived on some campus, by some small ideological group, what does it matter? The duty of the French state is to show France in the light of its remarkable achievements, in the light of the remarkable things it can offer others. Believe me, nobody abroad cares a hoot for some rapper or French rock group, they have enough of their own. Only France has Racine.

I shall never forget the shock I felt as a teenager when I saw Robert Hirsch on stage at the Habimah theatre in Tel-Aviv. He played Nero in Britannicus, directed, I think, by Michel Vitold. For one unforgettable evening, in the eyes of the dazzled adolescent, he was much more than Nero: he was France itself.

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Résumés des contributions

Summaries of the Contributions

Jean-François Chougnet

La politique culturelle européenne n'a pas toujours bonne réputation en France. Cela se nourrit des réticences générales à l'encontre de l'intégration européenne, de ses pesanteurs discursives, de ses lourdeurs bureaucratiques. Curieusement, l'histoire des aspirations, des attentes d'une potentielle politique culturelle européenne n'a fait pas l'objet d'une attention comparable à celle de l'histoire des politiques culturelles françaises. On visera donc à retracer trois moments permettant d'approcher la question.

Dans la construction de cette relation complexe, on ne peut manquer de faire référence aux enthousiasmes de l'immédiat après-guerre et à la période des congrès fédéralistes. De cette phase, sortira le Conseil de l'Europe et l'adoption en 1954, de la Convention culturelle européenne. Le deuxième temps – injustement oublié aujourd'hui - s'inscrit bien sûr dans le cadre du non-dit culturel du Traité de Rome et se traduira dans des colloques importants comme celui d'Arc-et-Senans en 1972, efforts qui aboutiront à la Déclaration sur l'identité européenne de décembre 1973, efforts que la crise rendra sans effets. C'est le rythme d'une synchronisation des politiques culturelles nationales qui va désormais commander les avancées. Au-delà de différences politico-administratives, certains objectifs communs d'intervention sont de plus en plus partagés par les pays de ce qui est devenu l'Union européenne. On assiste à une certaine convergence budgétaire, en tout cas au partage de l'idée de la prédominance des financements publics. Dès lors, la construction pragmatique d'un espace pour la politique culturelle réduit en raison des moyens, mais sans heurts idéologiques, est devenue possible. Il a avancé et avance par la construction d'outils nouveaux de politique européenne, à partir du traité de Maastricht mais aussi de l'émergence d'un nouveau discours central, celui de l'importance de la culture dans l'économie, qui est devenu la base idéologique – assez étonnante – de bien des avancées « culturelles » de l'Union.

Jean-François Chougnet

European cultural policy is not always well regarded in France. This attitude is fostered by a general reticence with respect to European integration, its ponderous language and weighty bureaucracy. Curiously, less attention is paid to the history of the aspirations and expectations of a potential European cultural policy than to that of French cultural policies. We shall therefore seek to describe three periods to help us approach this question.

In reconstructing this complex relationship, we cannot avoid reference to the enthusiasm of the immediate post-war period and the federalist congresses. This phase produced the Council of Europe and the adoption of the European Cultural Convention in 1954. The second phase – now unjustly forgotten – is of course dominated by the Treaty of Rome's silence on culture and saw important conferences such as that held in Arc-et-Senans in 1972. These efforts ultimately led to the Declaration on European Identity of December 1973, but were rendered ineffective by the energy crisis. After this advances were made through the synchronization of national cultural policies. Above and beyond their politico-administrative differences, the countries that were to become the European Union increasingly found their interventions had certain shared goals. There was a degree of budgetary convergence, or at least a shared idea of the predominance of public funding. At this point it became possible to embark on the pragmatic construction of a space for cultural policy, limited by financial constraints, but free of ideological clashes. This has advanced and continues to progress through the construction of new instruments of European policy, based on the Maastricht Treaty and the emergence of a new language which emphasizes the importance of culture in the economy, which has provided the – surprising – ideological underpinning for many of the Union's "cultural" advances.

Antoine Compagnon

Comment inaugurer ce colloque du cinquantenaire sans rappeler la mission fixée aux affaires culturelles par André Malraux, lors de la création du ministère en 1959 ? Trois objectifs étaient alors posés, dans un ordre qui n'était pas indifférent : premièrement, le partage de la culture entre tous les Français, la popularisation des grandes œuvres françaises et accessoirement étrangères ; deuxièmement, le rayonnement, en France et hors de France, du « patrimoine culturel », notion nouvelle, assimilant aux monuments historiques tout ce qui du passé était jugé digne d'être conservé ; troisièmement, l'aide à la création contemporaine. C'est au regard de ces trois finalités que l'action du ministère depuis un demi-siècle peut être appréciée aujourd'hui.

Le changement du sens du mot *culture* en français courant à la fin du XX^e^ siècle a compliqué l'action du ministère, écartelé entre des pratiques de plus en plus hétéroclites, toutes qualifiées de culturelles. Plusieurs des principes qui ont fait l'histoire de la politique culturelle de l'État sont aujourd'hui en question, au point qu'un des anciens locataires de la rue de Valois a pu suggérer que ce ministère n'était plus nécessaire. Nous traversons un moment d'incertitude et même de turbulence ; nous nous trouvons sinon face à une crise, du moins devant plusieurs alternatives cruciales, telles que culture et éducation, culture et identité, culture et création, culture et marché,

Antoine Compagnon

We cannot open this fiftieth annual conference without recalling the mission given to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs by André Malraux, when it was founded in 1959. At that time, there were three stated objectives, in an order of some significance: firstly, the sharing of culture among all French citizens through the popularization of great works of art, primarily of French but also of foreign origin; secondly, the raising of awareness within and beyond France of the "cultural heritage" – a new notion that regarded everything worthy of conservation from the past in terms of historical monuments; thirdly, assistance for the creation of contemporary works. It is in the light of these three goals that we can now assess the Ministry's work over half a century.

Changes in the meaning of the word *culture* in late 20^th^-century French rendered the Ministry's intervention more complicated as it became split between ever more heterogeneous practices, all described as cultural. Several of the principles underpinning the history of the French government's cultural policy are now in question – and so much so that a former Culture Minister has suggested that the Ministry is no longer needed. We are going through uncertain, even turbulent times; we face, if not a crisis, then at least several crucial alternatives, including those of culture and education, culture and identity, culture and creation, culture and the market. From the

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etc. Observateur non engagé, nous en signalerons quelques-unes, celles qui semblent les plus urgentes.

Jean-Noël Jeanneney

Depuis Gutenberg, l'humanité n'a connu aucune mutation aussi profonde dans les techniques propres à enrichir et à diffuser l'héritage culturel de l'humanité. En dépit de la proximité chronologique de ce bouleversement, qui commence à peine, il revient à tous les citoyens, et au premier chef au ministère de la Culture, de réfléchir, pour l'action, aux moyens de tirer le meilleur parti d'une évolution qui est par nature (comme le fut l'imprimerie) profondément ambivalente.

Au cœur du propos, on rencontre la responsabilité de l'État dans la régulation du marché, en un temps où la tradition de centralisation est assaillie par la domination des réseaux. Quelles finalités doit-il servir ? Selon quelle philosophie politique ? Selon quels rythmes ? Avec quel type d'intervention ? La question de la spécificité des cultures nationales ou régionales et de la protection de leur diversité – sans qu'on renonce, certes, à des aspirations universelles – est toujours essentielle.

À chaque pas surgit le problème des coûts et de qui les assume. Il n'existe jamais de gratuité réelle. La nature des chemins de circulation des financements (assurés par les citoyens comme consommateurs ou comme contribuables) est donc vitale, tout comme la défense, dans ce monde nouveau, des droits d'auteur sans lesquels tout se tarirait.

Pierre-Michel Menger

L'analyse comparée des politiques culturelles publiques en Europe conduit habituellement à identifier des modèles différents d'action à partir du croisement de deux critères principaux : celui du caractère centralisé ou décentralisé (ou fédéral) de l'action publique, et celui de la délégation de choix et d'action à des agences et des conseils publics indépendants (selon le modèle de l'arm's length) ou de l'exercice direct de la responsabilité par l'autorité ministérielle et son administration. Cette double distinction perd une partie de son pouvoir descriptif lorsque les politiques culturelles sont analysées dans leur évolution. Depuis un demi-siècle, les politiques culturelles se sont développées dans les démocraties parlementaires européennes de manière assez similaire. L'évolution peut être décomposée entre quatre étapes successives : 1) la construction d'une politique systématique d'offre culturelle à partir d'une définition restreinte de la culture éligible à l'intervention publique et à partir d'une conception verticale de la démocratisation par conversion ; 2) une décentralisation progressive de l'action publique, qui provoque une différenciation croissante de ses missions et de ses fonctions, et qui soumet à contestation le modèle universaliste et unanimiste initial ; 3) une révision du champ d'intervention légitime de l'action publique, qui déclare symboliquement obsolète l'une des hiérarchies fondatrices de la politique culturelle, celle qui opposait la culture savante, objet de protection à l'écart des lois du marché, à la culture de divertissement, gouvernée par les lois de l'économie industrielle ; 4) une justification croissante de la politique culturelle par ses contributions à la croissance économique et à l'équilibre de diversité sociale des nations, qui fonde en légitimité le pouvoir régulateur de l'action publique mais aussi les incitations à une expansion des « industries créatives » et les exigences d'évaluation des procédures et des résultats. D'une culture démocratisable à une culture socialement et économiquement soutenable : le chemin parcouru paraît modifier substantiellement les objectifs fondateurs. Mais cette lecture doit être complétée : l'inertie de l'action publique est beaucoup plus forte que ne le laissent supposer ces changements de paradigme.

Pierre Nora

Jusqu'à la fin des années 1970, le patrimoine était encadré par les lois de 1913 complétées par l'Inventaire supplémentaire de 1927 et, bien que décentralisé, il ne comptait que 90 monuments protégés par an et d'une centaine d'inscriptions à l'Inventaire.

Dans les années 1980, il est passé de ce premier âge à un deuxième, avec l'année dite « du patrimoine », la création d'une Direction du patrimoine, et surtout la modification officielle du décret des attri-

position of a detached observer, we shall consider a few of those that seem to be most urgent.

Jean-Noël Jeanneney

Not since Gutenberg has humanity faced such a profound mutation in the techniques used to enrich and pass on the human cultural heritage. Although this sea-change is close to us in time, and only just beginning, it is for all citizens, and particularly the Ministry of Culture, to reflect – as a preliminary to action – on how to get the best out of an evolution which is highly ambivalent in nature – as printing was before it.

At the heart of the matter lies the state's responsibility for market regulation, at a time when the tradition of centralization is under attack from the dominance of networks. What ends should it strive for, what political philosophy should it follow, with what frequency and what kind of interventions? The issue of the specificity of national and regional cultures and the need to protect their diversity – without of course abandoning universal aspirations – remains fundamental.

The problem of cost and who bears it is a constant concern. Nothing is ever really free. The nature of the circulation of finance (provided by citizens as both consumers and tax-payers) is thus crucial, as is, in this new world, the defence of copyright, without which all the wellsprings would dry up .

Pierre-Michel Menger

Comparative analyses of public cultural policies in Europe usually involve the identification of various models of intervention based on the intersection of two main criteria: the centralized or decentralized (or indeed federal) nature of state intervention and the delegation of choice and action to independent agencies and public bodies (the 'arm's length' model) or the direct exercise of responsibility by Ministers and their administration. This distinction loses some of its descriptive power when we analyse the evolution of cultural policies. Over the last fifty years, cultural policies have developed in a fairly similar way across the European parliamentary democracies. This evolution can be split into four successive phases: 1) the construction of a systematic policy for the cultural offer based on a limited definition of the culture eligible for state support and a vertical conception of democratization through conversion; 2) the gradual decentralization of state intervention, leading to an increasing differentiation in its missions and functions and rendering the initial universalist and unanimist model open to challenge; 3) a revision of the legitimate scope of state intervention, declaring symbolically obsolete one of the founding hierarchies of cultural policy, which contrasted serious culture, to be protected from market forces, with entertainment culture, which was governed by the laws of industrial economics; 4) the increasing justification of cultural policy in terms of its contribution to economic growth and to the balance of the social diversity of nations, legitimizing both the regulatory power of state intervention and calls for expansion of the "creative industries" and demands for the evaluation of procedures and results. This movement from culture as a democratizable value to culture that is socially and economically justifiable seems also to have altered the original goals. But this analysis remains incomplete: the inertia of state intervention is far stronger than these paradigm shifts might lead us to suppose.

Pierre Nora

Up to the late 1970s, cultural heritage was covered by the laws of 1913, supplemented by the survey of historic buildings and monuments known as the *Inventaire Supplémentaire* in 1927, and whilst decentralised, it only included 90 listed buildings and monuments a year and some hundred new registrations to the *Inventaire*.

The 1980s saw this first era give way to a second, with the so-called "year of cultural heritage", instituted under the aegis of the Directorate of Cultural Heritage, and particularly the official changes to the Ministry's remit with the arrival of Jack Lang in 1981. The Ministry, whose primary aim was to make "the greatest number of humanity's finest works, particularly those from France, available to

butions du Ministère au moment de l'arrivée de Jack Lang en 1981 : le Ministère qui avait pour première mission « de rendre accessibles les œuvres capitales de l'humanité, et d'abord de la France, au plus grand nombre possible de Français » et « d'assurer la plus vaste audience à notre patrimoine culturel » devient un Ministère chargé principalement de « préserver le patrimoine national, régional ou des divers groupes sociaux pour le profit commun de la collectivité toute entière. »

Le patrimoine change de sens. Du plus élevé et rare de la création, il est passé au quotidien le plus traditionnel.

Les deux décennies suivantes ont été l'occasion d'une nouvelle inflexion : l'accent mis sur la mémoire est remplacé par un accent mis sur l'identité. Le patrimoine comme mémoire est lié au temps, au changement de plus en plus rapide de toute chose, au sentiment de la perte, et donc à la pulsion conservatrice. Le patrimoine comme identité est lié, lui, à un mouvement social, à l'émancipation contemporaine de toutes les formes de minorités et il aboutit à faire du patrimoine la version immanente et laïcisée de l'objet sacré. Le patrimoine comme mémoire met l'accumulation au cœur du phénomène ; comme identité, il y met une toute autre constellation : l'émotionnel, le passionnel, et surtout le conflictuel. Le problème de la reconnaissance, de la propriété de ce patrimoine devient central.

Trente ans plus tard, avec l'arrivée du numérique, de l'internet, de la mise générale en réseaux, etc. nous sommes à l'aube d'un troisième âge du patrimoine, et entrons dans un patrimoine totalement fabriqué. La frontière entre patrimoine public et patrimoine privé est supprimée… Pour le dire d'un mot, on est passé d'un patrimoine de stock à un patrimoine de flux. Jusqu'à maintenant, le patrimoine renvoyait au *réel*, constitué à partir d'un dépôt, de la collecte, du tri, de la conservation et de la destruction de supports matériels stables. L'horizon est un patrimoine purement *virtuel*, mais fait d'un enregistrement quasi automatique de soi que l'humanité porterait comme sa carapace patrimonielle.

Krzysztof POMIAN

Après avoir constaté que la question concernant l'identité collective porte sur l'avenir, on montre qu'il en va de même avec le patrimoine : il est destiné en priorité aux générations futures. Il extériorise et rend visible les liens qui nous unissent d'une part à celles qui nous ont précédées et d'autre part à celles qui suivront - liens qui ne se réduisent ni à une succession dans le temps ni à une simple filiation génétique mais sont fondés sur une communauté de valeurs et de significations. On traite ensuite des éléments du patrimoine culturel et de la place de celui-ci dans le patrimoine commun de la nation. Suit une esquisse de l'histoire du patrimoine culturel en France depuis la Révolution, qui insiste sur le lien de l'accès au patrimoine avec les avancées de la démocratie. On s'arrête ensuite sur l'intérêt pour le patrimoine manifeste depuis quelques décennies pour en interroger la signification. Et on montre que c'est seulement après la perte graduelle par les idéologies de leur emprise sur les masses et sur les intellectuels suite à la sécularisation des mentalités pour l'ultramontanisme et le catholicisme rigoriste, suite à la Seconde Guerre mondiale pour les nationalismes monarchistes et racistes, et suite à la crise de l'avenir manifeste depuis la fin des années soixante-dix du XX^{e} siècle, pour les espoirs révolutionnaires, et après les avancées de l'intégration européenne et de la mondialisation que l'identité nationale est devenue problématique et que le patrimoine culturel a acquis, pour la réflexion sur celle-ci, une centralité qu'il n'avait jamais eue auparavant, quand il n'intéressait que les spécialistes.

Jacques REVEL

Les quarante dernières années ont vu un profond réaménagement des rapports entre culture et territoire. Il rompt avec des traditions solidement ancrées dans l'expérience historique singulière qui est celle de la France : une très ancienne centralité parisienne redoublée par une emprise durable de l'État sur les institutions, les productions et la diffusion culturelles. Ces conceptions ont fortement remises en cause pour toute une série de raisons, de nature différente sans doute, mais dont les effets ont été cumulatifs. De nouveaux acteurs sont apparus sur la scène culturelle, en particulier les collectivités territoriales au premier rang desquelles les villes. De nouveaux mécanismes contractuels ont

the greatest possible number of French people", and to "ensure the widest audience for our cultural heritage" became a Ministry whose mission was principally "preserving the cultural heritage of the nation, the regions and of various social groups for the overall benefit of the wider society".

The meaning of cultural heritage was changing. From the most rare and refined examples of creativity, it became synonymous with the most traditional.

The two decades which followed showed a changing focus: a preoccupation with identity replaced the preoccupation with memory. Cultural heritage as memory is linked to time, to the increasing pace at which all things change, to a feeling of loss, and thus to the desire to collect and to preserve. Cultural heritage as identity is also linked to a social movement, to the contemporary emancipation of all minority forms and ends up creating a cultural heritage which is an immanent and secularised version of a sacred object. Cultural heritage as memory puts accumulation at the heart of the phenomenon; as identity, emphasis is placed on a host of entirely different issues: emotion, passion, and above all, conflict. The problem of recognition, of ownership of this cultural heritage becomes central.

Thirty years on, with the arrival of digital technology, the internet, the circulation of data in networks, etc, we find ourselves at the dawn of a third era of cultural heritage, with an entirely manufactured heritage. The lines between public and private cultural heritages are becoming blurred… In short, we have gone from a stock-based heritage system to a flow-based heritage system. Until now, cultural heritage was linked to the real, comprising the delivery, the collection, sorting, conservation and destruction of stable physical media. On the horizon is a purely virtual cultural heritage, but one built upon the quasi-automatic recording of the self, whereby cultural heritage is worn like a digital carapace.

Krzysztof POMIAN

Having noted that the issue of collective identity has importance for the future, we show that the same is true for heritage, which is primarily intended for future generations. Heritage externalizes and renders visible the ties that bind us to both those who have gone before us and those who will come after. These ties are not reducible to a succession in time, nor to a simple genetic inheritance, but are grounded in shared values and meanings. We then discuss elements of the cultural heritage and its place in the shared heritage of the nation. There follows an outline of the history of cultural heritage in France since the Revolution, emphasizing the link between access to heritage and democratic advances. We then consider the manifest interest in heritage over recent decades and consider what it signifies. We shall show that it was only as ideologies gradually lost their grip over the masses and intellectuals alike – following the secularization of attitudes in the case of ultramontanism and strict Catholicism, the Second World War in that of monarchist and racist nationalisms and the future crisis evident since the late 1970s in the case of revolutionary hopes – and since the progress of European integration and globalization, that national identity has become problematic. With respect to that identity, cultural heritage has acquired a centrality that it never had before, when it was of interest only to specialists.

Jacques REVEL

The last forty years have seen a fundamental reorganization of the relationships between culture and territory. This has broken with traditions solidly rooted in the singular historical experience of France, linked to the historic centrality of Paris, reinforced by the long-standing grip of the state over cultural institutions and the production and distribution of culture. These conceptions have come under strong challenge for all kinds of different reasons whose effects are cumulative. New actors have appeared in the cultural arena, with city authorities foremost among them. New contractual mechanisms have

toriales, au premier rang des quelles les villes. La forme contractuelle a rendu possible des formes neuves de concertation et de coopération, mais aussi de spécialisation, entre les différentes instances et à tous les niveaux. On peut donc parler d'une déconcentration puis, dans un second temps, d'une véritable décentralisation de l'action culturelle publique.

Ce constat suffit-il à garantir une meilleure cohérence des politiques culturelles ? Dans un moment où le répertoire des productions et des pratiques s'est considérablement démultiplié à la faveur de cette mutation, une gouvernance culturelle « territorialisée » assure-t-elle des conditions plus satisfaisantes à la création et à la consommation ? Et en quel sens peut-on dire qu'elle est toujours territoriale ?

enabled new forms of consultation, cooperation and specialization between the different bodies at every level. So we can speak of the de-concentration and, in the second phase, real decentralization of state intervention in the cultural field.

Is this observation enough to guarantee more consistency between cultural policies? At a time when these changes have led to considerable proliferation in the repertoire of productions and practices, can "territorialized" local governance provide more satisfactory conditions for the creation and consumption of culture? And in what sense can it said still to be territorial?

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